Development on ball valve of sucker ROD pump to increase pump capacity effeciency

After some long period of production, the well may not be able to lift the hydrocarbons by its natural energy. Therefore artificial lift system is applied. Sucker rod pump as one of the artificial system commonly used, is a pumping system using a surface power source to drive a downhole pump assembly. Its components are: beam, crank assembly, sucker-rod string, plunger, and valve assembly to convert the reciprocating motion to vertical fluid movement. This sucker rod is very common and widely used on onshore platforms where the reservoir pressure is not adequate to lift the Hydrocarbon by its natural force. Even though sucker rod pump is commonly used, there is still weakness which can be improved through this proposed project. In this study, it is proposed that the stationary ball valve at the bottom of the pump must be developed in a manner that the ball valve will be immediately closed as the downstroke begins and similarly, the travelling valve is opened. It is proposed that energy to close and to open the valve is added by the energy generated by the motor. In this way, the motor will help to pull and push the ball up and down therefore the closing and the opening period will be reduced and also the motor will also help to avoid leakage at the valve. The development will give great benefit in increasing the pumping capacity and also as well as to maximize the profit of production compan

War and Peace between Title VII\u27s Disparate Impact Provision and the Equal Protection Clause: Battling for a Compelling Interest

“[T]he war between disparate impact and equal protection will be waged sooner or later, and it behooves us to begin thinking about how – and on what terms – to make peace between them.” This Article addresses Justice Scalia’s premonition in Ricci v. DeStefano by providing an analysis of how that war may be waged and whether peace can be made between Title VII’s disparate impact provision and the Equal Protection Clause. Ricci involved a challenge to the City of New Haven’s decision to void the test results of an examination required for promotion within the City’s fire department. The test adversely affected African-American firefighters, who passed the examination at a lower rate than Caucasian firefighters. Because of the disproportionate number of African-American firefighters who failed the test, the City feared that it would be subject to discrimination lawsuits under the disparate impact provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Disparate impact focuses on the results of employment decisions and imposes liability when employment practices cause a disparate impact on the basis of race or any other protected class. “The City was faced with a prima facie case of disparate-impact liability” because the pass rates for the Hispanic and African-American test takers fell below the 80% rule. Consequently, the City refused to certify the tests and thereby voided the results. This Article seeks to answer the constitutional question left unresolved in Ricci – whether Title VII’s disparate impact provision violates the Equal Protection Clause by requiring employers to consider race in their employment practices. This Article seeks to test Title VII’s disparate impact provision under strict scrutiny to determine if it can survive an Equal Protection challenge. This Article’s focus is to provide an extensive search for a compelling purpose that may justify the racial classifications that are required under Title VII’s disparate impact provision. Operating on the assumption that the disparate impact provision implicates racial classifications, this Article examines six rationales that may be asserted as compelling interests to defend the provision against an Equal Protection challenge: (1) remedying past discrimination; (2) smoking out discrimination (intentional or unconscious); (3) obtaining the benefits of diversity; (4) providing role models; (5) satisfying an operational need; and (6) providing equal employment opportunity by removing barriers. Finally, this Article anticipates the attacks that may be lodged against those defenses

Under Containment: Preempting State Ebola Quarantine Regulations

The outbreak of Ebola in Africa and its recent emergence in America has brought to light that the ambit of state sovereignty in the face of federal policy is unsettled in the public health field. Quarantine laws have historically been recognized as an exercise of state police powers and, absent discriminatory uses, courts have afforded much deference to states when the federal government is dormant. This article explores federalism implications when federal and state sovereigns contest the purview of regulating Ebola, other epidemics, and quarantine. This article examines how the federal government can assert supremacy to regulate treatment of epidemics and quarantine through preemption and evaluates the value of federal and state sovereignty over such matters. It argues that the anti-preemption clause in the Public Health Service Act, which governs federal authority over quarantine and communicable diseases, and the Supreme Court’s general presumption against from preemption will not save state quarantine regulations from preemption. It concludes that preemption doctrines, particularly obstacle and field preemption, can override state quarantine regulations because state law threatens national security by frustrating federal efforts to contain Ebola in West Africa and impeding the executive’s exercise of foreign affairs power

When the Evil Day Comes, Will Title VII\u27s Disparate Impact Provision be Narrowly Tailored to Survive an Equal Protection Clause Challenge

The road to hell is paved with good intentions. Employers must be careful about the intentional and unintentional effect of their employment practices, even when acting with good motive. Title VII’s disparate impact provision holds employers liable for employment practices that cause an adverse impact on racial groups, even when the employment practice applies equally to all groups and was not implemented to disadvantage a particular group. A prima facie case of disparate impact can arise solely based on numbers - a comparison between the rate at which one racial group passes a test or is selected for hiring or promotion as compared to rate of other racial groups. The disparate impact provision raises an Equal Protection Clause issue because it encourages employers to make race-conscious employment decisions to avoid disparate impact liability. This Article takes on the difficult question that the Supreme Court avoided in Ricci v. DeStefano: Does the provision violate the Equal Protection Clause? Evaluating the disparate impact provision under the rigors of strict scrutiny, this Article examines if the provision is narrowly tailored to achieve the possible compelling interests of remedying past discrimination, smoking out discrimination, increasing diversity, providing role models, meeting an operational need, or removing barriers to equal employment opportunities. After considering whether the disparate impact provision operates as a rigid quota, affords flexibility or individualized decisions, is narrow in scope and duration, applies to white males, and has available race-neutral alternatives, this Article concludes that the provision fails narrow tailoring and is likely unconstitutional

Following Fisher: Narrowly Tailoring Affirmative Action

Affirmative action has been at the forefront of educational policies and to this day continues to enliven debates. For decades, schools have litigated over whether affirmative action can be used to create a diverse student body. Now, the litigation has shifted to whether affirmative action policies are narrowly tailored. The Supreme Court’s most recent affirmative action case, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, requires that schools prove that there are no workable race neutral alternatives in order to demonstrate that their affirmative action programs are narrowly tailored. This article examines the available race neutral alternatives: percentage plans; socioeconomic based admissions policies; elimination of legacy and development admission preferences; recruitment, retention, and financial aid programs; and community outreach. After evaluating their effectiveness, this article concludes that these programs are workable race neutral alternatives that higher education institutions must consider before they resort to using race as a factor in admissions

Qualitative Diversity: Affirmative Action’s New Reframe

How is diversity measured? When is diversity sufficient? The Supreme Court has pressed these hard questions in affirmative action cases. With respect to college admissions, although a university campus might have a diverse student body, universities are beginning to justify the continuation of race-based affirmative action programs on the need for qualitative diversity, i.e., intraracial diversity—diversity within diversity. In the Court’s most recent affirmative action case, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, the university advanced two novel diversity arguments, never before employed in affirmative action cases, to justify its race-based admissions policy: there is a lack of diversity within small courses of 5–24 students, and there is a lack of diversity among the admitted minority students. The minorities admitted through the state’s Top Ten Percent program, a neutral class rank program, typically consisted of those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds and who were the first in their family to attend college. The university argued that its race-based holistic admissions program was necessary to admit students who could bring viewpoints and experiences different from the students admitted through the Top Ten Percent Program. Others construed this argument as the university, in essence, wanting more privileged minorities with higher credentials. This article explores the difficulties raised by the qualitative diversity argument and anticipates the challenges it might wreak upon the Civil Rights movement. This article cautions that a reliance on qualitative diversity to justify affirmative action undermines one of the bases upon which the Civil Rights movement was founded—to overcome racial stereotypes. An affirmative action program based on qualitative diversity also risks jeopardizing the legitimacy of affirmative action altogether when questions of deservedness within a race are raised and risks jeopardizing the united front needed to advance civil rights if people within a race are pitted against each other

Asymmetries, Norm Matching, and the Pursuit of Equity between the Police and the Public

Concerns about police abuse and overcriminalization are on the forefront of public conscientiousness. In spite of the Black Lives Matter movement and calls for police reform, law enforcement officials enjoy a variety of criminal procedure loopholes and double standards, which the United States Supreme Court has ratified through its creation of the open fields, mistake of law, and third party doctrines, as well as its acceptance of deceptive police practices. This Article analyzes the asymmetries between permissible civilian conduct and permissible police conduct to make a broader, systemic critique of the double standards and loopholes that pervade constitutional criminal procedure. It further seeks to provide a starting place for reconciling an individual\u27s rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments with permissive police practices. As it now stands, police may openly trespass on fenced, private fields with posted warning signs, lie or fabricate evidence during an investigation to extract a confession, excuse a wrongful stop or arrest by claiming a mistake of law, and obtain warrantless access to information shared with entrusted businesses, though such information is ordinarily protected against public disclosure. By allowing these practices, the Court, at the expense of privacy and other rights, endorses acts for which members of the public would be criminally sanctioned. The perpetuation of these double standards, loopholes, and asymmetries can trigger serious unintended consequences. Cognitive dissonance can result when individuals discover that their expectations of the law conflict with its actual operation and when their expectations of privacy and other rights are consequently upended. To remedy the cognitive dissonance, a person might retreat into isolation. This retreat can negatively impact social capital, or the benefit that accrues from networking and social interactions. Moreover, as individuals discover the double standards and loopholes afforded to police, they may perceive the criminal justice system as unfair and lose trust in the laws, police, and, ultimately, the government\u27s legitimacy-which could itself culminate in disobedience of laws. Therefore, this Article proposes an elegant, easily administrable rule: the Court should cease to privilege these asymmetries over individual rights and recalibrate doctrinal police policies to conform to societal norms and public expectations. The courts, governmental bodies, and law enforcement entities should eliminate these asymmetries to secure the public\u27s trust and confidence

Judicial Nullification of Juries: Use of Acquitted Conduct at Sentencing

At trial, defendants are afforded a panoply of rights right to counsel, to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, to confront witnesses, and to exclude inadmissible evidence. However, these rights, except for the right to counsel, disappear at sentencing. In deciding a defendant’s sentence, a court may consider conduct that has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and even conduct of which the jury has acquitted the defendant. Consideration of acquitted conduct has resulted in dramatic increases in the length of defendants’ sentences sometimes resulting in life imprisonment based merely on a judge’s finding that a defendant more likely than not committed the offense. Courts have relied on United States v. Watts and United States v. Booker to support their continued use of acquitted conduct at sentencing. This Article argues that Watts is not viable and that the merits majority opinion in Booker, as opposed to the remedial majority opinion, is most consistent with the Court’s precedent established by Apprendi v. New Jersey and its progeny. This Article concludes that use of acquitted conduct violates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. In addition to offering a constitutional basis, this Article examines the following policy grounds for prohibiting the use of acquitted conduct: the role served by juries and benefits they provide, the dramatic impact of sentencing enhancements based on acquitted conduct, the potential for misuse by prosecutors, and the end of actual or legal innocence. Finally, this Article suggests that United States v. Gall and United States v. Kimbrough have restored judicial discretion in sentencing, providing judges with the independence to reject the use of acquitted conduct on the grounds that it contravenes the purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to promote respect for the law, afford deterrence, and avoid unwarranted disparity