Quantifier elimination in C*-algebras

The only C*-algebras that admit elimination of quantifiers in continuous logic are $\mathbb{C}, \mathbb{C}^2$, $C($Cantor space$)$ and $M_2(\mathbb{C})$. We also prove that the theory of C*-algebras does not have model companion and show that the theory of $M_n(\mathcal {O_{n+1}})$ is not $\forall\exists$-axiomatizable for any $n\geq 2$.Comment: More improvements and bug fixes. To appear in IMR

On the Reverse Engineering of the Citadel Botnet

Citadel is an advanced information-stealing malware which targets financial information. This malware poses a real threat against the confidentiality and integrity of personal and business data. A joint operation was recently conducted by the FBI and the Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit in order to take down Citadel command-and-control servers. The operation caused some disruption in the botnet but has not stopped it completely. Due to the complex structure and advanced anti-reverse engineering techniques, the Citadel malware analysis process is both challenging and time-consuming. This allows cyber criminals to carry on with their attacks while the analysis is still in progress. In this paper, we present the results of the Citadel reverse engineering and provide additional insight into the functionality, inner workings, and open source components of the malware. In order to accelerate the reverse engineering process, we propose a clone-based analysis methodology. Citadel is an offspring of a previously analyzed malware called Zeus; thus, using the former as a reference, we can measure and quantify the similarities and differences of the new variant. Two types of code analysis techniques are provided in the methodology, namely assembly to source code matching and binary clone detection. The methodology can help reduce the number of functions requiring manual analysis. The analysis results prove that the approach is promising in Citadel malware analysis. Furthermore, the same approach is applicable to similar malware analysis scenarios.Comment: 10 pages, 17 figures. This is an updated / edited version of a paper appeared in FPS 201

Wireless Telecommunications, Infrastructure Security, and the NIMBY Problem

This article explores the clash between federal policies encouraging wireless communications services and the application of local land use regulations to the siting of telecommunications towers. It concludes that Congress’s effort to strike a balance in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 between local concerns on one hand and national commerce and homeland security on the other has proved vague in content and susceptible to procedural thickets that might make local parochialism impervious to challenge. The article suggests statutory changes, including time limitations and the creation of presumptions and safe harbor rules, that might better balance infrastructure development needs with local autonomy