The apparatus composition and architecture of Erismodus quadridactylus and the implications for element homology in prioniodinin conodonts

The apparatus composition and architecture of prioniodinin conodonts is poorly understood, largely because few prioniodinin taxa are represented by articulated oral feeding apparatuses (natural assemblages) in the fossil record, but also due to the highly variable gradational morphology of their constituent elements that makes apparatus reconstruction problematic. We describe here a natural assemblage of Erismodus quadridactylus (Stauffer), a prioniodinin, from the Sandbian (Late Ordovician) of North Dakota, USA. The assemblage demonstrates that the apparatus architecture of Erismodus is similar to those of late Palaeozoic prioniodinins namely, Kladognathus Rexroad and Hibbardella Bassler, but also has similarities with ozarkodinin apparatuses. In addition, there is evidence to suggest that E. quadridactylus shares topological similarities to balognathid architecture, with respect to the position of its inferred P elements. The apparatus composition and architecture presented here indicate that, at least with respect to the M–S array, an ‘ozarkodinin‐type’ bauplan is probably more widely representative across prioniodontids. The assemblage demonstrates that element morphotypes traditionally considered to lie within the S array are M elements, whereas others traditionally interpreted as P elements are found in the S array. These observations are used as a basis for refining concepts of element homology among prioniodinin conodonts and their closest relatives

Governing the Global Commons with Local Institutions

Most problems faced by modern human society have two characteristics in common - they are tragedy-of-the-commons type of problems, and they are global problems. Tragedy-of-the-commons type of problems are those where a commonly shared resource is overexploited by free riders at the expense of everyone sharing the resource. The exploitation of global resources such as clean air and water, political stability and peace, etc. underlies many of the most pressing human problems. Punishment of free riding behavior is one of the most frequently used strategies to combat the problem, but the spatial reach of sanctioning institutions is often more limited than the spatial effects of overexploitation. Here, we analyze a general game theoretical model to assess under what circumstances sanctioning institutions with limited reach can maintain the larger commons. We find that the effect of the spatial reach has a strong effect on whether and how the commons can be maintained, and that the transitions between those outcomes are characterized by phase transitions. The latter indicates that a small change in the reach of sanctioning systems can profoundly change the way the global commons can be managed