The Term Structure of Investment and the Bank's Insurance Function.

The article re-examines the proposition, first formulated by Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybcvig ( 1983), that in a production economy with stochastic liquidity shocks to the household sector, banks serve to provide optimal intertemporal insurance to consumers. The paper argues that in order to understand the moral hazard problems inherent in this insurance problem, it is too narrow to consider solely the role of banks as providers of liquidity. The paper develops a model with several investment opportunities in which banks have the additional function of asset diversification

L'impact de l'UME sur les marchés financiers européens.

Quelques mois après la création de l’UME, cet article examine les premiers indices permettant de jauger les performances et de pressentir l’évolution future des marchés de capitaux en Europe. Dans presque tous les domaines, l’UME a d’ores et déjà bouleversé le paysage financier de l’Europe. Cette évolution était en partie prévisible à cause des effets directs de l’euro. Ses éventuelles répercussions moins immédiates étaient plus hypothétiques. Elles se sont produites parce que les intervenants des marchés ont vu dans sa création le signal d’un changement du marché financier européen et qu’ils ont coordonné leurs anticipations en conséquence. Classification JEL : G15von Thadden Ernst-Ludwig. L'impact de l'UME sur les marchés financiers européens . In: Revue d'économie financière, n°62, 2001. L'Europe bancaire et financière après l'euro / Banking and financial Europe after (...) pp. 93-108

Liquidity and Control : A Dynamic Theory of Corporate Ownership Structure.

The paper develops a theory of ownership structure based on the notion that corporate control and secondary market liquidity are not perfectly compatible with each other. We analyze the tradeoff between these two objectives for two different ownership structures: the privately held firm, which is characterized by restricted trading opportunities for owners and non-anonymous trading, and the publicly traded firm where trading opportunities are unrestricted and trading is anonymous. We develop pricing formulas for each structure, compare these with each other, and derive predictions for optimal ownership design, depending on the institutional structure of the capital market. (JEL: G 32, D 23).SCOPUS: ar.jinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishe