A Case for Lorentzian Relativity

The Lorentz transformation (the LT) is explained by changes occurring in the wave characteristics of matter as it changes inertial frame. This explanation is akin to that favoured by Lorentz, but informed by later insights, due primarily to de Broglie, regarding the underlying unity of matter and radiation. To show the nature of these changes, a massive particle is modelled as a standing wave in three dimensions. As the particle moves, the standing wave becomes a travelling wave having two factors. One is a carrier wave displaying the dilated frequency and contracted ellipsoidal form described by the LT, while the other (identified as the de Broglie wave) is a modulation defining the dephasing of the carrier wave (and thus the failure of simultaneity) in the direction of travel. The superluminality of the de Broglie wave is thus explained, as are several other mysterious features of the optical behaviour of matter, including the physical meaning of the Schrödinger Eqn. and the relevance to scattering processes of the de Broglie wave number. Consideration is given to what this Lorentzian approach to relativity might mean for the possible existence of a preferred frame and the origin of the observed Minkowski metric

Logic and rationality in OR interventions : an examination in the light of the ‘critical rationalist’ approach

Historically OR has conceived of itself as a professional practice giving rational, objective advice rooted in the ethos of science. However, the claim of science to rationality and objectivity has wilted under the onslaught of relativist and post-modern attack. One proposed philosophy of science seeks to avoid such problems by adopting a strictly objectivist approach. Critical rationalism (CR), the philosophy originated by Karl Popper, attempts to eliminate all inductive, justificatory and merely subjective claims by the ruthless application of deductive logic. The philosophical development of the CR approach to practice is currently a work-in-progress; however, it is an approach that should on the face of it find favour with OR, particularly for those who want to claim that OR is logically rational. The paper, drawing on the work of David Miller, explores how such an approach can be applied in the OR context. It concludes that although as CR suggests it may be possible to drive out inductive and justificatory claims in OR, subjective choice is an essential element of managerial decision-making and cannot be ignored or assumed away. The paper identifies some of the challenges that confront philosophers of practice if OR is to take the insights of CR to heart, suggests some possible responses, and identifies areas for future research

Structuralism as a form of scientific realism

Structural realism has recently re-entered mainstream discussions in the philosophy of science. The central notion of structure, however, is contested by both advocates and critics. This paper briefly reviews currently prominent structuralist accounts en route to proposing a metaphysics of structure that is capable of supporting the epistemic aspirations of realists, and that is immune to the charge most commonly levelled against structuralism. This account provides an alternative to the existing epistemic and ontic forms of the position, incorporating elements of both. Structures are here identified with relations between first order, causal properties: properties that confer specific dispositions for relations. This form of structuralism constitutes an explicit proposal for what seem implicit structuralist tendencies in sophisticated but more traditional characterizations of realism. An outline of the proposal's response to the anti-realist's pessimistic induction on the history of scientific theories is considered