The Influence of Markov Decision Process Structure on the Possible Strategic Use of Working Memory and Episodic Memory

Researchers use a variety of behavioral tasks to analyze the effect of biological manipulations on memory function. This research will benefit from a systematic mathematical method for analyzing memory demands in behavioral tasks. In the framework of reinforcement learning theory, these tasks can be mathematically described as partially-observable Markov decision processes. While a wealth of evidence collected over the past 15 years relates the basal ganglia to the reinforcement learning framework, only recently has much attention been paid to including psychological concepts such as working memory or episodic memory in these models. This paper presents an analysis that provides a quantitative description of memory states sufficient for correct choices at specific decision points. Using information from the mathematical structure of the task descriptions, we derive measures that indicate whether working memory (for one or more cues) or episodic memory can provide strategically useful information to an agent. In particular, the analysis determines which observed states must be maintained in or retrieved from memory to perform these specific tasks. We demonstrate the analysis on three simplified tasks as well as eight more complex memory tasks drawn from the animal and human literature (two alternation tasks, two sequence disambiguation tasks, two non-matching tasks, the 2-back task, and the 1-2-AX task). The results of these analyses agree with results from quantitative simulations of the task reported in previous publications and provide simple indications of the memory demands of the tasks which can require far less computation than a full simulation of the task. This may provide a basis for a quantitative behavioral stoichiometry of memory tasks

Grid Cells, Place Cells, and Geodesic Generalization for Spatial Reinforcement Learning

Reinforcement learning (RL) provides an influential characterization of the brain's mechanisms for learning to make advantageous choices. An important problem, though, is how complex tasks can be represented in a way that enables efficient learning. We consider this problem through the lens of spatial navigation, examining how two of the brain's location representations—hippocampal place cells and entorhinal grid cells—are adapted to serve as basis functions for approximating value over space for RL. Although much previous work has focused on these systems' roles in combining upstream sensory cues to track location, revisiting these representations with a focus on how they support this downstream decision function offers complementary insights into their characteristics. Rather than localization, the key problem in learning is generalization between past and present situations, which may not match perfectly. Accordingly, although neural populations collectively offer a precise representation of position, our simulations of navigational tasks verify the suggestion that RL gains efficiency from the more diffuse tuning of individual neurons, which allows learning about rewards to generalize over longer distances given fewer training experiences. However, work on generalization in RL suggests the underlying representation should respect the environment's layout. In particular, although it is often assumed that neurons track location in Euclidean coordinates (that a place cell's activity declines “as the crow flies” away from its peak), the relevant metric for value is geodesic: the distance along a path, around any obstacles. We formalize this intuition and present simulations showing how Euclidean, but not geodesic, representations can interfere with RL by generalizing inappropriately across barriers. Our proposal that place and grid responses should be modulated by geodesic distances suggests novel predictions about how obstacles should affect spatial firing fields, which provides a new viewpoint on data concerning both spatial codes

Learning and generalization under ambiguity: an fMRI study.

Adaptive behavior often exploits generalizations from past experience by applying them judiciously in new situations. This requires a means of quantifying the relative importance of prior experience and current information, so they can be balanced optimally. In this study, we ask whether the brain generalizes in an optimal way. Specifically, we used Bayesian learning theory and fMRI to test whether neuronal responses reflect context-sensitive changes in ambiguity or uncertainty about experience-dependent beliefs. We found that the hippocampus expresses clear ambiguity-dependent responses that are associated with an augmented rate of learning. These findings suggest candidate neuronal systems that may be involved in aberrations of generalization, such as over-confidence