Culture, nationality and demographics in ultimatum games

We use experimental data collected in Russia and in the United States using a simple ultimatum game to evaluate two alternative hypotheses that may account for previously observed behavior in multinational experiments. One hypothesis postulates that behavioral differences observed in bargaining experiments arise from country-specific cultural environments. We submit the alternative hypothesis that different behavior in such experiments stems from differences in the demographic characteristics of the subject pools within each country. Because of its simplicity, our experimental design allows us to discriminate between these two hypotheses. Our findings support the alternative hypothesis.Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT

Social norms and social choice

Experiments can provide rich information on behavior conditional on the institutional rules of the game being imposed by the experimenter. We consider what happens when the subjects are allowed to choose the institution through a simple social choice procedure. Our case study is a setting in which sanctions may or may not be allowed to encourage “righteous behavior.” Laboratory experiments show that some subjects in public goods environments employ costly sanctions against other subjects in order to enforce what appears to be a social norm of contribution. We show that this artificial society is not an attractive place to live, by any of the standard social choice criteria. If it came about because of evolutionary forces, as speculated, then The Blind Watchmaker was having one of his many bad days at the workbench. In fact, none of our laboratory societies with perfect strangers matching ever chose to live in such a world. Our findings suggest that the conditions under which a group or a society would choose a constitution that is based on voluntary costly sanctions are very special.Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT

Policy making and rent-dissipation: An experimental test.

Abstract We present a transfer-seeking model of political economy that links the theory of Becker (1983) with Tullock-type models of politically contestable rents. In our model the size of the transfer is determined endogenously, and over-dissipation of rents is predicted even under conditions of risk-neutrality and perfect rationality. We implement an empirical test of this model by collecting behavioral data in a laboratory experiment. We confirm the existence of behavior that leads to over-dissipation of rents in games with both symmetric and asymmetric political power. To the extent that the transfer-seeking costs are social costs, our findings imply that the total costs of running government might be greatly underestimated if the value of the rent is used as a proxy for the rent-seeking cost. We also confirm the hypotheses that lowering the political power of one player can lead to smaller rent-seeking expenditures and to larger transfer

Testing static game theory with dynamic experiments : a case study of public goods

Game theory provides predictions of behavior in many one-shot games. On the other hand, most experimenters usually play repeated games with subjects, to provide experience. To avoid subjects rationally employing strategies that are appropriate for the repeated game, experimenters typically employ a “random strangers” design in which subjects are randomly paired with others in the session. There is some chance that subjects will meet in multiple rounds, but it is claimed that this chance is so small that subjects will behave as if they are in a one-shot environment. We present evidence from public goods experiments that this claim is not always true.Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT

Discounting in developing countries : a pilot experiment in Timor-Leste

We conduct laboratory experiments in Timor-Leste designed to test if individual discount rates vary with the time horizon for which the rate is elicited. Our experiments test a design that has been successfully employed in field experiments in developed countries, and that avoids several confounds of previous procedures. We find that there is onsiderable heterogeneity in individual discount rates, and that this heterogeneity is associated with observable demographic characteristics. We also find evidence that is consistent with exponential discounting behavior, although our sample sizes do not allow us to definitively reject alternative specifications. We discuss modifications of our laboratory experiments that would facilitate field experiments in Timor-Leste.Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT

Estimating Subjective Probabilities

Subjective probabilities play a role in many economic decisions. There is a large theoretical literature on the elicitation of subjective probabilities, and an equally large empirical literature. However, there is a gulf between the two. The theoretical literature proposes a range of procedures that can be used to recover subjective probabilities, but stresses the need to make strong auxiliary assumptions or “calibrating adjustments” to elicited reports in order to recover the latent probability. With some notable exceptions, the empirical literature seems intent on either making those strong assumptions or ignoring the need for calibration. We illustrate how one can jointly estimate risk attitudes and subjective probabilities using structural maximum likelihood methods. This allows the observer to make inferences about the latent subjective probability, calibrating for virtually any well-specified model of choice under uncertainty. We demonstrate our procedures with experiments in which we elicit subjective probabilities. We calibrate the estimates of subjective beliefs assuming that choices are made consistently with expected utility theory or rank-dependent utility theory. Inferred subjective probabilities are significantly different when calibrated according to either theory

Theory and Experiments

Subjective beliefs play a role in many economic decisions. There is a large theoretical literature on the elicitation of beliefs, and an equally large empirical literature. However, there is a gulf between the two. The theoretical literature proposes a range of procedures that can be used to recover beliefs, but stresses the need to make strong auxiliary assumptions or “calibrating adjustments” to elicited reports in order to recover the latent belief. With some notable exceptions, the empirical literature seems intent on either making those strong assumptions or ignoring the need for calibration. We make three contributions to bridge this gulf. First, we offer a general theoretical framework in which the belief elicitation task can be viewed as an exchange of state-dependent commodities between two traders. Second, we provide a specific elicitation procedure which has clear counterparts in field betting environments, and that is directly motivated by our theoretical framework. Finally, we illustrate how one can jointly estimate risk attitudes and subjective beliefs using structural maximum likelihood methods. This allows the observer to make inferences about the latent subjective belief, calibrating for virtually any well-specified model of choice under uncertainty. We demonstrate our procedures with an experiment in which we elicit subjective probabilities over three future events and one fact

Estimating Aversion to Uncertainty

It is intuitive that decision-makers might have attitudes towards uncertainty just as they might have attitudes towards risk. However, it is only recently that this intuitive notion has been formalized and axiomatically characterized. We estimate the extent of uncertainty aversion in a manner that is parsimonious and consistent with theory. We demonstrate that one can jointly estimate attitudes towards uncertainty, attitudes towards risk, and subjective probabilities in a rigorous manner. Our structural econometric model constructively demonstrates the theoretical claims that it is possible to define uncertainty aversion in an empirically tractable manner. Our results show that attitudes towards risk and uncertainty can be different, qualitatively and quantitatively, and that allowing for these differences can have significant effects on inferences about subjective probabilities

Dual Criteria Decisions

The most popular models of decision making use a single criteria to evaluate projects or lotteries. However, decision makers may actually consider multiple criteria when evaluating projects. We consider a dual criteria model from psychology. This model integrates the familiar tradeoffs between risk and utility that economists traditionally assume, allowance for rank-dependent decision weights, and consideration of income thresholds. We examine the issues involved in full maximum likelihood estimation of the model using observed choice data. We propose a general method for integrating the multiple criteria, using the logic of mixture models, which we believe is attractive from a decision-theoretic and statistical perspective. The model is applied to observed choices from a major natural experiment involving intrinsically dynamic choices over highly skewed outcomes. The evidence points to the clear role that income thresholds play in such decision making, but does not rule out a role for tradeoffs between risk and utility or probability weighting

Non-Linear Mixed Logit and the Characterization of Individual Heterogeneity

Experimental data exhibit considerable individual heterogeneity. We review the econometric methods employed to characterize that heterogeneity. We pay particular attention to the trade-off between collecting and allowing for observable characteristics, such as the familiar demographics, and the use of statistical methods to allow for unobserved individual heterogeneity. We demonstrate that these tools are complementary