Role of social environment and social clustering in spread of opinions in co-evolving networks

Taking a pragmatic approach to the processes involved in the phenomena of collective opinion formation, we investigate two specific modifications to the co-evolving network voter model of opinion formation, studied by Holme and Newman [1]. First, we replace the rewiring probability parameter by a distribution of probability of accepting or rejecting opinions between individuals, accounting for the asymmetric influences in relationships among individuals in a social group. Second, we modify the rewiring step by a path-length-based preference for rewiring that reinforces local clustering. We have investigated the influences of these modifications on the outcomes of the simulations of this model. We found that varying the shape of the distribution of probability of accepting or rejecting opinions can lead to the emergence of two qualitatively distinct final states, one having several isolated connected components each in internal consensus leading to the existence of diverse set of opinions and the other having one single dominant connected component with each node within it having the same opinion. Furthermore, and more importantly, we found that the initial clustering in network can also induce similar transitions. Our investigation also brings forward that these transitions are governed by a weak and complex dependence on system size. We found that the networks in the final states of the model have rich structural properties including the small world property for some parameter regimes. [1] P. Holme and M. Newman, Phys. Rev. E 74, 056108 (2006)

Dynamics of Three Agent Games

We study the dynamics and resulting score distribution of three-agent games where after each competition a single agent wins and scores a point. A single competition is described by a triplet of numbers $p$, $t$ and $q$ denoting the probabilities that the team with the highest, middle or lowest accumulated score wins. We study the full family of solutions in the regime, where the number of agents and competitions is large, which can be regarded as a hydrodynamic limit. Depending on the parameter values $(p,q,t)$, we find six qualitatively different asymptotic score distributions and we also provide a qualitative understanding of these results. We checked our analytical results against numerical simulations of the microscopic model and find these to be in excellent agreement. The three agent game can be regarded as a social model where a player can be favored or disfavored for advancement, based on his/her accumulated score. It is also possible to decide the outcome of a three agent game through a mini tournament of two-a gent competitions among the participating players and it turns out that the resulting possible score distributions are a subset of those obtained for the general three agent-games. We discuss how one can add a steady and democratic decline rate to the model and present a simple geometric construction that allows one to write down the corresponding score evolution equations for $n$-agent games

Volatility clustering and scaling for financial time series due to attractor bubbling

A microscopic model of financial markets is considered, consisting of many interacting agents (spins) with global coupling and discrete-time thermal bath dynamics, similar to random Ising systems. The interactions between agents change randomly in time. In the thermodynamic limit the obtained time series of price returns show chaotic bursts resulting from the emergence of attractor bubbling or on-off intermittency, resembling the empirical financial time series with volatility clustering. For a proper choice of the model parameters the probability distributions of returns exhibit power-law tails with scaling exponents close to the empirical ones.Comment: For related publications see http://www.helbing.or

Opinion dynamics: rise and fall of political parties

We analyze the evolution of political organizations using a model in which agents change their opinions via two competing mechanisms. Two agents may interact and reach consensus, and additionally, individual agents may spontaneously change their opinions by a random, diffusive process. We find three distinct possibilities. For strong diffusion, the distribution of opinions is uniform and no political organizations (parties) are formed. For weak diffusion, parties do form and furthermore, the political landscape continually evolves as small parties merge into larger ones. Without diffusion, a pattern develops: parties have the same size and they possess equal niches. These phenomena are analyzed using pattern formation and scaling techniques.Comment: 5 pages, 5 figure