Pseudomonas Cytochrome c551 at 2.0 angstrom Resolution: Enlargement of the Cytochrome c Family

The structure of respiratory cytochrome c551 of Pseudomonas aeruginosa, with 82 amino acids, has been solved by x-ray analysis and refined to a crystallographic R factor of 16.2%. It has the same basic folding pattern and hydrophobic heme environment as cytochromes c, c2, and c550, except for a large deletion at the bottom of the heme crevice. This same "cytochrome fold" appears to be present in photosynthetic cytochromes c of green and purple sulfur bacteria, and algal cytochromes f, suggesting a common evolutionary origin for electron transport chains in photosynthesis and respiration

Trade and Growth with Heterogeneous Firms

This paper explores the impact of trade on growth when firms are heterogeneous. We find that greater openness produces anti-and pro-growth effects. The Melitz-model selection effects raises the expected cost of introducing a new variety and this tends to slow the rate of new-variety introduction and hence growth. The pro-growth effect stems from the impact that freer trade has on the marginal cost of innovating. The balance of the two effects is ambiguous with the sign depending upon the exact nature of the innovation technology and its connection to international trade in goods and ideas. We consider five special cases (these include the Grossman-Helpman, the Coe- Helpman and Rivera-Batiz-Romer models) two of which suggest that trade harms growth; the others predicting the opposite.trade and endogenous growth, heterogeneous firms, dynamic versus staticefficiency

Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers

Governments frequently intervene to support domestic industries, but a surprising amount of this support goes to ailing sectors. We explain this with a lobbying model that allows for entry and sunk costs. Specifically, policy is influenced by pressure groups that incur lobbying expenses to create rents. In expanding industry, entry tends to erode such rents, but in declining industries, sunk costs rule out entry as long as the rents are not too high. This asymmetric appropriablity of rents means losers lobby harder. Thus it is not that government policy picks losers, it is that losers pick government policy.

Offshoring: General Equilibrium Effects on Wages, Production and Trade

A simple model of offshoring is used to integrate the complex gallery of results that exist in the theoretical offshoring/fragmentation literature. The paper depicts offshoring as 'shadow migration' and shows that this allows straightforward derivation of the general equilibrium effects on prices, wages, production and trade (necessary and sufficient conditions are provided). We show that offshoring requires modification of the four HO theorems, so econometricians who ignore offshoring might reject the HO theorem when a properly specified version held in the data. We also show that offshoring is an independent source of comparative advantage and can lead to intra-industry trade in a Walrasian setting.Offshoring, Shadow migration, Inter-industry trade, Intra-industry trade, Trade theorems

Trade and Growth with Heterogenous Firms

This paper explores the impact of trade on growth when firms are heterogeneous. We find that greater openness produces anti-and pro-growth effects. The Melitz-model selection effects raises the expected cost of introducing a new variety and this tends to slow the rate of new-variety introduction and hence growth. The pro-growth effect stems from the impact that freer trade has on the marginal cost of innovating. The balance of the two effects is ambiguous with the sign depending upon the exact nature of the innovation technology and its connection to international trade in goods and ideas. We consider five special cases (these include the Grossman-Helpman, the Coe-Helpman and Rivera-Batiz-Romer models) two of which suggest that trade harms growth; the others predicting the opposite.