Routing Games over Time with FIFO policy

We study atomic routing games where every agent travels both along its decided edges and through time. The agents arriving on an edge are first lined up in a \emph{first-in-first-out} queue and may wait: an edge is associated with a capacity, which defines how many agents-per-time-step can pop from the queue's head and enter the edge, to transit for a fixed delay. We show that the best-response optimization problem is not approximable, and that deciding the existence of a Nash equilibrium is complete for the second level of the polynomial hierarchy. Then, we drop the rationality assumption, introduce a behavioral concept based on GPS navigation, and study its worst-case efficiency ratio to coordination.Comment: Submission to WINE-2017 Deadline was August 2nd AoE, 201

Bottleneck Routing Games with Low Price of Anarchy

We study {\em bottleneck routing games} where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion on any edge in the network. In the literature, bottleneck games assume player utility costs determined by the worst congested edge in their paths. However, the Nash equilibria of such games are inefficient since the price of anarchy can be very high and proportional to the size of the network. In order to obtain smaller price of anarchy we introduce {\em exponential bottleneck games} where the utility costs of the players are exponential functions of their congestions. We find that exponential bottleneck games are very efficient and give a poly-log bound on the price of anarchy: $O(\log L \cdot \log |E|)$, where $L$ is the largest path length in the players' strategy sets and $E$ is the set of edges in the graph. By adjusting the exponential utility costs with a logarithm we obtain games whose player costs are almost identical to those in regular bottleneck games, and at the same time have the good price of anarchy of exponential games.Comment: 12 page

LP-based Covering Games with Low Price of Anarchy

We present a new class of vertex cover and set cover games. The price of anarchy bounds match the best known constant factor approximation guarantees for the centralized optimization problems for linear and also for submodular costs -- in contrast to all previously studied covering games, where the price of anarchy cannot be bounded by a constant (e.g. [6, 7, 11, 5, 2]). In particular, we describe a vertex cover game with a price of anarchy of 2. The rules of the games capture the structure of the linear programming relaxations of the underlying optimization problems, and our bounds are established by analyzing these relaxations. Furthermore, for linear costs we exhibit linear time best response dynamics that converge to these almost optimal Nash equilibria. These dynamics mimic the classical greedy approximation algorithm of Bar-Yehuda and Even [3]

Resource Competition on Integral Polymatroids

We study competitive resource allocation problems in which players distribute their demands integrally on a set of resources subject to player-specific submodular capacity constraints. Each player has to pay for each unit of demand a cost that is a nondecreasing and convex function of the total allocation of that resource. This general model of resource allocation generalizes both singleton congestion games with integer-splittable demands and matroid congestion games with player-specific costs. As our main result, we show that in such general resource allocation problems a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist by giving a pseudo-polynomial algorithm computing a pure Nash equilibrium.Comment: 17 page

Congestion Games with Complementarities

We study a model of selfish resource allocation that seeks to incorporate dependencies among resources as they exist in modern networked environments. Our model is inspired by utility functions with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) which is a well-studied model in economics. We consider congestion games with different aggregation functions. In particular, we study $L_p$ norms and analyze the existence and complexity of (approximate) pure Nash equilibria. Additionally, we give an almost tight characterization based on monotonicity properties to describe the set of aggregation functions that guarantee the existence of pure Nash equilibria.Comment: The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_1

LNCS

In resource allocation games, selfish players share resources that are needed in order to fulfill their objectives. The cost of using a resource depends on the load on it. In the traditional setting, the players make their choices concurrently and in one-shot. That is, a strategy for a player is a subset of the resources. We introduce and study dynamic resource allocation games. In this setting, the game proceeds in phases. In each phase each player chooses one resource. A scheduler dictates the order in which the players proceed in a phase, possibly scheduling several players to proceed concurrently. The game ends when each player has collected a set of resources that fulfills his objective. The cost for each player then depends on this set as well as on the load on the resources in it – we consider both congestion and cost-sharing games. We argue that the dynamic setting is the suitable setting for many applications in practice. We study the stability of dynamic resource allocation games, where the appropriate notion of stability is that of subgame perfect equilibrium, study the inefficiency incurred due to selfish behavior, and also study problems that are particular to the dynamic setting, like constraints on the order in which resources can be chosen or the problem of finding a scheduler that achieves stability

Human Embryonic and Fetal Mesenchymal Stem Cells Differentiate toward Three Different Cardiac Lineages in Contrast to Their Adult Counterparts

Mesenchymal stem cells (MSCs) show unexplained differences in differentiation potential. In this study, differentiation of human (h) MSCs derived from embryonic, fetal and adult sources toward cardiomyocytes, endothelial and smooth muscle cells was investigated. Labeled hMSCs derived from embryonic stem cells (hESC-MSCs), fetal umbilical cord, bone marrow, amniotic membrane and adult bone marrow and adipose tissue were co-cultured with neonatal rat cardiomyocytes (nrCMCs) or cardiac fibroblasts (nrCFBs) for 10 days, and also cultured under angiogenic conditions. Cardiomyogenesis was assessed by human-specific immunocytological analysis, whole-cell current-clamp recordings, human-specific qRT-PCR and optical mapping. After co-culture with nrCMCs, significantly more hESC-MSCs than fetal hMSCs stained positive for α-actinin, whereas adult hMSCs stained negative. Furthermore, functional cardiomyogenic differentiation, based on action potential recordings, was shown to occur, but not in adult hMSCs. Of all sources, hESC-MSCs expressed most cardiac-specific genes. hESC-MSCs and fetal hMSCs contained significantly higher basal levels of connexin43 than adult hMSCs and co-culture with nrCMCs increased expression. After co-culture with nrCFBs, hESC-MSCs and fetal hMSCs did not express α-actinin and connexin43 expression was decreased. Conduction velocity (CV) in co-cultures of nrCMCs and hESC-MSCs was significantly higher than in co-cultures with fetal or adult hMSCs. In angiogenesis bioassays, only hESC-MSCs and fetal hMSCs were able to form capillary-like structures, which stained for smooth muscle and endothelial cell markers.Human embryonic and fetal MSCs differentiate toward three different cardiac lineages, in contrast to adult MSCs. Cardiomyogenesis is determined by stimuli from the cellular microenvironment, where connexin43 may play an important role