Did Jesus Survive The Cross?

This study explored whether it was possible for Jesus to survive the crucifixion from a medical and historical perspective. The scope of this thesis is based purely on what is evidentially plausible and more likely. Therefore, the data must reflect whether it was possible for Jesus to survive being crucified. Medical examination and ancient Roman sources were utilized to determine the nature and effectiveness of a Roman crucifixion. Furthermore, several theories concerning how one expires by the crucifixion were included to provide a rounded conclusion. Contrasting hypotheses offered greater insight into refining the question for which this thesis was designed. Finally, this study analyzed other theories and assertions from Muslim beliefs, Jewish thoughts, Christian theists, and apologetic responses to the overall subject of the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. Upon viewing several texts from Muslim scholars and the Quran, Jewish scholarship, and Christian scholarship, this study concluded that it was medically impossible for Jesus to survive a Roman crucifixion. Upon this realization, the ultimate conclusion supports the authority of Scripture on the matter—namely, the death and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth

Industrial policy to develop a multi-firm industry

AbstractGovernments face pressure to act when coordination and learning externalities block development of otherwise-profitable industries that would produce merit goods for the domestic market. A short-term subsidy that offsets these externalities could potentially jump-start a multi-firm industry, if the subsidy induces a pioneer firm to enter and then the pioneer’s first-period output generates coordination and learning externalities. These externalities could induce subsequent entry by input suppliers and/or competitors. However, empirical evidence raises questions about the ability of governments to use short-term subsidies to jump-start new industries. We explore one explanation for the difficulty of jump-starting new industries: the subsidy could generate counter-productive incentives for the pioneer firm to prevent entry of additional firms. We model the jump-start strategy and examine whether coupling a short-term fixed subsidy with a per-unit subsidy can achieve the objective of creating a multi-firm industry

Unrestricted Entry and Nonprice Competition: The Case of Technological Adoption in Hospitals

Medical technology adoption is a major contributor to rising health care expenditures in the US. Multiple market failures provide incentives for hospitals to adopt technologies. Unrestricted entry may result in excess capacity and reductions in output that are inefficient with respect to cost and quality. We analyze the effects of hospital entry in the market for coronary artery bypass graft surgery on the number of procedures performed at both the market and firm levels, using California data from 1983 to 1990. We test the hypothesis that entry has differential effects on hospital output in a market with nonprice competition, depending on market structure. Results show that as the proximity of the nearest competitor increases with entry, hospital output declines. Holding distance to the nearest competitor constant, increasing the number of competitors results in a smaller, but still significant, decrease in output. When there are few incumbents nearby, however, output does not change significantly with entry, suggesting "business-augmenting" effects that result in increased physician referrals offset much of the conventional "businessstealing" effects.Hospital Competition, Medical Technology, Market Structure, Cabg,

Profile of the uninsured in Jordan

Dwayne A. Banks; Lonna Milburn: Hannan Sabr

Long Way to Go: History of Illinois Wesleyan\u27s Diversity

The 2012 group titled their research project Know Your Story and this film describes the history of multiculturalism and the SEP Program at IWU from 1988-2012. A press release on the participants in this year\u27s program is available at http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/news/1970