1,029 research outputs found

    On the Politics of the Regulatory Reform: Econometric Evidence from the OECD Countries

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    This paper empirically investigates contrasting views on the politics of economic policy. Merging different databases, we test various predictions coming form different strands of literature, with the aim of explaining the cross-sectional and temporal variation in the degree of regulatory intervention and entry liberalization in the digital mobile telecommunications industry of OECD countries during the 1990's. We analyze the role of political institutions, government's types and ideological position, industry and consumers’ private interests, as well as the regulatory environment in shaping regulatory policy. We find strong evidence that all these sets of variables help to explain some degree of variability in the observed liberalization patterns among countries. Yet, political and regulatory institutions and the pressure of strong incumbent firms are found to be the most important factors. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Zur Politik der Regulierungsreform: Ökonometrische Evidenz fĂŒr OECD-LĂ€nder) In diesem Beitrag werden verschiedene TheorieansĂ€tze zur Wettbewerbspolitik am Beispiel der Deregulierung der Mobilfunksindustrie in OECD-LĂ€ndern empirisch getestet. Die Rolle der politischen Institutionen, der Regierungstypologie und ihrer ideologischen Positionierung im politischen Spektrum, der privaten Interessen der Industrie und Konsumenten, sowie der Struktur von Regulierungsbehörden wird anhand einer neu entwickelten Datenbank untersucht, um die beobachte VariabilitĂ€t in der Deregulierungspolitik zwischen OECD-LĂ€ndern zu erklĂ€ren. Es wird gezeigt, dass alle diese verschiedene Faktoren die Deregulierung der Mobilfunksindustrie in OECD-LĂ€nder wĂ€hrend der 90er Jahren signifikant beeinflusst haben. Die Struktur der politische Institutionen und Regulierungsbehörden sowie der Druck starker Unternehmen im Markt sind jedoch die entscheidenden Faktoren des Deregulierungsprozesses.Political Economy, Regulation, Entry Liberalization, Institutions, Ideology, Private Interests, Mobile Telecommunications, OECD

    Path mutual information for a class of biochemical reaction networks

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    Living cells encode and transmit information in the temporal dynamics of biochemical components. Gaining a detailed understanding of the input-output relationship in biological systems therefore requires quantitative measures that capture the interdependence between complete time trajectories of biochemical components. Mutual information provides such a measure but its calculation in the context of stochastic reaction networks is associated with mathematical challenges. Here we show how to estimate the mutual information between complete paths of two molecular species that interact with each other through biochemical reactions. We demonstrate our approach using three simple case studies.Comment: 6 pages, 2 figure

    The impact of horizontal mergers on rivals: Gains to being left outside a merger

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    It is commonly perceived that firms do not want to be outsiders to a merger between competitor firms. We instead argue that it is beneficial to be a non-merging rival firm to a large horizontal merger. Using a sample of mergers with expert-identification of relevant rivals and the event-study methodology, we find rivals generally experience positive abnormal returns at the merger announcement date. Further, we find that the stock reaction of rivals to merger events is not sensitive to merger waves; hence, 'future acquisition probability' does not drive the positive abnormal returns of rivals. We then build a conceptual framework that encompasses the impact of merger events on both merging and rival firms in order to provide a schematic to elicit more information on merger type

    Product Market Competition and Lobbying Coordination in the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry

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    This paper empirically investigates market behavior and firms’ lobbying in a unified structural setup. In a sequential game, where firms lobby for regulation before they compete in the product market, we derive a testable measure of lobbying coordination. Applying the setting to the early U.S. cellular services industry, we find that lobbying expenditures, as measured by campaign contributions, and market conduct were consistent with a one-shot Nash equilibrium and that price caps were binding on average. Furthermore, campaign contributions from cellular firms effectively lowered the burden of the price caps and reduced production costs. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Produktmarktwettbewerb und Koordination im Lobbying in der U.S. Mobilfunkindustrie) Dieses Paper untersucht Marktverhalten und Lobbying durch Unternehmen empirisch in einem vereinheitlichten strukturellen Ansatz. In einem sequentiellen Spiel, wo die Firmen fĂŒr Regulierung Lobbyismus betreiben, bevor sie im Produktmarkt konkurrieren, leiten wir ein testbares Maß fĂŒr Lobbying- Koordination her. In einer Anwendung auf den frĂŒhen US Mobilfunkmarkt zeigen wir, dass Marktverhalten und Lobbying-Ausgaben (gemessen als Parteispenden) mit einem einfachen Nashgleichgewicht vereinbar sind und die Preisobergrenzen im Durchschnitt binden. Außerdem waren Parteispenden offenbar ein effektives Mittel um die Preisgrenzen zu lockern und kostenbezogene Regulierung abzumildern.Collusion, Lobbying, Price Cap, Regulation, Rent-Seeking, Interest, Groups, Telecommunication

    The impact of horizontal mergers on rivals: Gains to being left outside a merger

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    It is commonly perceived that firms do not want to be outsiders to a merger between competitor firms. We instead argue that it is beneficial to be a non-merging rival firm to a large horizontal merger. Using a sample of mergers with expert-identification of relevant rivals and the event-study methodology, we find rivals generally experience positive abnormal returns at the merger announcement date. Further, we find that the stock reaction of rivals to merger events is not sensitive to merger waves; hence, 'future acquisition probability' does not drive the positive abnormal returns of rivals. We then build a conceptual framework that encompasses the impact of merger events on both merging and rival firms in order to provide a schematic to elicit more information on merger type.rivals; mergers; acquisitions; event-study

    Product Market Competition and Lobbying Coordination in the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry

    Get PDF
    This paper empirically investigates market behavior and firmsÂŽ lobbying in a unified structural setup. In a sequential game, where firms lobby for regulation before they compete in the product market, we derive a destable measure of lobbying coordination. Applying the setting to the early U.S. cellular services industry, we find that lobbying expenditures, as measured by campaign contributions, and market conduct were consistent with a one-shot Nash equilibrium and that price caps were binding on average. Furthermore, campaign contributions from cellular firms effectively lowered the burden of the price caps and reduced production costs.

    How Effective is European Merger Control?

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    This paper applies a novel methodology to a unique dataset of large concentrations during the period 1990-2002 to assess merger control’s effectiveness. By using data gathered from several sources and employing different evaluation techniques, we analyze the economic effects of the European Commission’s (EC) merger control decisions and distinguish between blockings, clearances with commitments (either behavioral or structural), and outright clearances. We run an event study on merging and rival firms’ stocks to quantify the profitability effects of mergers and merger control decisions. We back up our results and methodology by using alternative measures for the merger’s profitability effects based on balance sheet data and obtain consistent results. Our findings suggest that outright blockings solve the competitive problems generated by the merger. Remedies are not always effective in solving the market power concerns, at least not on average. Nevertheless, both structural (divestitures) and behavioral remedies do help restore effective competition when correctly applied to anticompetitive mergers during the first investigation phase. Yet, they are on the whole ineffective or even detrimental when applied after the second investigation phase. Finally, remedies - especially behavioral ones - seem to constitute a rent transfer from merging firms to rivals when mistakenly applied to pro-competitive mergers

    On the Stability of Research Joint Ventures: Implications for Collusion

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    Though there is a body of theoretical literature on research joint ventures (RJV) participation facilitating collusion, empirical tests are rare. Even more so, there are few empirical tests on the general theme of collusion. This note tries to fill this gap by assuming a correspondence between the stability of research joint ventures and collusion. By using data from the US Nation Cooperation Research Act, we show that large RJVs in concentrated industries are more stable and hence more suspect to collusion

    The Dynamics of Research Joint Ventures: A Panel Data Analysis

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    The aim of this paper is to test the determinants of Research Joint Ventures’ (RJVs) group dynamics. We look at entry, exit and turbulence in RJVs that have been set up under the US National Cooperative Research Act, which allows for certain antitrust exemptions in order to stimulate firms to cooperate in R&D. Accounting for unobserved project characteristics and controlling for inter-RJV interactions and industry effects, the Tobit panel regressions show the importance of group and time features for an RJV’s evolution. We further identify an average RJV’s long-term equilibrium size and assess its determining factors. Ours is a first attempt to produce robust stylized facts about cooperational short- and long-term dynamics, an important but neglected dimension in research cooperations

    The Impact of Horizontal Mergers on Rivals: Gains to Being Left Outside a Merger

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    It is commonly perceived that firms do not want to be outsiders to a merger between competitor firms. We instead argue that it is beneficial to be a non-merging rival firm to a large horizontal merger. Using a sample of mergers with expert-identification of relevant rivals and the event-study methodology, we find rivals generally experience positive abnormal returns at the merger announcement date. Further, we find that the stock reaction of rivals to merger events is not sensitive to merger waves; hence, ‘future acquisition probability’ does not drive the positive abnormal returns of rivals. We then build a conceptual framework that encompasses the impact of merger events on both merging and rival firms in order to provide a schematic to elicit more information on merger type. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Die Wirkung von horizontalen ZusammenschlĂŒssen auf Wettbewerber: Der Nutzen einer Außenseiterposition bei Fusionen) Es ist gemeinhin bekannt, dass Unternehmen nicht Außenseiter einer Fusion zwischen eigenen Wettbewerbern sein wollen. In dieser Arbeit zeigen wir, dass es fĂŒr Unternehmen durchaus vorteilhaft sein kann, sich an einem großen horizontalen Zusammenschluss nicht zu beteiligen. Anhand einer Datenbank von großen Fusionen, in denen die relevanten Wettbewerber der fusionierenden Unternehmen von Experten der EuropĂ€ischen Kommission identifiziert worden sind, und Mithilfe einer Ereignisstudienmethode, bestĂ€tigen wir empirisch, dass Wettbewerber durchschnittlich positive abnormale Gewinne bei der AnkĂŒndigung eines Zusammenschlusses erzielen. DarĂŒber hinaus stellen wir fest, dass die Reaktion der Aktienkurse von Konkurrenten bei der AnkĂŒndigung eines Zusammenschlusses nicht anfĂ€llig fĂŒr Fusionswellen ist, und dass die abnormalen Gewinne nicht von der "kĂŒnftigen FirmenĂŒbernahmewahrscheinlichkeit" getrieben sind. Schließlich wird in der Studie ein konzeptioneller Rahmen entwickelt, der die Auswirkungen der Fusion sowohl auf die fusionierenden Unternehmen und als auch auf die Wettbewerber zusammenfasst, um die Art des Zusammenschlusses besser identifizieren zu können.Rivals, Mergers, Acquisitions, Event-Study
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