Miscommunicating ideas: some key lessons for risk management.

This PhD submission consists of twelve articles and six reviews published over the period 1999 to 2007, together with a context statement that seeks to draw out the dominant themes, methodologies and results of my research. Essentially, I have examined the impact on the risk management of certain areas in science and security, of two significant trends that emerged and merged within contemporary society over the last 25 years. These are; processes of 'individuation' and of lde-politicisation'. Together, they have helped shape a new culture for policy-making and communication in most fields which, I suggest, has adverse consequences. 'Individuation' refers to the gradual breakdown of social bonds of solidarity and community which, while hardly new in capitalist society, accelerated in their reach and consequence over this period. Individuals isolated from strong social networks are ultimately weak. 'De-politicisation' refers to the loss of interest and participation in mainstream politics, which has also been widely noted and commented upon. This reached new heights (or lows) in the current period, and is distinct from the 'politicisation’ of both science and security. These themes are explored further elsewhere, but it is my contention that their convergence has led to the creation of a new culture of risk management and communication which I have sought to critique. My research, presented in the accompanying papers, has utilised a diverse set of methodological approaches, focusing primarily on the reinterpretation of existing data and analysis through a series of case-studies. Intelligence, in both the general sense and in the world of security, consists of a combination of information and interpretation. My purpose here has been to present an alternative framework for contemporary debates. My work has revealed the impact of these key processes and the new culture and identities - vulnerable victims and assertive advocates - that have been created by them. I have examined numerous manifestations and limitations of these. My articles confirm the rise of a culture more worried over possibilities than probabilities. The precautionary principle in science and pre-emptive action in relation to perceived security threats are examples of this. I conclude by noting that this has led to society being reorganised around risk. By miscommunicating risk - to connect with isolated individuals - politicians and officials will further exacerbate the trends identified above. By implication, I point to the possibility of an alternative - a debate about risks that maintains a sense of perspective and proportion, thereby rekindling the social bonds that generate confident individuals and purposeful politics

Handling Uncertainty and Ambiguity in the COVID-19 Pandemic

The 2019 novel coronavirus outbreak is unprecedented. Yet some look to ready-made models to addressit. This creates confusion about more adaptive responses that reflect an uncertain and ambiguous context.Those assessing associated mental health challenges must be wary of overdiagnosis. Handling thepandemic well, requires engaging the public as mature partners

The Hollow Flag:The gulf between EU security rhetoric and real security

This paper argues that EU security policy suffers from an intrinsic, gnawing weakness. This weakness, the hollowness in the flag, is the absence of the public. In contrast to endless bureaucracies, meetings between elites, nice-sounding strategies or fine aspirations, real security comes from engaging the public in a serious, national conversation about the past, present and future of the nation, of Europe, and of the World. Implicitly, the EU recognises this. The EU flag, after all, symbolises a region, points to a shared history and set of values, and makes plain the central role of the peoples of Europe. Sadly, in practice, the people are missing. The flag is hollow. This paper seeks to illustrate the way in which the theory and practise of security in the EU leaves the people out of the conversation. Without a secure anchor in the hopes, fears and aspirations of real people – democratically constituted into the nation-states that make up the Union – security can only ever be an abstract concept.Whilst the dreams and plans of elites – for peace in Europe, for the protection of rights and democracy, for the expansion of the framework of the EU to new nations – may be praiseworthy, until and unless they are grounded in the demos, they remain only that: dreams. What’s more, failure to engage the people in a genuine discussion about security makes the world a more dangerous place. Despite the fears of EU elites and despite the founding myths of post-1945 Europe, militarism, the nation-state, and the masses are not intrinsically connected. It is in fact the opposite. Without the people, there is no real security

The Hollow Flag:The gulf between EU security rhetoric and real security

This paper argues that EU security policy suffers from an intrinsic, gnawing weakness. This weakness, the hollowness in the flag, is the absence of the public. In contrast to endless bureaucracies, meetings between elites, nice-sounding strategies or fine aspirations, real security comes from engaging the public in a serious, national conversation about the past, present and future of the nation, of Europe, and of the World. Implicitly, the EU recognises this. The EU flag, after all, symbolises a region, points to a shared history and set of values, and makes plain the central role of the peoples of Europe. Sadly, in practice, the people are missing. The flag is hollow. This paper seeks to illustrate the way in which the theory and practise of security in the EU leaves the people out of the conversation. Without a secure anchor in the hopes, fears and aspirations of real people – democratically constituted into the nation-states that make up the Union – security can only ever be an abstract concept.Whilst the dreams and plans of elites – for peace in Europe, for the protection of rights and democracy, for the expansion of the framework of the EU to new nations – may be praiseworthy, until and unless they are grounded in the demos, they remain only that: dreams. What’s more, failure to engage the people in a genuine discussion about security makes the world a more dangerous place. Despite the fears of EU elites and despite the founding myths of post-1945 Europe, militarism, the nation-state, and the masses are not intrinsically connected. It is in fact the opposite. Without the people, there is no real security

Scientists advise, ministers decide?:The role of scientific expertise in UK policymaking during the coronavirus pandemic

COVID-19 has been a transformational crisis, uprooting everyday lives and causing some of the most significant health, social, and economic challenges in recent memory. Similarly, coronavirus has also forced significant political change, refocusing attention on politics and policymaking structures during a time of crisis. This shift is exemplified by scientific advisers’ role at the forefront of governmental decision-making. Scientific advice has provided vital knowledge and insight into the government’s pandemic responses.However, the coronavirus pandemic has also highlighted the complex nature of combining science with politics, as well as the difficulties involved in distinguishing between expert advice and political or moral choices. Such complexity warrants a reconsideration of science’s impact on policymaking. Namely, from a long-term view, the growth of governmental experts started well before the coronavirus pandemic. Partly, this proliferation is driven by a desire to improve policymaking, given that there is a clear need to effectively consult, consider, and act on the advice of experts in all fields of government.Nevertheless, societal changes like a declining trust in government also mean that expert advice can increasingly be used as a tool to legitimate or depoliticise debates. Considering the complexity of fighting a global pandemic, this belies that advice must be effectively scrutinised within broader contextual or operational considerations – a government cannot simply ‘follow the science’. Coronavirus highlights the need for a renewed focus on the interplay of expertise and policymaking, considering who, why, and on what basis governments are advised – as well as what lessons they draw from it

Remaking Bandung Sixty Years On

This Communication Article proposes that if the Bandung Spirit is to be revived in the twenty-first century, then this will necessitate an appreciation in the first instance of how different the world is today from conditions 60 years ago – both across the Global South but also, more particularly, in the West. The key shift may have been one from an assertive imposition of rule based on a clarity of vision and purpose, to a more insecure and reactive form of engagement that lacks direction. This latter seeks to compensate for an absence of meaning behind forms of procedural risk management. It will be the ability of the former colonies to put forward a direction that captivates all, based on transcending the past and presenting coherent human values rather than mere economic might that will determine the future

Securitising education to prevent terrorism or losing direction?

This article examines the growing relationship between security and education, particularly in the light of the UK government’s Prevent Duty that seeks to tackle radicalisation in a variety of milieus, including universities. However, rather than seeing this process as being merely one-way, through a so-called securitisation of education (in the parlance of the Copenhagen School of International Relations), what is explored here is the dialectic between these two spheres. It is suggested that a heightened sensitivity to the supposed consequences of inflammatory rhetoric on the well-being of supposedly suggestible or vulnerable students has been in existence within education for quite some time. In that regards, the securitising efforts of politicians and officials are pushing against an open door. What’s more, it is proposed that the inability of the authorities to hold the line in support of absolute freedom of expression, within academia and beyond, tacitly encourages the very people the government would hope to detract

Theory informed by practice. Application informed by purpose. Why to understand and manage risk, cultural context is the key

Risk analysis and risk management are reliant in order to be effective on their ability to engage with and communicate to non-specialist audiences, whether these be policy-makers asked to turn the advice that they agree with into practice, those implementing decisions, or the public, who are often on the receiving end of these.Accordingly, there needs to be clarity of purpose regarding – and reflected through – the language used, the partners engaged, and the proposed ends of any measures to be implemented. These elements sit within specific cultural contexts – both geographical and historical – and it is essential to account for these in translating theory into practice.This article surveys the discourse used across various examples, including a detailed case study. The most significant conclusion is that while data and evidence certainly matter for validation – understanding culture remains key to effective risk analysis and trustworthy risk management because, on the whole, people look for meaning beyond the mere ‘facts’. This applies to risks assumed to be narrowly technical as much as those with a strong social, cultural and political dimension.Few risk analysts and safety experts consider or account for the broader, contextual and cultural factors that impact their choices, analyses and modes of dissemination. This creates a divide between those commissioning and conducting the research and those to whom it is held to apply and needs to be implemented by, which undermines democratic accountability, as well as the possible benefits of, and trust in, their enterprise