6,004 research outputs found
A General Bargaining Model of Legislative Policy-making
We present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space. In contrast to other bargaining models, the status quo is not assumed to be bad for all legislators, and delay may be Pareto efficient. We prove existence of stationary equilibria. We show that if all legislators are risk averse or if even limited transfers are possible, then delay is only possible if the status quo lies in the core. Thus, we expect immediate agreement in multidimensional models, where the core is typically empty. In one dimension, delay is possible if and only if the status quo lies in the core of the voting rule, and then it is the only possible outcome. Our comparative statics analysis yield two noteworthy insights: moderate status quos imply moderate policy outcomes, and legislative patience implies policy moderation
A dynamic model of democratic elections in multidimensional policy spaces
We propose a general model of repeated elections. In each period, a challenger is chosen from the electorate to run against an incumbent politician in a majority-rule election, and the winner then selects a policy from a multidimensional policy space. Individual policy preferences are private information, whereas policy choices are publicly observable. We prove existence and continuity of equilibria in "simple" voting and policy strategies; we provide examples to show the variety of possible equilibrium patterns in multiple dimensions; we analyze the effects of patience and office-holding benefits on the persistence of policies over time; and we identify relationships between equilibrium policies and the core of the underlying voting game. As a byproduct of our analysis, we show how equilibrium incentives maylead elected representatives to make policy compromises, even when binding commitments are unavailable. We provide an informational story for incumbency advantage. Finally, we give an asymptotic version of the median voter theorem for the one-dimensional model as voters become-arbitrarily patient
A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces
We propose a general model of repeated elections. In each period, a challenger is chosen from the electorate to run against an incumbent politician in a majority-rule election, and the winner then selects a policy from a multidimensional policy space. Individual policy preferences are private information, whereas policy choices are publicly observable. We prove existence and continuity of equilibria in “simple” voting and policy strategies; we provide examples to show the variety of possible equilibrium patterns in multiple dimensions; we analyze the effects of patience and office-holding benefits on the persistence of policies over time; and we identify relationships between equilibrium policies and the core of the underlying voting game. As a byproduct of our analysis, we show how equilibrium incentives may lead elected representatives to make policy compromises, even when binding commitments are unavailable. We provide an informational story for incumbency advantage. Finally, we give an asymptotic version of the median voter theorem for the one-dimensional model as voters becomes arbitrarily patient.
The case for new academic workspaces
Executive summary: This report draws upon the combined efforts of
a number of estates professionals, architects,
academics, designers, and senior managers
involved in the planning of new university buildings
for the 21st century. Across these perspectives,
all would agree – although perhaps for different
reasons - that this planning is difficult and that a
number of particular considerations apply in the
design of academic workspaces. Despite these
difficulties, they will also agree that when this
planning goes well, ‘good’ buildings are truly
transformational – for both the university as a
whole and the people who work and study in them.
The value of well-designed buildings goes far
beyond their material costs, and endures long after
those costs have been forgotten ..
A Social Choice Lemma on Voting over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games
We prove a lemma characterizing majority preferences over lotteries on a subset of Euclidean space. Assuming voters have quadratic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility representations, and assuming existence of a majority undominated (or "core") point, the core voter is decisive: one lottery is majority-preferred to another if and only if this is the preference of the core voter. Several applications of this result to dynamic voting games are discussed
A multidimensional model of repeated elections
We analyze a discrete-time, infinite-horizon model of elections. In each period, a
challenger is chosen from the electorate to run against an incumbent politician in a
majority-rule election, and the winner then selects a policy from a multidimensional
policy space. Individuals' policy preferences are private information, whereas policy
choices are publicly observable. We prove existence and continuity of equilibria in
"simple" voting and policy strategies; we provide examples to show the variety of
possible equilibrium patterns in multiple dimensions; we analyze the effects of patience
and office-holding benefits on the persistence of policies over time; and we identify
relationships between equilibrium policies and the core of the underlying voting game
A bargaining model of legislative policy-making
We present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an
arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space. In contrast to other bargaining models,
the status quo is not assumed to be “bad,” and delay may be Pareto efficient. We
prove existence of stationary equilibria. The possibility of equilibrium delay depends on
four factors: risk aversion of the legislators, the dimensionality of the policy space, the
voting rule, and the possibility of transfers across districts. If legislators are risk averse,
if there is more than one policy dimension, and if voting is by majority rule, for example,
then delay will almost never occur. In one dimension, delay is possible if and only if the
status quo lies in the core of the voting rule, and then it is the only possible outcome.
This "core selection" result yields a game-theoretic foundation for the well-known median
voter theorem. Our comparative statics analysis yield two noteworthy insights: (i) if the
status quo is close to the core, then equilibrium policy outcomes will also be close to the
core (a moderate status quo produces moderate policy outcomes), and (ii) if legislators
are patient, then equilibrium proposals will be close to the core (legislative patience leads
to policy moderation)
Existence of Nash Equilibria on Convex Sets
We analyze a non-cooperative game in which the set of feasible strategy profiles is compact and convex but possibly non-rectangular. Thus, a player's feasible strategies may depend on the strategies used by others, as in Debreu's (1952,1982) generalized games. In contrast to the model of Debreu, we do not require preferences to be defined over infeasible strategy profiles, and we do not require a player's feasible strategy correspondence to have non-empty values. We prove existence of Nash equilibria under a lower hemicontinuity condition, and we give examples of classes of games in which this condition is satisfied
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