Risky Punishment and Reward in the Prisoner’s Dilemma

We conduct a prisoner’s dilemma experiment with a punishment/reward stage, where punishments and rewards are risky. This is compared with a risk free treatment. We find that subjects do not change their behavior in the face of risky outcomes. Additionally, we measure risk attitude and the emotions of subjects. While we find a strong influence of emotions, individual risk aversion has no effect on the decision to punish or reward. This is good news for lab experiments who abstract from risky outcomes. From the perspective of social preferences, our results provide evidence for risk neutral inclusion of other player’s payoffs in the decisionmaker’s utility function.Prisoner’s dilemma, risk, punishment, reward, emotions, experiment

Punishment with Uncertain Outcomes in the Prisoner’s Dilemma

This paper experimentally investigates whether risk-averse individuals punish less if the outcome of punishment is uncertain than when it is certain. Our design includes three treatments: Baseline in which the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game is played; Certain Punishment in which the prisoner’s dilemma game is followed by a punishment stage allowing subjects to decrease the other player’s payoff by 2 Euros; and Uncertain Punishment in which subjects could decrease the other player’s payoff with a 50% probability by 1 Euro and with a 50% probability by 3 Euros. We find that in all cases the risk-averse subjects are equally likely to cooperate in the prisoner’s dilemma and equally likely to punish in the second stage in either of the two punishment treatments.Experimental economics; prisoner’s dilemma; punishment; risk aversion; uncertainty

Punishment with Uncertain Outcomes in the Prisoner’s Dilemma

This paper experimentally investigates whether risk-averse individuals punish less if the outcome of punishment is uncertain than when it is certain. Our design includes three treatments: Baseline in which the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game is played; Certain Punishment in which the prisoner’s dilemma game is followed by a punishment stage allowing subjects to decrease the other player’s payoff by 2 Euros; and Uncertain Punishment in which subjects could decrease the other player’s payoff with a 50% probability by 1 Euro and with a 50% probability by 3 Euros. We find that in all cases the risk-averse subjects are equally likely to cooperate in the prisoner’s dilemma and equally likely to punish in the second stage in either of the two punishment treatments.experiment, prisoner’s dilemma, punishment, risk aversion, uncertainty

A Comparison of Social Media Job Search Versus Traditional Job Search Methods on Employment of Students With Moderate to Severe Disabilities

Students with disabilities in transition programs experience difficulty with finding permanent employment. This study investigated the effects of social media on employment outcomes. Participants included 37 students ages 18 to 22 with moderate to severe disabilities in transition programs in a Western state school system. The student researcher divided 37 participants into two groups: (a) social media job search, or (b) traditional job search. Participants were systematically assigned to one of two groups based on five variables: (a) gender, (b) socioeconomic status (SES), (c) daily computer usage, (d) diagnosis, and (e) participation on social media sites. Social media and traditional groups consisted of 18 and 19 participants, respectively. Groups were further subdivided into two groups of 9-10 participants with procedures carried out in an equivalent manner across those subgroups. The control groups implemented traditional job search methods while the social media groups learned to explore social media in the context of a job search. Variables included (a) job placements, (b) job interviews, and (c) job referrals. The students in all groups met twice weekly for 4 weeks. The researcher found that the social media job search group had higher numbers of job placements, interviews, and referrals compared to the traditional job search group. Seven participants in the social media job search group found employment compared to two in the traditional job search group. Within the social media job search group, there were nine job interviews compared to five in the control group. The participants in the social media job search group received 62 referrals compared to the nine received in the control group. These findings suggest social media may play a role in increasing employment activity and outcomes in post-high school job search endeavors

Pure Strategy Equilibria in Symmetric Two-Player Zero-Sum Games

We observe that a symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure strategy equilibrium if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors matrix. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure equilibrium. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. Our findings extend to general two-player zero-sum games using the symmetrization of zero-sum games due to von Neumann. We point out that the class of symmetric two-player zero-sum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric two-player games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of finite population evolutionary stable strategies.Symmetric two-player games, zero-sum games, Rock-Paper-Scissors, single-peakedness, quasiconcavity, finite population evolutionary stable strategy, saddle point, exact potential games

Once Beaten, Never Again: Imitation in Two-Player Potential Games

We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, public goods games, common pool resource games, and minimum effort coordination games.Imitate-the-best, learning, exact potential games, symmetric games, relative payoffs, zero-sum games

Parameter Estimation by Conditional Coding

Conditional coding is an application of Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods for sampling from conditional distributions. It is applied here to the problem of estimating the parameters of a computer-simulated pattern of fractures in an isomorphic, homotropic material under plane strain. We investigate the theory and procedures of conditional coding and show the viability of the technique by its application

Pure Saddle Points and Symmetric Relative Payoff Games

It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors game. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. We apply our theory to a rich collection of examples by noting that the class of symmetric two-player zero-sum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric two-player games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of a finite population evolutionary stable strategies.symmetric two-player games, zero-sum games, Rock-Paper-Scissors, single-peakedness, quasiconcavity, finite population evolutionary stable strategy, increasing differences, decreasing differences, potentials, additive separability

Pure Saddle Points and Symmetric Relative Payoff Games

It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors game. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. We apply our theory to a rich collection of examples by noting that the class of symmetric two-player zero-sum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric two-player games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of a finite population evolutionary stable strategies.symmetric two-player games; zero-sum games; Rock-Paper-Scissors; single-peakedness; quasiconcavity; finite population evolutionary stable strategy; increasing differences; decreasing differences; potentials; additive separability