Nettle and Mellado\u27s Small matters: How churches and parents can raise up world-changing children (Book Review)

A review of Nettle, G., & Mellado, S. (2016). Small matters: How churches and parents can raise up world-changing children. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan. 185 pp. $21.00. ISBN 978031052103

Keel and Schroer\u27s Creation; Biblical theologies in the context of the ancient Near East (Book Review)

A review of Keel, O., & Schroer, S. (2015). Creation; Biblical theologies in the context of the ancient Near East (Peter T. Daniels, Trans.). Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 244 pp. $44.99. ISBN 978157506093

Site Context and History of the Orson B. Adams Homestead and Surrounding Area for the Historic American Landscapes Survey

In 1862, Orson B. Adams settled in Harrisburg, Utah. He and his family were part of a movement by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, also known as the Mormons, to create a self-sufficient colony in the west. The Mormon settlers were called to establish agricultural towns throughout southern Utah and west to the Pacific and grow crops such as grapes and cotton

The (ir)relevance of truth to rationality

It is possible to act for a reason. We do it all the time. You might have brought her medicine for the reason that she is ill. He might go to the store to get milk. Edmund might skate in the middle of the pond because the ice in the middle of the pond is thin. What must be true of us, and of the world, such that we can act for reasons? In normal cases, when someone acts for the reason that (for example) the ice in the middle of the pond is thin, it really is the case that the ice in the middle is thin. This is mostly due to the fact that we are not often wrong about such mundane ways the world is. But what if one takes it that the ice is thin, and in fact it is not thin? Can one still act for the reason that the ice is thin? In my efforts to give a sufficient answer to this question, I have been led to a package of views, the core tenets of which are at least the following five. First, it is possible to act in the light of a falsehood: a consideration that is not the case can be an agent’s reason for acting. Second, it is not possible to act in unbelief: in order for an agent to act for a reason, the agent must at least believe that reason to be the case. Third, the reasons for which agents act can play a role in explaining the actions done for those reasons –– even when agents act in the light of falsehoods. Fourth, there are very few (if any) formal rules or principles constraining the explanatory role of reasons. Any action explanation that specifies the content of the reason for acting has reserved a legitimate explanatory role for the reason. Fifth, all of these claims apply equally to motivating and normative reasons, so-called practical and epistemic reasons, and reasons for action and reasons for belief.Philosoph

Isothermal, mass-limited rarefactions in planar and spherical geometry

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/98660/1/PhysPlasmas_18_104506.pd

Design of flyer-plate-driven compressible turbulent mix experiments using Z

The use of flyer plates to drive compressible turbulent mix experiments is discussed. The experimental parameters can be optimized, in order to maximize the degree of nonlinear development of either the Rayleigh–Taylor or the Richtmyer–Meshkov instability. Analytic formulas are presented for this optimization. Results of this analysis and of simulations are shown for experiments that might be accomplished on the Z machine at Sandia National Laboratories [M. K. Matzen, Phys. Plasmas 4, 1519 (1997)]. One finds that unique experiments could be accomplished with this device. © 2002 American Institute of Physics.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/70368/2/PHPAEN-9-8-3545-1.pd