1,418 research outputs found

    Loss of Substitutability: A Note On Disparity between WTP and WTA / Perte de la Substituabilité

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    This paper focuses on the disparity between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept indices in nonmarket valuation. The substitution effect makes agents value net losses higher than opportunity losses. In regard to net losses, we show that imperfect substitutability respectively induces infinite and finite compensation demanded in the neoclassical framework and loss aversion. Consequently, the models translate net losses in a different way Ce papier traite de la disparitĂ© entre les indices de consentement-Ă -payer et consentement-Ă -recevoir dans l’évaluation hors-marchĂ©. En raison de l’effet de substitution, les pertes sĂšches sont plus valorisĂ©es que les coĂ»ts d’opportunitĂ©. A l’égard des pertes sĂšches, nous montrons que la substituabilitĂ© imparfaite induit un consentement-Ă -recevoir respectivement infini et fini dans les modĂšles nĂ©oclassique et d’aversion aux pertes. DĂšs lors, la notion de perte sĂšche est diffĂ©remment abordĂ©e dans les deux modĂšles.WTP-WTA disparity, substitution effect, loss aversion, disparitĂ© CAP-CAR, effet de substitution, aversion aux pertes

    Principal-agent Relationships: A Note on Biomass Depletion

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    Public authorities frequently mandate public or private agencies to manage their renewable natural resources. Contrary to the agency, which is an expert in renewable natural resource management, public authorities usually ignore the sustainable level of harvest. In this note, we first model the contractual relationship between a principal, who owns the renewable natural resource, and an agent, who holds private information on its sustainable level of harvest. We then look for the Pareto-optimal allocations. In the situation of an imperfect information setting, we find that the Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that the harvesting level stands outside the sustainability interval. The information rent held by the agent turns out to be unavoidable, such that stepping outside the sustainability interval implies the possibility of depletion of the renewable natural resource. This, in turn, compromises the maintenance of the ecological balance in natural ecosystems

    Private Valuation of a Public Good in Three Auction Mechanisms / Evaluation privĂ©e d’un bien public dans trois mĂ©canismes d’enchĂšres

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    We evaluate the impact of three auction mechanisms – the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) mechanism, the second-price auction, and the random nth-price auction – in the measurement of private willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept for a pure public good. Our results show that the endowment effect can be eliminated with repetitions of the BDM mechanism. Yet, on a logarithmic scale, the random nth-price auction yields the highest speed of convergence to welfare indices’ equality. Overall, we observe that subjects value public goods in reference to their private subjective benefit derived from the public good funding. Nous Ă©valuons l’impact de trois mĂ©canismes d’enchĂšre – le mĂ©canisme Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM), l’enchĂšre au deuxiĂšme prix, et l’enchĂšre alĂ©atoire au niĂšme prix – dans l’évaluation des consentement-Ă -payer et consentement-Ă -recevoir privĂ©s d’un bien public pur. Nos rĂ©sultats montrent que l’effet de dotation peut ĂȘtre Ă©liminĂ© en rĂ©pĂ©tant le mĂ©canisme BDM. NĂ©anmoins, Ă  l’échelle logarithmique, l’enchĂšre alĂ©atoire au niĂšme prix donne la vitesse de convergence vers l’égalitĂ© des indices de bien-ĂȘtre la plus Ă©levĂ©e. Plus gĂ©nĂ©ralement, nous observons que les sujets d’étude Ă©valuent les biens publics en se rĂ©fĂ©rant Ă  l’avantage privĂ© et subjectif qui rĂ©sulte du financement du bien public.Contingent valuation, WTP-WTA gap, auctions, public good private supply, Ă©valuation contingente, Ecart CAP-CAR, enchĂšres, provision privĂ©e des biens publics

    Sustainable Network Dynamics

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    We propose a dynamic graph-theoretic model for ecosystem management as a control over networked system composed of target nodes and unmarked nodes. The network is represented by a complete graph, in which all vertices are connected by a unique edge. Target nodes are attracted by the objective function issued from the external ecosystem management. They pull the network towards the objective position, which is either non-null or stationary. The management policy is considered successful if the graph remains connected in time, that is, target nodes attain the objective and unmarked nodes stay in the convex hull. At the time of the ecosystem network transfer, the model yields an Impossibility Theorem as well as a Sustainability Criterion to maintain full connectivity of the network. The latter can be easily linked to the general definition of sustainability as ecosystem integrity preservation. At last, we identify three management rules to ensure the maintenance of connectivity in time, given the properties of the objective transposition function, the nature of connections and utility updating time-delays between the nodes Nous proposons un modĂšle dynamique de gestion des Ă©cosystĂšmes par la thĂ©orie des graphes en tant que contrĂŽle d’un systĂšme en rĂ©seau composĂ© de nƓuds cibles et de nƓuds non identifiĂ©s. Le rĂ©seau est reprĂ©sentĂ© par un graphe complet dans lequel tous les nƓuds sont connectĂ©s par une arĂȘte unique. Les nƓuds cibles sont attirĂ©s par une fonction objectif issue d’un processus externe de gestion des Ă©cosystĂšmes. Ils tirent le rĂ©seau vers la position de l’objectif qui peut ĂȘtre non-nulle ou stationnaire. La politique de gestion est considĂ©rĂ©e rĂ©ussie si le graphe reste connectĂ© dans le temps, c'est-Ă -dire que les nƓuds cibles atteignent l’objectif et les nƓuds non identifiĂ©s restent dans l’enveloppe convexe. Lors de la transposition du rĂ©seau Ă©cosystĂ©mique dans le temps, le modĂšle gĂ©nĂšre un ThĂ©orĂšme de l’ImpossibilitĂ© ainsi qu’un CritĂšre de DurabilitĂ© qui maintient la pleine connectivitĂ© du rĂ©seau. Ce dernier peut aisĂ©ment ĂȘtre reliĂ© Ă  la dĂ©finition gĂ©nĂ©rale de la durabilitĂ© comme la prĂ©servation de l’intĂ©gritĂ© Ă©cologique. Enfin, nous identifions trois rĂšgles de gestion pour assurer le maintien de la connectivitĂ© dans le temps, sachant les propriĂ©tĂ©s de la fonction objectif de transposition, la nature des connexions, et les retards de rĂ©actualisation de l’utilitĂ© entre les nƓuds.bioeconomics, ecosystem management, graph theory, connectedness., bioĂ©conomie, gestion des Ă©cosystĂšmes, thĂ©orie des graphes, connectivitĂ©

    Dynamics of Provision of Threshold Public Goods

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    Agents face an ambiguous risk of biodiversity survival as well as ambiguous expected losses from its extinction. As a collectivity, agents are faced with the option of privately funding the protection of biodiversity for biomedical research. We propose two evolutionary models of threshold public goods game and public goods option market, where we consider population dynamics with proportional fair-share contributors versus free-riders. In the first model, we find that agents contribute both in null and ambiguous survival scenarios. In the second model, in case of ambiguous survival, the public good is provided when the agents exchanging option contracts are equally divided into buyers and sellers. This result holds for a specific market belief over the species survival. However, the absence of surplus captured on the option market condemns its raison d’ĂȘtre. Low risk will provoke unconditional social free-riding in both models. Les agents font face Ă  un risque ambigu quant Ă  la survie de la biodiversitĂ© ainsi qu’à des pertes espĂ©rĂ©es ambiguĂ«s de par leur extinction. En tant que collectivitĂ©, les agents ont la possibilitĂ© de financer, Ă  titre privĂ©, la protection de la biodiversitĂ© Ă  des fins de recherche biomĂ©dicale. Nous proposons deux modĂšles Ă©volutionnaires de jeu du bien public avec seuil et de marchĂ© des options sur bien public, oĂč nous considĂ©rons la dynamique des populations composĂ©es de contributeurs – Ă  hauteur de leur juste part proportionnelle – et de passagers clandestins. Dans le premier modĂšle, nos rĂ©sultats montrent que les agents contribuent aussi bien dans les scĂ©narios de survie nulle que de survie ambiguĂ«. Dans le second modĂšle, le bien public est fourni lorsque les agents nĂ©gociant les contrats d’options sont identiquement divisĂ©s entre acheteurs et vendeurs. Ce rĂ©sultat se vĂ©rifie pour une croyance spĂ©cifique du marchĂ© sur la survie des espĂšces. NĂ©anmoins, l’absence de surplus captĂ© sur le marchĂ© des options condamne sa raison d’ĂȘtre. Un risque faible provoquera un comportement de passager clandestin inconditionnel dans les deux modĂšles.biodiversity, ambiguity, threshold public goods, option markets, prediction markets, evolutionary game theory, biodiversitĂ©, ambiguĂŻtĂ©, biens publics avec seuil, marchĂ©s d’options, marchĂ©s de prĂ©diction, thĂ©orie des jeux Ă©volutionnaires

    Vers une composition optimale de la forĂȘt française

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    L’objectif de cette Ă©tude est d’appliquer la thĂ©orie de la sĂ©lection de portefeuille Ă  la diversitĂ© en essences des forĂȘts françaises. Les titres financiers sont ainsi remplacĂ©s par les essences forestiĂšres. Le portefeuille optimal est celui qui minimise le risque, tout en maintenant la productivitĂ© actuelle. L’étude est menĂ©e par dĂ©partement et sur 11 essences : Ă©picĂ©a commun (Picea abies), sapin pectinĂ© (Abies alba), pin sylvestre (Pinus sylvestris), pin maritime (Pinus pinaster), mĂ©lĂšze d’Europe (Larix decidua), douglas (Pseudotruga menziesii), chĂȘne pĂ©donculĂ© (Quercus robur), chĂȘne sessile (Quercus petraea), chĂȘne pubescent (Quercus pubescens), chĂȘne vert (Quercus ilex) et hĂȘtre commun (Fagus sylvatica). Les donnĂ©es utilisĂ©es proviennent des bases de donnĂ©es de l’Institut de l’information gĂ©ographique et forestiĂšre (IGN). Les sorties du modĂšle corroborent les recommandations actuelles. À l’échelle nationale, dans la partie mĂ©ridionale, les auteurs observent une productivitĂ© moindre mais aussi une meilleure rĂ©sistance. À l’inverse, le Nord, actuellement plus productif, est plus sensible aux perturbations. Ces rĂ©sultats illustrent le fait que certains outils Ă©conomiques et financiers peuvent ĂȘtre utilisĂ©s dans un contexte sylvicole, Ă  des fins d’aide Ă  la dĂ©cision.The objective of this study is to apply the theory of portfolio selection to the diversity of species in the French forests. Financial assets are thereby replaced by tree species. The optimal portfolio is the one that minimizes risk while maintaining the current productivity constant. The study is conducted per department and on 11 species: Norway spruce (Picea abies), Silver fir (Abies alba), Scots pine (Pinus sylvestris), Maritime pine (Pinus pinaster), European larch (Larix decidua), Douglas fir (Pseudotruga menziesii), Pedunculate oak (Quercus robur), Sessile oak (Quercus petraea), Downy oak (Quercus pubescens), Holm oak (Quercus ilex) and Common beech (Fagus sylvatica). The data comes from databases of the French National Institute of Geographic and Forest Information (IGN). The model outputs are consistent with the current recommendations. At the national level, in the southern part, we observe lower productivity but also better resistance. Conversely, the North, currently more productive, is more subjected to disturbances. The results illustrate the applicability of some economic and financial tools to a forestry setting, for the purpose of decision-making

    Differential cross section measurements for the production of a W boson in association with jets in proton–proton collisions at √s = 7 TeV

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    Measurements are reported of differential cross sections for the production of a W boson, which decays into a muon and a neutrino, in association with jets, as a function of several variables, including the transverse momenta (pT) and pseudorapidities of the four leading jets, the scalar sum of jet transverse momenta (HT), and the difference in azimuthal angle between the directions of each jet and the muon. The data sample of pp collisions at a centre-of-mass energy of 7 TeV was collected with the CMS detector at the LHC and corresponds to an integrated luminosity of 5.0 fb[superscript −1]. The measured cross sections are compared to predictions from Monte Carlo generators, MadGraph + pythia and sherpa, and to next-to-leading-order calculations from BlackHat + sherpa. The differential cross sections are found to be in agreement with the predictions, apart from the pT distributions of the leading jets at high pT values, the distributions of the HT at high-HT and low jet multiplicity, and the distribution of the difference in azimuthal angle between the leading jet and the muon at low values.United States. Dept. of EnergyNational Science Foundation (U.S.)Alfred P. Sloan Foundatio
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