The Importance of Audit Firm Characteristics and the Drivers of Auditor Change in UK Listed Companies

This paper explores the importance of audit firm characteristics and the factors motivating auditor change based on questionnaire responses from 210 listed UK companies (a response rate of 70%). Twenty-nine potentially desirable auditor characteristics are identified from the extant literature and their importance elicited. Exploratory factor analysis reduces these variables to eight uncorrelated underlying dimensions: reputation/quality; acceptability to third parties; value for money; ability to provide non-audit services; small audit firm; specialist industry knowledge; non-Big Six large audit firm; and geographical proximity. Insights into the nature of 'the Big Six factor' emerge. Two thirds of companies had recently considered changing auditors; the main reasons cited being audit fee level, dissatisfaction with audit quality and changes in top management. Of those companies that considered change, 73% did not actually do so, the main reasons cited being fee reduction by the incumbent and avoidance of disruption. Thus audit fee levels are both a key precipitator of change and a key factor in retaining the status quo

Can auditors be independent? – Experimental evidence on the effects of client type

Recent regulatory initiatives stress that an independent oversight board, rather than the management board, should be the client of the auditor. In an experiment, we test whether the type of client affects auditors’ independence. Unique features of the German institutional setting enable us to realistically vary the type of auditors’ client as our treatment variable: we portray the client either as the management preferring aggressive accounting or the oversight board preferring conservative accounting. We measure auditors’ perceived client retention incentives and accountability pressure in a post-experiment questionnaire to capture potential threats to independence. We find that the type of auditors’ client affects auditors’ behaviour contingent on the degree of the perceived threats to independence. Our findings imply that both client retention incentives and accountability pressure represent distinctive threats to auditors’ independence and that the effectiveness of an oversight board in enhancing auditors’ independence depends on the underlying threat

Strategic Decision Behavior and Audit Quality of Big and Small Audit Firms in a Tendering Process

We investigate the strategic decision making of audit firms in a tendering process. In particular, we are interested in how audit firms behave to acquire audit clients and which audit quality is ensured. Our main findings are manifold. First, if two big audit firms are competing, we do not observe that each firm tries to acquire all clients. However, if one big and one small audit firm are competing, we find evidence that the big audit firm generally apply strategies to acquire all available clients. In contrast, the small audit firm uses a clear "Guerilla Strategy" which means that the firm concentrates only on few clients whereas the other clients are almost ignored. Second, small audit firms are better off if more clients do exist in the tendering process. Thus, the legislator should ensure that more audit clients are tendered if the competitiveness of smaller audit firms should be enhanced. Third, in a situation in which the competitive advantage of big audit firms increases over-proportionally, we do not observe that big audit firms are able to decrease the market share of small audit firms markedly or are even able to push small audit firms out of the market. Fourth, we find that the quality level of an audit is higher if the client is acquired by a small audit firm. This implies that increasing the number of smaller audit firms could increase the quality level of the audit market

The Role of Information and Financial Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting

We review recent literature on the role of financial reporting transparency in reducing governance-related agency conflicts among managers, directors, and shareholders, as well as in reducing agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors, and offer researchers some suggested avenues for future research. Key themes include the endogenous nature of debt contracts and governance mechanisms with respect to information asymmetry between contracting parties, the heterogeneous nature of the informational demands of contracting parties, and the heterogeneous nature of the resulting governance and debt contracts. We also emphasize the role of a commitment to financial reporting transparency in facilitating informal multiperiod contracts among managers, directors, shareholders, and creditors