166 research outputs found

    Is there a physically universal cellular automaton or Hamiltonian?

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    It is known that both quantum and classical cellular automata (CA) exist that are computationally universal in the sense that they can simulate, after appropriate initialization, any quantum or classical computation, respectively. Here we introduce a different notion of universality: a CA is called physically universal if every transformation on any finite region can be (approximately) implemented by the autonomous time evolution of the system after the complement of the region has been initialized in an appropriate way. We pose the question of whether physically universal CAs exist. Such CAs would provide a model of the world where the boundary between a physical system and its controller can be consistently shifted, in analogy to the Heisenberg cut for the quantum measurement problem. We propose to study the thermodynamic cost of computation and control within such a model because implementing a cyclic process on a microsystem may require a non-cyclic process for its controller, whereas implementing a cyclic process on system and controller may require the implementation of a non-cyclic process on a "meta"-controller, and so on. Physically universal CAs avoid this infinite hierarchy of controllers and the cost of implementing cycles on a subsystem can be described by mixing properties of the CA dynamics. We define a physical prior on the CA configurations by applying the dynamics to an initial state where half of the CA is in the maximum entropy state and half of it is in the all-zero state (thus reflecting the fact that life requires non-equilibrium states like the boundary between a hold and a cold reservoir). As opposed to Solomonoff's prior, our prior does not only account for the Kolmogorov complexity but also for the cost of isolating the system during the state preparation if the preparation process is not robust.Comment: 27 pages, 1 figur

    Causal inference using the algorithmic Markov condition

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    Inferring the causal structure that links n observables is usually based upon detecting statistical dependences and choosing simple graphs that make the joint measure Markovian. Here we argue why causal inference is also possible when only single observations are present. We develop a theory how to generate causal graphs explaining similarities between single objects. To this end, we replace the notion of conditional stochastic independence in the causal Markov condition with the vanishing of conditional algorithmic mutual information and describe the corresponding causal inference rules. We explain why a consistent reformulation of causal inference in terms of algorithmic complexity implies a new inference principle that takes into account also the complexity of conditional probability densities, making it possible to select among Markov equivalent causal graphs. This insight provides a theoretical foundation of a heuristic principle proposed in earlier work. We also discuss how to replace Kolmogorov complexity with decidable complexity criteria. This can be seen as an algorithmic analog of replacing the empirically undecidable question of statistical independence with practical independence tests that are based on implicit or explicit assumptions on the underlying distribution.Comment: 16 figure

    Detecting confounding in multivariate linear models via spectral analysis

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    We study a model where one target variable Y is correlated with a vector X:=(X_1,...,X_d) of predictor variables being potential causes of Y. We describe a method that infers to what extent the statistical dependences between X and Y are due to the influence of X on Y and to what extent due to a hidden common cause (confounder) of X and Y. The method relies on concentration of measure results for large dimensions d and an independence assumption stating that, in the absence of confounding, the vector of regression coefficients describing the influence of each X on Y typically has `generic orientation' relative to the eigenspaces of the covariance matrix of X. For the special case of a scalar confounder we show that confounding typically spoils this generic orientation in a characteristic way that can be used to quantitatively estimate the amount of confounding.Comment: 27 pages, 16 figure
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