Regulation of Telecommunications: The Choice Between Market and Regulatory Failures

Purpose – The paper examines the main regulatory frameworks of the telecommunications industry through the concept of market failure and analyses how and why the policy often leads to undesirable outcomes that might be considered as regulatory failure. Methodology/approach/design – The research uses the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications as a base for the analysis of the main policy objectives through the prism of the market failure theory with an eye to the interests of the main market players in the telecommunications markets. Findings – About any aspect of regulation allows to find ways to create opportunities for some groups of the industry and stifle activity of others. Despite the theory of market failure provides reasonable justifications for regulation of telecommunications markets, it is possible to argue that many of these problems are mainly the consequence of the policy and could be better solved by market mechanisms. Originality/value – The results of the research allow to look at the problems of telecommunications development and issues of the high level of concentration of the telecommunications markets as regulatory formed problems rather than consequences of the inherited industry’s characteristics

Regulation of Telecommunications: The Choice Between Market and Regulatory Failures

Purpose – The paper examines the main regulatory frameworks of the telecommunications industry through the concept of market failure and analyses how and why the policy often leads to undesirable outcomes that might be considered as regulatory failure. Methodology/approach/design – The research uses the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications as a base for the analysis of the main policy objectives through the prism of the market failure theory with an eye to the interests of the main market players in the telecommunications markets. Findings – About any aspect of regulation allows to find ways to create opportunities for some groups of the industry and stifle activity of others. Despite the theory of market failure provides reasonable justifications for regulation of telecommunications markets, it is possible to argue that many of these problems are mainly the consequence of the policy and could be better solved by market mechanisms. Originality/value – The results of the research allow to look at the problems of telecommunications development and issues of the high level of concentration of the telecommunications markets as regulatory formed problems rather than consequences of the inherited industry’s characteristics

Multiclass classification using quantum convolutional neural networks with hybrid quantum-classical learning

Multiclass classification is of great interest for various applications, for example, it is a common task in computer vision, where one needs to categorize an image into three or more classes. Here we propose a quantum machine learning approach based on quantum convolutional neural networks for solving the multiclass classification problem. The corresponding learning procedure is implemented via TensorFlowQuantum as a hybrid quantum-classical (variational) model, where quantum output results are fed to the softmax activation function with the subsequent minimization of the cross entropy loss via optimizing the parameters of the quantum circuit. Our conceptional improvements here include a new model for a quantum perceptron and an optimized structure of the quantum circuit. We use the proposed approach to solve a 4-class classification problem for the case of the MNIST dataset using eight qubits for data encoding and four ancilla qubits; previous results have been obtained for 3-class classification problems. Our results show that the accuracy of our solution is similar to classical convolutional neural networks with comparable numbers of trainable parameters. We expect that our findings will provide a new step toward the use of quantum neural networks for solving relevant problems in the NISQ era and beyond

Regulation of Telecommunications: the Choice Between Market and Regulatory Failures

Purpose \u2013 The paper examines the main regulatory frameworks of the telecommunications industry through the concept of market failure and analyses how and why the policy often leads to undesirable outcomes that might be considered as regulatory failure. Methodology/approach/design \u2013 The research uses the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications as a base for the analysis of the main policy objectives through the prism of the market failure theory with an eye to the interests of the main market players in the telecommunications markets. Findings \u2013 About any aspect of regulation allows to find ways to create opportunities for some groups of the industry and stifle activity of others. Despite the theory of market failure provides reasonable justifications for regulation of telecommunications markets, it is possible to argue that many of these problems are mainly the consequence of the policy and could be better solved by market mechanisms. Originality/value \u2013 The results of the research allow to look at the problems of telecommunications development and issues of the high level of concentration of telecommunications markets as at the regulatory formed problems rather than consequences of the inherited industry\u2019s characteristics

Analysing the Impact of Regulation on Disruptive Innovations: The Case of Wireless Technology

The paper analyses the role of regulation in the suppression of disruptive innovations and shows that this process might be explained by the dependance on the path of joint evolution of regulation and the mainstream technology. Industrial policy in highly regulated industries such as wireless telecommunications is able to support evolution of established technologies and adjust itself to sustaining innovations, while regulatory disconnection impedes disruptive technologies, and the market plays a quite secondary role in this process. We observe more innovations in those parts of telecommunications where regulator is less active, but the core, the physical layer, of the industry is changing in sustaining way of development of the technology. The paper argues that the problem of impediment to disruptive innovations could be alleviated if the crucial resources of the industry were accessible for a number of potential innovators and newcomers. The openness makes easier the appearance of disruptive technologies, and regulation must facilitate it in order to promote opportunities for creative destruction

Regulation of Telecommunications: the Choice Between Market and Regulatory Failures

Purpose \u2013 The paper examines the main regulatory frameworks of the telecommunications industry through the concept of market failure and analyses how and why the policy often leads to undesirable outcomes that might be considered as regulatory failure. Methodology/approach/design \u2013 The research uses the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications as a base for the analysis of the main policy objectives through the prism of the market failure theory with an eye to the interests of the main market players in the telecommunications markets. Findings \u2013 About any aspect of regulation allows to find ways to create opportunities for some groups of the industry and stifle activity of others. Despite the theory of market failure provides reasonable justifications for regulation of telecommunications markets, it is possible to argue that many of these problems are mainly the consequence of the policy and could be better solved by market mechanisms. Originality/value \u2013 The results of the research allow to look at the problems of telecommunications development and issues of the high level of concentration of telecommunications markets as at the regulatory formed problems rather than consequences of the inherited industry\u2019s characteristics