Plural Slot Theory

Kit Fine (2000) breaks with tradition, arguing that, pace Russell (e.g., 1903: 228), relations have neither directions nor converses. He considers two ways to conceive of these new "neutral" relations, positionalism and anti-positionalism, and argues that the latter should be preferred to the former. Cody Gilmore (2013) argues for a generalization of positionalism, slot theory, the view that a property or relation is n-adic if and only if there are exactly n slots in it, and (very roughly) that each slot may be occupied by at most one entity. Slot theory (and with it, positionalism) bears the full brunt of Fine's (2000) symmetric completions and conflicting adicities problems. I fully develop an alternative, plural slot theory (or pocket theory), which avoids these problems, key elements of which are first considered by Yi (1999: 168 ff.). Like the slot theorist, the pocket theorist posits entities (pockets) in properties and relations that can be occupied. But unlike the slot theorist, the pocket theorist denies that at most one entity can occupy any one of them. As a result, she must also deny that the adicity of a property or relation is equal to the number of occupiable entities in it. By abandoning these theses, however, the pocket theorist is able to avoid Fine's problems, resulting in a stronger theory about the internal structure of properties and relations. Pocket theory also avoids a serious drawback of anti-positionalism

Between Atomism and Superatomism

There are at least three vaguely atomistic principles that have come up in the literature, two explicitly and one implicitly. First, standard atomism is the claim that everything is composed of atoms, and is very often how atomism is characterized in the literature. Second, superatomism is the claim that parthood is well-founded, which implies that every proper parthood chain terminates, and has been discussed as a stronger alternative to standard atomism. Third, there is a principle that lies between these two theses in terms of its relative strength: strong atomism, the claim that every maximal proper parthood chain terminates. Although strong atomism is equivalent to superatomism in classical extensional mereology, it is strictly weaker than it in strictly weaker systems in which parthood is a partial order. And it is strictly stronger than standard atomism in classical extensional mereology and, given the axiom of choice, in such strictly weaker systems as well. Though strong atomism has not, to my knowledge, been explicitly identified, Shiver appears to have it in mind, though it is unclear whether he recognizes that it is not equivalent to standard atomism in each of the mereologies he considers. I prove these logical relationships which hold amongst these three atomistic principles, and argue that, whether one adopts classical extensional mereology or a system strictly weaker than it in which parthood is a partial order, standard atomism is a more defensible addition to one’s mereology than either of the other two principles, and it should be regarded as the best formulation of the atomistic thesis

Infinite Descent

Once one accepts that certain things metaphysically depend upon, or are metaphysically explained by, other things, it is natural to begin to wonder whether these chains of dependence or explanation must come to an end. This essay surveys the work that has been done on this issue—the issue of grounding and infinite descent. I frame the discussion around two questions: (1) What is infinite descent of ground? and (2) Is infinite descent of ground possible? In addressing the second question, I will consider a number of arguments that have been made for and against the possibility of infinite descent of ground. When relevant, I connect the discussion to two important views about the way reality can be structured by grounding: metaphysical foundationalism and metaphysical infinitism

Redesigning the Curriculum for Aviation Maintenance Apprenticeships: Integrating Social and Reflective Practices

Competencies have been used for many years to align the values, behaviour, knowledge, and skills of individuals with the goals of the organizations in which they are employed. The organization in which I am employed in the role as a technical instructor, previously did not have a curriculum in place to support a competency-based model for the apprentices who are working in an aviation maintenance capacity. This action research paper outlines the redesigned curriculum, grafting reflective and social learning aspects; the result of is intended to affect positive change in the learning practices of both the individual and organization

Assessing Socio-Economic Risk of Affected Populations in the Path of Lahars Flows from Mount Rainier

https://digitalcommons.tacoma.uw.edu/gis_projects/1059/thumbnail.jp

The theory and pedagody of semantic inconsistency in critical reasoning

One aspect of critical reasoning is the analysis and appraisal of claims and arguments. A typical problem, when analysing and appraising arguments, is inconsistent statements. Although several inconsistencies may have deleterious effects on rationality and action, not all of them do. As educators, we also have an obligation to teach this evaluation in a way that does justice to our normal reasoning practices and judgements of inconsistency. Thus, there is a need to determine the acceptable inconsistencies from those that are not, and to impart that information to students. We might ask: What is the best concept of inconsistency for critical reasoning and pedagogy? While the answer might appear obvious to some, the history of philosophy shows that there are many concepts of “inconsistency”, the most common of which comes from classical logic and its reliance on opposing truth-values. The current exemplar of this is the standard truth functional account from propositional logic. Initially, this conception is shown to be problematic, practically, conceptually and pedagogically speaking. Especially challenging from the classical perspective are the concepts of ex contradictione quodlibet and ex falso quodlibet. The concepts may poison the well against any notion of inconsistency, which is not something that should be done unreflectively. Ultimately, the classical account of inconsistency is rejected. In its place, a semantic conception of inconsistency is argued for and demonstrated to handle natural reasoning cases effectively. This novel conception utilises the conceptual antonym theory to explain semantic contrast and gradation, even in the absence of non-canonical antonym pairs. The semantic conception of inconsistency also fits with an interrogative argument model that exploits inconsistency to display semantic contrast in reasons and conclusions. A method for determining substantive inconsistencies follows from this argument model in a 4 straightforward manner. The conceptual fit is then incorporated into the pedagogy of critical reasoning, resulting in a natural approach to reasoning which students can apply to practical matters of everyday life, which include inconsistency. Thus, the best conception of inconsistency for critical reasoning and its pedagogy is the semantic, not the classical.Philosophy Practical and Systematic TheologyD. Phi

Relative Positionalism and Variable Arity Relations

Maureen Donnelly’s (2016) relative positionalism correctly handles any fixed arity relation with any symmetry such a relation can have, yielding the intuitively correct way(s) in which that relation can apply. And it supplies an explanation of what is going on in the world that makes this the case. But it has at least one potential shortcoming — one that its opponents are likely to seize upon: it can only handle relations with fixed arities. It is unable to handle relations with variable arities. I argue that, all else being equal, relative positionalism ought nonetheless to be preferred to its closest competitors — at least to the extent that the explanation it supplies of relational application is plausible — even though those competitors can handle variable arity relations in addition to fixed arity relations

Towards an "Invested Empirical Method": Reclaiming Feminist Science Studies

This article summarizes some of the contributions of feminist science scholars in order to explore the possibilities of a critical science of sex, gender, and sexuality, and suggests the radical possibilities of "invested empirical research methods" - investigative approaches grounded in both scientific method and an interest in social justice. Résumé Cet article fait le sommaire de certaines contributions de spécialistes de la science féministe afin d'explorer les possibilités d'une science critique sur le sexe, sur le genre et la sexualité, et suggère les possibilités radicales des « méthodes de recherches empiriques investies » - rechercher des approches basées sur la méthode scientifique et sur un intérêt pour la justice sociale

Long (Standing) Digital Divisions: Women's IT Work in Canada

This article explores the concept of "digital divide" as it pertains to women's work in and with IT in Canada. While "digital divide" has some usefulness as an analytical concept for feminist scholars, the complex nature of IT-based work requires a broader and deeper understanding. Résumé Cet article explore le concept de la "division digitale" en ce qui a trait au travail des femmes dans et avec la technologie informatique au Canada. Quoique la "division digitale" ait quelqu’utilité en tant que concept analytique pour les érudites féministes, la nature complexe du travail basé sur la technologie informatique demande une com prehension plus élargie et plus approfondie