Reconciling WTP to actual adoption of green energy tariffs: A diffusion model of an induced environmental marke

This paper develops a formal model that links the willingness to pay (WTP) literature with the established innovation diffusion literature. This concern arises from an attempt to reconcile the large disparities that have been observed between actual adoption of green energy tariffs and WTP for such tariffs. These disparities have often been attributed to upward response bias and the free rider problem. However, empirical research indicates that other factors have hindered the development of green energy markets, including supply side problems and poor regulation. Using an epidemic diffusion framework our model shows how increasing consumer environmental concern driven by word of mouth and mass media communication channels results in a growing number of people who state they are WTP for green energy. The presence of upward response bias and the free rider problem result in 'feasible adoption' being below stated WTP. Feasible adoption is, in turn, differentiated from actual adoption by the extent of market imperfections. It is concluded that; (1) the potential of such markets may take time to reap and that the low penetration rates of today may reflect a conventional diffusion trajectory and (2); low and stable energy prices appear to be a precondition if consumers are to contribute substantively to the funding of renewables investments through green tariffs.Willingness-to-pay, innovation diffusion, green energy, environmental valuation

Market entry and roll-out with product differentiation

This paper examines a general problem exemplified by post-auction (third generation---`3G') mobile telecommunications markets. When entering these (or any other) markets, firms must often decide on the degree of coverage (`roll-out') they wish to achieve. Prior investment must be sunk in order to achieve the desired (or mandated) coverage level. We study the private and social incentives of a would-be entrant into a market with horizontal product differentiation when choosing its level of roll-out. The endogenous extent of entry influences downstream retail prices; Bertrand or local monopoly pricing or a mixed strategy equilibrium may emerge. Importantly, entry may involve too much or too little roll-out from a social perspective, thus suggesting that regulatory intervention may be appropriate to achieve desired levels of competition in such settings.

What is the Strategic Response Adopted by SMES During the COVID-19 Crisis in the UAE? A Case Study of Two Emirati SMES

The coronavirus pandemic has triggered an unprecedented economic crisis that is having a drastic negative impact on the financial performance and competitiveness of businesses around the world. Due to COVID-19, the global economy has contracted severely, making it difficult for companies around the world to maintain adequate levels of performance and profitability. SMEs are particularly vulnerable to such disruptions, as their access to finance and human resources is much more limited compared to medium or large companies. However, since SMEs contribute significantly to a country’s gross domestic product (GDP), the threat of coronavirus to their viability poses a significant threat to the economic and social development of their host country. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) experienced the negative economic consequences of COVID-19 with its GDP witnessing a significant decline in 2020. While virtually all Emirati businesses have suffered losses due to COVID-19, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) were particularly vulnerable to the consequences of the pandemic due to their small size and newness. This study aims to find out how Emirati SMEs are strategically responding to the coronavirus crisis and coping with its impact. To achieve this, a case study was conducted on two Emirati SMEs and data from semi-structured interviews and self-administered questionnaires were used. Primary quantitative data were collected from 50 employees of two SMEs operating in the UAE. One company specialized in real estate and maintenance services, and the second was a yacht manufacturing company that also provided maintenance services. In addition, primary qualitative data were collected from 10 managers and owners of these SMEs. Our research found that supply chain disruptions, supplier bankruptcy, limited access to financial resources, demand shortages, and limited field-service activities were among the main challenges faced by the two SMEs during the COVID-19 crisis. The strategic responses that were actively adopted by these SMEs included monitoring the external environment for business opportunities, adjusting supplier management, servitization, and establishing new supply chain links and partnerships. By developing an understanding of the strategic responses of the two SMEs, our research contributed to both theory and practice by applying the concept of crisis management to SMEs facing the COVID-19 crisis, a crisis that can be considered a “black swan” event. By exploring this topic, the research contributes to the existing body of knowledge and to our understanding of how SMEs in a developing economy respond to COVID-19 and how resilient they are to this major crisis. Keywords: SMEs, COVID-19, crisis management, strategic response

Quality and Environmental Regulation: Verifying Compliance along the Supply Chain

Among the factors providing incentives to monitor the behaviour of input suppliers are the regulatory requirements to which downstream firms are subject. We develop a formal economic model to examine the relationship between the strictness of the regulatory environment and downstream firms’ incentives to act as inspectors of their sub-contractors. We consider the interaction between a downstream producer and an upstream input supplier. The downstream chooses the probability with which to monitor the upstream’s compliance and the upstream chooses a compliance level which determines compliance of the end product with quality or environmental regulation. We find that the strictness of regulation affects the downstream’s monitoring strategy in combination with the level of quality or environmental standards. If the standards are sufficiently low then the strictness of regulation increases incentives to monitor the upstream. Contrary, if the standards are sufficiently high then the pressure on the downstream to monitor the upstream is relaxed and the strictness of regulation decreases incentives to monitor. We argue that the strictness of regulation should not be treated in isolation as a factor determining the choice of downstream firms to monitor their input suppliers.compliance; monitoring; supply chain; quality and environmental regulation

Exploring How the Covid-19 Pandemic has Changed Greek Consumers' Habits

The recent COVID-19 pandemic has impacted various aspects of consumer behavior and affected spending levels. In addition, businesses have had to adapt to everchanging environmental conditions to survive this global health, economic, and social crisis. The online market has taken an important place in people’s daily lives, while e-commerce sales and social media usage increased during this period. The main objective of this article was to examine how the COVID-19 pandemic affected and changed consumer behavior. Using a web survey of 117 consumers in Greece, this study sheds light on the seminal topic of changes in purchasing behavior during the COVID -19 pandemic, while the research findings may contribute to the development of more appropriate marketing strategies. Keywords: Covid-19 pandemic, consumer behavior, online shoppin

Optimal pricing of court services *

Abstract Litigants are generally charged for using court services. The charges involved are usually set to achieve a combination of efficiency, equity and funding goals. This paper presents a simple model, based on regulated monopoly pricing, to address the question of how these charges should be set. We find that fixed fees generally form part of the optimal charging package, despite concerns about their regressive nature. Per-unit fees will also be used though they may be set below cost; in this case, a trade-off emerges and the fixed fee is used to achieve funding goals. Our model is a useful one for developing extensions from the nonlinear pricing literature. JEL number: K40, L5

Can the Threat of Costly Litigation be Incentive Enough for Companies to Engage in CSR?

In 1970 Milton Friedman wrote “[t]he social responsibility of business is to increase profits” (p. 122). Today there are voices advocating that engaging in CSR is in the direction of increasing profits. It is also argued that engaging in CSR helps firms alleviate some of the risks associated with the uncertain environments in which they operate. This research aims to look at the question of whether the threat of costly litigation can provide an incentive to firms to engage in CSR. We built a model where a firm and an interested party engage in litigation. The firm operates in a market and earns profits and can engage in a level of CSR which will determine the probability that damage will be caused by the firm. An interested party affected by the damage claims compensation. The firm and interested party may settle out of court or the plaintiff may bring the case to court. We assume that besides damages, the firm’s investment in CSR affects the plaintiff’s probability of winning at trial. We find that investment in CSR reduces the amount of cases brought to court and at the same time increases the probability of a case settling out of court. We also find some ambiguity regarding the effect of CSR on settlement offers with the driving forces here being on the one hand the reduction in the probability of the plaintiff winning trial and the increase in the probability of settlement and the level of court costs on the other hand. We conclude that there is incentive for firms to invest in CSR in order to avoid costly litigatio

CSR as a signal to inform collective action

Collective action in the form of a boycott or a campaign or any other threat that affects the operations of a firm is considered an instrument in the hands of organizations and consumers to control firm behaviour and to apply pressure on firms to behave in a socially responsible manner. This paper adds to existing literature on collective action in the context of CSR by looking at firms’ incentives to signal their true technology through the choice of CSR in order to avoid collective action of a higher magnitude than that corresponding to their true type of technology. It is shown that collective action does not always succeed to provide incentives to firms to engage in CSR and finds conditions for collective action to be successful