Moral Rationalization Contributes More Strongly to Escalation of Unethical Behavior Among Low Moral Identifiers Than Among High Moral Identifiers

Occasional acts of immorality are commonplace. One way in which people deal with their own prior immoral acts, is to rationalize why their acts are morally acceptable. It has been argued that such post hoc moral rationalizations may contribute to continuation or escalation of immoral behavior. This paper experimentally tests this causal influence of post hoc moral argumentation on escalation of immoral behavior and also tests how this depends on people’s level of moral identity. In three experiments we asked participants to generate moral arguments for their past behaviors. The results show that engaging in moral rationalization causes subsequent continuation and escalation of previous immoral behavior, but more so for low moral identifiers than for high moral identifiers.Social decision makin

Leader-Follower Effects in Resource Dilemmas: The Roles of Leadership Selection and Social Responsibility

Previous research on the allocation of scarce resources shows that when people are assigned labels of leader or follower in their group, leaders allocate more of the scarce resources to themselves than followers do. In three laboratory studies, we examine the idea that how people are selected for the leader role (i.e. election or appointment) determines whether leaders take more or equal shares (relative to followers) from a common resource. In a first experiment, we show that participants were more accepting of norm violating behavior by an appointed versus elected leader. In a second experiment, we show that when participants were assigned to a leader or follower role, allocations of appointed leaders differed significantly from those of elected leaders and followers, whereas there was no difference between the two latter conditions. Moreover, elected leaders were shown to feel more social responsibility than both appointed leaders and followers. In a final experiment, we show that when participants were primed with the concept of social responsibility (relative to a neutral condition) no difference in allocations between appointed and elected leaders emerged

Buying and selling exchange goods: Loss aversion and the endowment effect

An experimental market was used to investigate whether exchange goods may be susceptible to the endowment effect. Previous research (Kahneman et al., 1990) suggested that the endowment effect will not be observed in exchange goods. The present study demonstrates that it may be observed, but only when traders are uncertain about future exchange prices. It is argued that this is a manifestation of loss aversion due to the difficulty of computing the net gains and losses of trade when exchange rates are uncertain

Get Angry, Get Out: The Interpersonal Effects of Anger Communication in Multiparty Negotiation

Research on multiparty negotiation has investigated how parties form coalitions to secure payoffs but has not addressed how emotions may affect such coalition decisions. Extending research on bilateral negotiations which has generally argued that it is beneficial to communicate anger, we argue that it constitutes a considerable risk when there are more than two people present at the negotiation table. Using a computer-mediated coalition game we show that communicating anger is a risky strategy in multiparty bargaining. The main findings of three studies were that participants: (1) form negative impressions of players who communicate anger and therefore (2) exclude such players from coalitions and from obtaining a payoff share, but (3) make considerable concessions on those rare occasions that they choose to form a coalition with an angry player, or (4) when they had to form a coalition with an angry player. We discuss the implications of these results for theorizing on emotions, negotiations, and coalition formation

Dealing with missed opportunities: action vs. state orientation moderates inaction inertia

Inaction inertia refers to the effect that missing a more attractive opportunity decreases the likelihood to act on an attractive current opportunity in the same domain. We studied the influence of how people cope with negative decision outcomes (i.e., action vs. state orientation) on this inaction inertia effect. Experiment 1 used an experimental induction of action vs. state orientation and confirmed our prediction that state oriented people showed more inaction inertia than action oriented people. Experiment 2 replicated these results with a measure of chronic action orientation and showed a mediating effect of valuation of the current opportunity. Experiment 3 showed that temporal segregation of the current from the missed opportunity decreased inaction inertia effects for state oriented, but not for action oriented people. We discuss the implications of these results for the inaction inertia and action vs. state orientation literatures

Missed losses loom larger than missed gains: Electrodermal reactivity to decision choices and outcomes in a gambling task.

This is the final version of the article. It was first available from Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13415-015-0395-yLoss aversion is a defining characteristic of prospect theory, whereby responses are stronger to losses than to equivalently sized gains (Kahneman & Tversky Econometrica, 47, 263-291, 1979). By monitoring electrodermal activity (EDA) during a gambling task, in this study we examined physiological activity during risky decisions, as well as to both obtained (e.g., gains and losses) and counterfactual (e.g., narrowly missed gains and losses) outcomes. During the bet selection phase, EDA increased linearly with bet size, highlighting the role of somatic signals in decision-making under uncertainty in a task without any learning requirement. Outcome-related EDA scaled with the magnitudes of monetary wins and losses, and losses had a stronger impact on EDA than did equivalently sized wins. Narrowly missed wins (i.e., near-wins) and narrowly missed losses (i.e., near-losses) also evoked EDA responses, and the change of EDA as a function of the size of the missed outcome was modestly greater for near-losses than for near-wins, suggesting that near-losses have more impact on subjective value than do near-wins. Across individuals, the slope for choice-related EDA (as a function of bet size) correlated with the slope for outcome-related EDA as a function of both the obtained and counterfactual outcome magnitudes, and these correlations were stronger for loss and near-loss conditions than for win and near-win conditions. Taken together, these asymmetrical EDA patterns to objective wins and losses, as well as to near-wins and near-losses, provide a psychophysiological instantiation of the value function curve in prospect theory, which is steeper in the negative than in the positive domain.This work was completed within the University of Cambridge Behavioural and Clinical Neuroscience Institute (director: TW Robbins), supported by a consortium award from the Medical Research Council (MRC Ref G1000183) and Wellcome Trust (WT Ref 093875/Z/10/Z). YW was supported by a Chinese Scholarship Council–Cambridge International Scholarship and the Treherne Studentship in Biological Sciences from Downing College, Cambridge. LC is the Director of the Centre for Gambling Research at UBC, which is supported by funding from the British Columbia Lottery Corporation and the Province of BC government

Product forms for availability

This paper shows and illustrates that product form expressions for the steady state distribution, as known for queueing networks, can also be extended to a class of availability models. This class allows breakdown and repair rates from one component to depend on the status of other components. Common resource capacities and repair priorities, for example, are included. Conditions for the models to have a product form are stated explicitly. This product form is shown to be insensitive to the distributions of the underlying random variables, i.e. to depend only on their means. Further it is briefly indicated how queueing for repair can be incorporated. Novel product form examples are presented of a simple series/parallel configuration, a fault tolerant database system and a multi-stage interconnection network

How emotion communication guides reciprocity: establishing cooperation through disappointment and anger

Emotions fulfil many social functions, but data on their essential function of establishing cooperation are lacking. We investigated how communicating anger and disappointment guides reciprocal cooperative behavior. Although anger may force cooperation by announcing retaliation, we predicted that communicating disappointment was less likely to backfire. A laboratory study in which participants played against the reciprocal strategy of tit-for-tat showed that communicated disappointment established more cooperation than did anger. This effect also carried over to future cooperation decisions. Partners communicating disappointment evoked less anger, were evaluated more positively and as forgiving rather than retaliatory. Communication of disappointment thus appears conducive to establishing mutually beneficial relationships

When and how communicated guilt affects contributions in public good dilemmas

"Two laboratory studies investigated how groups may deal with the strong emotions that social dilemmas often elicit. A first study showed that a new group member evaluated guilt communicated by a fellow group member as more instrumental than neutral emotion feedback when the amount of required resources to obtain the public good (i.e., provision point) was perceived as difficult to obtain. A second study revealed that participants use communicated guilt to draw inferences about both past and future contributions from all fellow group members. Participants also contributed more themselves and adhered to equality more often when guilt versus no emotion was communicated, but only when the provision point was high. Expected contributions from fellow group members mediated this effect." [author's abstract

A “More-is-Better” heuristic in anticommons dilemmas: Psychological insights from a new anticommons bargaining game

In the present paper, we investigate how people make decisions when bargaining about complementary resources. When the ownership of such resources is fragmented, actors often fail to coordinate on efficient access, leading to an overall loss in social welfare; the tragedy of the anticommons. In a series of three experiments, in which we introduce a newly developed Anticommons Bargaining Game, we show that people tend to treat perfectly complementary resources as if they are non-complementary. Specifically, we demonstrate that both sellers and buyers of such resources used a more-is-better heuristic when determining their prices. That is, sellers who initially owned a larger part of the resource asked a higher price for their resource than sellers with a smaller part, even though only the combination of parts generated value for the buyer. Likewise, buyers offered more money to sellers with a larger part than to sellers with a smaller part. While this heuristic does not necessarily impede coordination, inequality in resources led to unequal monetary outcomes between the two sellers