Terror, tortur og den tikkende bombe

The so-called “war on terror” has renewed the interest in torture in practice as well as in theory. The philosophical debate about possible justifications for torture has to a large extent revolved about the ticking time-bomb scenario: would it be justified to torture a terrorist in order to prevent a catastrophe? I criticize arguments based on ticking bomb scenarios in two steps. First, I show that exceptional resort to torture will not be possible in the situations where it is most needed. Second, I state several pragmatic as well as principled objections against a state sanctioned or tolerated practice of torture. Finally, I offer an explanation of what it means to regard the prohibition of torture as absolute

Forskningsintegritet og videnskabens etos: – om redeskideri og ansvarlig forskningspraksis

In this article, I discuss present development in Danish university research, which put research integrity under pressure. The background for the article is a recent enhanced focus on the subject in the shape of rules and procedures for enhancing responsible conduct of research. The article discusses the relation between norms and counter norms for scientific research and includes a recent case about questionable research practice at Aarhus University

Dronedrab og etik – i princippet og i praksis

I artiklen argumenteres der for, at de moralske problemer i den militære praksis med målrettede dronedrab knytter sig til en række bestemte karakteristika ved dronekrig, som er definitoriske. Det er derfor problematisk, at der ofte abstraheres fra disse karakteristika, når moralfilosoffer diskuterer, om dronekrig ”i princippet” er moralsk forsvarlig eller ej

Lessons of Reproductive Ethics for Principlism

This article brings together two debates in bioethics more substantively than has been the case until now. One is the methodological debate over "principlism," i.e., the theoretical framework for analyzing and solving (bio)ethical problems proposed by Beauchamp and Childress in Principles of Biomedical Ethics (PBE). The other is the normative debate about reproductive ethics, i.e., procreative rights and obligations in a time of pervasive opportunities for making detailed choices about the properties and capacities of future people. The obvious point of bringing the debates together is to show how they can illuminate each other in fruitful ways consistent with the method of reflective equilibrium endorsed in PBE. Furthermore, discussions of reproductive ethics is almost absent in PBE, making it an interesting "test case" on how principlist theory can have an impact on and be affected by confrontations with new practices and considerations in biomedicine. Reproductive ethics is especially interesting due to the so-called non-identity considerations, which pose a challenge to common morality views on harm to and respect for persons. My focus is mainly on some methodological points about the import of concrete normative discussions for formulating basic normative principles. However, I unfold a number of substantial points in order to demonstrate this. It is my impression that most writers on principlism underestimate the effect of engaging with concrete problems. Specifically, I conclude that reflecting on procreative obligations provides strong reasons for specifying the basic principles in ways that uncover new dimensions of them and not just new applications. Key words: principlism, reproductive ethics, non-identity problem, nonmaleficence, respect for person