Sylvan's Bottle and other Problems

According to Richard Routley, a comprehensive theory of fiction is impossible, since almost anything is in principle imaginable. In my view, Routley is right: for any purported logic of fiction, there will be actual or imaginable fictions that successfully counterexample the logic. Using the example of ‘impossible’ fictions, I test this claim against theories proposed by Routley’s Meinongian contemporaries and also by Routley himself (for what he called ‘esoteric’ works of fiction) and his 21st century heirs. I argue that the phenomenon of impossible fictions challenges even today’s modal Meinongians

Can a Robot Smile? Wittgenstein on Facial Expression

Some researchers in social robotics aim to build ‘face robots’—machines that interact with human beings (or other robots) by means of facial expression and gesture. They aim, in part, to use these robots to test hypotheses concerning human social and psychological development (and disorders such as autism) in controlled, repeatable experiments. A robot may be said to ‘grin’ and ‘frown’, or to have ‘a smile on its face’. This is not to claim merely that the robot has a certain physical configuration or behaviour; nor is it to say merely that the robot’s ‘facial’ display is, like an emoticon or photograph, a representation of a smile or frown. Although researchers may refrain from claiming that their machines have emotions, they attribute expressive behaviours to them literally and without qualification. Wittgenstein said, however, ‘A smiling mouth smiles only in a human face’. Smiling is a complex conventional gesture. A facial display is a smile only if it has a certain meaning—the meaning that distinguishes a smile from a human grimace or facial tic, and from a chimpanzee’s bared-teeth display. In this paper I explore the implications of Wittgenstein’s remarks on expression for the claim that face robots can smile or frown

Rethinking Turing’s Test and the Philosophical Implications

© 2020, Springer Nature B.V. In the 70 years since Alan Turing’s ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ appeared in Mind, there have been two widely-accepted interpretations of the Turing test: the canonical behaviourist interpretation and the rival inductive or epistemic interpretation. These readings are based on Turing’s Mind paper; few seem aware that Turing described two other versions of the imitation game. I have argued that both readings are inconsistent with Turing’s 1948 and 1952 statements about intelligence, and fail to explain the design of his game. I argue instead for a response-dependence interpretation (Proudfoot 2013). This interpretation has implications for Turing’s view of free will: I argue that Turing’s writings suggest a new form of free will compatibilism, which I call response-dependence compatibilism (Proudfoot 2017a). The philosophical implications of rethinking Turing’s test go yet further. It is assumed by numerous theorists that Turing anticipated the computational theory of mind. On the contrary, I argue, his remarks on intelligence and free will lead to a new objection to computationalism

Turing’s Three Senses of “Emotional”

Turing used the expression “emotional” in three distinct ways: to state his philosophical theory of the concept of intelligence, to classify arguments for and against the possibility of machine intelligence, and to describe the education of a “child machine”. The remarks on emotion include several of the most important philosophical claims. This paper analyses these remarks and their significance for current research in Artificial Intelligence

Can a Robot Smile? Wittgenstein on Facial Expression

Recent work in social robotics, which is aimed both at creating an artificial intelligence and providing a test-bed for psychological theories of human social development, involves building robots that can learn from ‘face-to-face’ interaction with human beings — as human infants do. The building-blocks of this interaction include the robot’s ‘expressive’ behaviours, for example, facial-expression and head-and-neck gesture. There is here an ideal opportunity to apply Wittgensteinian conceptual analysis to current theoretical and empirical work in the sciences. Wittgenstein’s philosophical psychology is sympathetic to embodied and situated Artificial Intelligence (see Proudfoot, 2002, 2004b), and his discussion of facial-expression is remarkably modern. In this chapter, I explore his approach to facial-expression, using smiling as a representative example, and apply it to the canonical interactive face robot, Cynthia Breazeal’s Kismet (see e.g. Breazeal, 2009, 2002). I assess the claim that Kismet has expressive behaviours, with the aim of generating philosophical insights for AI

Fetuin-A and albumin alter cytotoxic effects of calcium phosphate nanoparticles on human vascular smooth muscle cells

Calcification is a detrimental process in vascular ageing and in diseases such as atherosclerosis and arthritis. In particular, small calcium phosphate (CaP) crystal deposits are associated with inflammation and atherosclerotic plaque de-stabilisation. We previously reported that CaP particles caused human vascular smooth muscle cell (VSMC) death and that serum reduced the toxic effects of the particles. Here, we found that the serum proteins fetuin-A and albumin (≥1 µM) reduced intracellular Ca2+ elevations and cell death in VSMCs in response to CaP particles. In addition, CaP particles functionalised with fetuin-A, but not albumin, were less toxic than naked CaP particles. Electron microscopic studies revealed that CaP particles were internalised in different ways; via macropinocytosis, membrane invagination or plasma membrane damage, which occurred within 10 minutes of exposure to particles. However, cell death did not occur until approximately 30 minutes, suggesting that plasma membrane repair and survival mechanisms were activated. In the presence of fetuin-A, CaP particle-induced damage was inhibited and CaP/plasma membrane interactions and particle uptake were delayed. Fetuin-A also reduced dissolution of CaP particles under acidic conditions, which may contribute to its cytoprotective effects after CaP particle exposure to VSMCs. These studies are particularly relevant to the calcification observed in blood vessels in patients with kidney disease, where circulating levels of fetuin-A and albumin are low, and in pathological situations where CaP crystal formation outweighs calcification-inhibitory mechanisms