Responding to Future Pandemics: Biosecurity Implications and Defense Considerations

In an evolving and expanding biothreat landscape caused by emerging biotechnologies, increases in global infectious disease outbreaks, and geopolitical instability, the Department of Defense now faces challenges that alter its traditional approach to biothreats and prompt the need for modernized, improved preparedness for—and response to—potential biothreat scenarios. These challenges further complicate specific weaknesses revealed by the COVID-19 pandemic, including the Department’s inability to sustain the military mission while meeting intragovernmental expectations to assist with civilian public health resources and services

Safely balancing a double-edged blade: identifying and mitigating emerging biosecurity risks in precision medicine

Tools and methods of precision medicine are developing rapidly, through both iterative discoveries enabled by innovations in biomedical research (e.g., genome editing, synthetic biology, bioengineered devices). These are strengthened by advancements in information technology and the increasing body of data—as assimilated, analyzed, and made accessible—and affectable—through current and emerging cyber—and systems- technologies. Taken together, these approaches afford ever greater volume and availability of individual and collective human data. Machine learning and/or artificial intelligence approaches are broadening this dual use risk; and in the aftermath of COVID-19, there is growing incentive and impetus to gather more biological data from individuals and their environments on a routine basis. By engaging these data—and the interventions that are based upon them, precision medicine offer promise of highly individualized treatments for disease and injury, optimization of structure and function, and concomitantly, the potential for (mis) using data to incur harm. This double-edged blade of benefit and risk obligates the need to safeguard human data from purloinment, through systems, guidelines and policies of a novel discipline, cyberbiosecurity, which, as coupled to ethical precepts, aims to protect human privacy, agency, and safety in ways that remain apace with scientific and technological advances in biomedicine. Herein, current capabilities and trajectories precision medicine are described as relevant to their dual use potential, and approaches to biodata security (viz.- cyberbiosecurity) are proposed and discussed

An Efficient Algorithm for the Spectra of Block Coded PAM Signals

Coordinated Science Laboratory was formerly known as Control Systems LaboratoryAuthor name on cover is misspelled as "Val Di Euliis"Joint Services Electronics Program / DAAB-07-72-C-0259National Science Foundation / NSF ENG 75-2262

Perspective: The Rapidly Expanding Need for Biosecurity by Design

Advancing biotechnologies are revolutionizing not only health and medicine, but also many different sectors such as agriculture, energy, chemistry, and textiles. As synthetic biology is leveraged as a programmable platform for the creation and biodesign of high-value biological medicines, foods, and commodities, the world is facing new territory in terms of ensuring the safety and security of both novel and engineered biological organisms, as well as the biological and digital platforms in which they are designed. Biosecurity practices and policies have traditionally revolved around preventing the misuse of biological pathogens, primarily through controlling access to pathogens. The advent of biodesign capabilities, such as gene editors, gene synthesis capabilities, and genetic engineering, requires a reevaluation of traditional biosecurity policies to mitigate risks associated with such engineering of biological entities. Here, features of “Biosecurity by Design” approaches are described, including the application of risk/benefit analysis and risk mitigation, post-COVID opportunities, and ethical global norms in the progression of biodesign and growing bioeconomies

Synthesis of Ternary Codes for Spectrum Shaping

Coordinated Science Laboratory was formerly known as Control Systems LaboratoryJoint Services Electronics Program / DAAB-07-72-C-0259National Science Foundation / NSF ENG 75-22621U of I OnlyRestricted to UIUC communit

Coding for the Control of Intersymbol Interference in Baseband Channels

121 p.Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1978.U of I OnlyRestricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETD

Synthesis of Ternary Codes for Spectrum Shaping

Coordinated Science Laboratory was formerly known as Control Systems LaboratoryJoint Services Electronics Program / DAAB-07-72-C-0259National Science Foundation / NSF ENG 75-22621U of I OnlyRestricted to UIUC communit

A Holistic Assessment of the Risks and Benefits of the Synthesis of Horsepox Virus

ABSTRACT The re-creation of horsepox virus, an extinct orthopoxvirus with similarity to smallpox virus, has caused concerns in the biosecurity and biodefense communities that the technical capabilities achieved could advance the re-creation of smallpox virus by nefarious actors. The work is now published. While the authors went through due biosecurity diligence at their research institution and with the proper Canadian federal authorities, now that the experiments have been published, there is an opportunity to discuss the dual use risks and benefits of the research itself, as well as those associated with publication of such research—all of which challenge current policies. Here, an analytical framework is used to assess the risks and benefits of such dual use research, and relevant components of biosecurity policy and the biodefense enterprise (including the acquisition of medical countermeasures) in the United States are discussed. The authors emphasize the need to use such risk/benefit assessments at the onset of research and throughout its development, followed by an assessment for its responsible communication