5,669 research outputs found
Partisanship and fiscal policy co-ordination in a monetary union
The recent economic literature shows a new interest in the links between politics and economics. In this paper, we join Hibbs’ partisanship theory with the literature of fiscal policies international co- ordination. Furthermore, by considering a monetary union context, we also open a new angle of view in the recent debate on the effects of the European Monetary Union. In fact, by considering the possibility of governments’ partisan behaviour, we analyse the possibility for governments of internalising macroeconomic spillovers deriving from public expenditure at a national level and investigate the interactions between fiscal and monetary authorities. This paper also partially answers recent concern for considering multi-player contexts and asymmetries in open economy analyses. Here, in fact, several kinds of co-operation and the effects of asymmetries in players' preferences are studied (e.g. the asymmetries in the governments’ preference due to their partisanship).partisanship, monetary union, international cooperation, policy games
Is corporatism feasible?
In this paper we consider a standard policy game between the Government and a union. In such a framework, we first investigate the effects of corporatism on macroeconomic performance vis-à-vis different kinds of non-co-operative equilibria. Afterwards, we introduce in the literature the issue of the feasibility of corporatism, i.e., whether and under what conditions it is in the interest of both agents to implement a corporatist approach to economic policies. We find that it is difficult to implement corporatism, although it generally increases social welfare, since it often reduces the union’s utility. In particular, we show that a micro-founded union will never find it profitable to co- operate with the Government, unless side-payments are considered. The study of this last issue is however beyond the scope of this paper.employment, inflation, trade unions, government, corporatism, policy game, feasibility
NON-NEUTRALITY OF MONETARY POLICY IN POLICY GAMES
The main aim of this article is to investigate the sources of non- neutrality in policy games involving one or more trade unions. We use a simple set up in order to clearly expose the basic mechanisms that also work in more complex frameworks. We show that there are common roots in the nonneutrality results so far obtained in apparently different contexts as, e.g., an inflation-averse union playing against the government; a union sharing some other common objective with a policy maker; or when more than one union interacts with monopolistic competitors in the goods market and a policymaker. We finally show that there are other cases where the nonneutrality result can arise.neutrality, money, unions, policy game.
Non-neutrality of economic policy: An application of the Tinbergen-Theil’s approach to a strategic context
Issues of policy effectiveness and neutrality are widespread in the economic literature. They have been increasingly raised in specific contexts within the class of LQ (linear-quadratic) policy games in the last 20 years, notably with reference to monetary policy. The more general conditions ensuring nonneutrality in a strategic environment remain however to be inquired. We fill this gap by applying the classical theory of economic policy to a strategic context. This is also useful to highlight some existence conditions for policy game solutions. We restrict ourselves to the common LQ-games in a static perfect information framework, but our simple logic can be extended to other more general situations.LQ-policy games, policy ineffectiveness, controllability.
Towards a new theory of economic policy: Continuity and innovation
This paper outlines the evolution of the theory of economic policy from the classical contributions of Frisch, Hansen, Tinbergen and Theil to situations of strategic interaction. Andrew Hughes Hallett has taken an active and relevant part in this evolution, having contributed to both the development and recent rediscovery of the classical theory, with possible relevant applications for model building.policy games, policy effectiveness, controllability, equilibrium existence
Wage and public expenditure setting in a monetary union
European countries have progressively integrated from the point of view of trade and investment and have a common currency now. However, labour market and fiscal institutions have largely retained their national status. The aim of this paper is to examine: a) the possibility for trade unions of internalising external effects stemming from wage setting in a national context; b) the possibility for governments of internalising macroeconomic spillovers deriving from public expenditure at a national level; c) the interactions between fiscal and monetary authorities. We have found a certain gain in terms of employment only when unions co-operate and we are in a regime where the impact of domestic prices on employment through the terms of trade is higher than the impact of domestic prices on employment through the CPI; in this case, a gain in terms also of inflation may take place. In the case of co-operation between governments gains may accrue only in terms of employment or inflation to one or the other country, if the weights put by the governments on price stability are different. This occurs because the central bank, whose overriding objective is price stability, neutralises any rise in the price levels (as well as the positive effects on employment) deriving from the rise in the government expenditures of both countries that take place as a consequence of governments’ co-operation. This paper partially answers recent concern for considering multi-player contexts and asymmetries in open economy analyses. Here, in fact, several kinds of partial coalitions and the effects of asymmetries in players' preferences are studied.monetary union, policy co-ordination, unions, public expenditure, policy games
P-V-T Behavior of 2,3,3,3-Tetrafluoroprop-1-ene (HFO-1234yf) in the Vapor Phase from (243 to 373) K
The P-V-T properties of 2,3,3,3-tetrafluoroprop-1-ene (CF 3 CFdCH 2 , HFO-1234yf), an environmentally
friendly refrigerant, were measured using a constant volume apparatus. Measurements were carried out at
temperatures from (243 to 373) K and at pressures from (84 to 3716) kPa. A total of 136 experimental
points, taken along 12 isochores, were obtained. Our experimental results were compared with a preliminary
equation of state. The measurements were also regressed to the Martin-Hou equation of state. No other
data on this fluid were found in the literature for the superheated region
Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games
This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence.Policy games, policy ineffectiveness, static controllability, Nash equilibrium existence
Controllability and non-neutrality of economic policy: The Tinbergen’s approach in a strategic context
In the last 20 years issues of policy effectiveness and neutrality (notably with reference to monetary policy) have been increasingly raised in the context of static LQ (linear-quadratic) policy games. The general conditions ensuring policy non-neutrality in a strategic environment remains however to be inquired. We state these conditions by generalizing the classical theory of economic policy developed by Tinbergen and others to such a context. We also state necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. We finally show that the conditions for monetary policy effectiveness asserted in the literature respect our general conditions.LQ-policy games, policy ineffectiveness, static controllability
Non-neutrality of monetary policy in policy games
The main aim of this article is to investigate the sources of non- neutrality in policy games involving one or more trade unions. We use a simple set up in order to clearly expose the basic mechanisms that also work in more complex frameworks. We show that there are common roots in the non-neutrality results so far obtained in apparently different contexts as, e.g., an inflation-averse union playing against the government; a union sharing some other common objective with a policy maker; or when more than one union interacts with monopolistic competitors in the goods market and a policymaker. We finally show that there are other cases where the non-neutrality result can arise.neutrality, money, unions, policy game
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