Asymmetric Yardstick Competition: Traditional Procurement versus Public-Private Partnerships

We investigate yardstick competition between local jurisdictions in which pure rent-seeking incumbents undertake an identical infrastructure project choosing be- tween two contractual arrangements with different financing profiles, namely traditional procurement (TP) and public- private partnership (PPP). We show that a mixed regime, in which TP is used in one jurisdiction and PPP in the other, is likely to arise when projects are mildly lucrative, and/or jurisdictions have a moderate fiscal capacity. We find that, in the mixed equilibrium, incumbents provide different levels of public services, face different probabilities of re-election, and obtain different rents. The adoption of different forms of project governance permits incumbents to disguise themselves and undermine voters' ability to assess their performances. Therefore, yardstick competition is hindered, even if jurisdictions display identical revenue capacities

Co-Production in Local Public Service Delivery: The Case of Waste Management

In a simple model of waste management, we analyse the basic aspects of co-production in local public service delivery. Our results suggest that citizen involvement may lead to an expansion of the production possibility frontier, if waste sorting is made sufficiently convenient, relative to work, through an appropriate tax policy. However, by diverting time away from work, this policy may trigger a tax base erosion phenomenon. We find that the incentive power of the tax should be high (low) when local preferences for the service are very high (low) relative to local incomes. In the intermediate situation, two cases arise. First, when preferences are (not very) low relative to incomes, taxation should pursue resource collection purposes and be deprived of its incentive effects. Second, when preferences are middle-to-high relative to incomes, the trade-off between incentive provision and tax base erosion causes the optimal tax rate to first increase, then decrease

Centralized standards and local taxation in municipal waste management

In the EU, standards for municipal waste sorting and recycling are established by the European central institutions, being mostly based on the available estimates of recyclable materials. In a simple model of co-production in municipal waste management with local taxation, we assess that central bodies enjoy more discretion and can set more ambitious targets in jurisdictions with stronger environmental preferences and/or lower expenditure needs. Incentives to engage in waste sorting and recycling are found to be less powerful with citizens who are less sensitive to the environmental preservation, and all the more when the public input has a high cost. This points to the conclusion that standards should be differentiated across jurisdictions, with due consideration of the local preferences and costs of waste management

Asymmetric Yardstick Competition: Traditional Procurement versus Public-Private Partnerships

We investigate yardstick competition between local jurisdictions in which pure rent-seeking incumbents undertake an identical infrastructure project choosing be- tween two contractual arrangements with different financing profiles, namely traditional procurement (TP) and public- private partnership (PPP). We show that a mixed regime, in which TP is used in one jurisdiction and PPP in the other, is likely to arise when projects are mildly lucrative, and/or jurisdictions have a moderate fiscal capacity. We find that, in the mixed equilibrium, incumbents provide different levels of public services, face different probabilities of re-election, and obtain different rents. The adoption of different forms of project governance permits incumbents to disguise themselves and undermine voters' ability to assess their performances. Therefore, yardstick competition is hindered, even if jurisdictions display identical revenue capacities

Global public good provision in emergency states: A model of (asymmetric) yardstick competition between rent-seeking governments

In a world with two countries, each governed by rent-seeking politicians, there are two strategies to manage an emergency (say, a pandemic) and provide some innovative (global) public good (say, a vaccination campaign) to citizens: (i) invest in adaptation of an existing technology into a suitable good and purchase it, if available, at a low price; (ii) do nothing and import the good, if available, at a higher price. With media insisting on cross-country performance comparisons, political incumbents running for a new mandate are forced into a yardstick competition mechanism through retrospective voters’ electoral decisions. One would expect them to follow the same strategy. In fact, an equilibrium with strategy diversification arises when the probability of success and/or the net benefits of the investment are relatively high. This scenario is more likely to occur the more patient incumbents are. On the one hand, the investing incumbent is attracted by the prospect of enjoying important savings on good procurement and withdrawals on national export revenues; on the other, the non-investing incumbent focuses opportunistically on the present, as he foresees little to gain in the future. Our findings offer a partial explanation to why one can observe strategy diversification for management of emergencies (such as, the Covid-19 pandemic) in (otherwise) similar countries

Small intestine neuromuscular dysfunction in a mouse model of dextran sulfate sodium-induced ileitis: Involvement of dopaminergic neurotransmission

Aims: Anomalies in dopaminergic machinery have been shown in inflammatory bowel disease (IBD) patients and preclinical models of IBD. Thus, we aimed to evaluate the impact of dextran sodium sulfate (DSS)-induced ileitis on enteric dopaminergic pathways. Materials and methods: Male C57/Bl6 mice (10\u202f\ub1\u202f2\u202fweeks old) received 2% DSS in drinking water for 5\u202fdays and were then switched to regular drinking water for 3\u202fdays. To measure ileitis severity inflammatory cytokines (IL-1\u3b2, TNF\u3b1, IL-6) levels were assessed. Changes in ileal muscle tension were isometrically recorded following: 1) cumulative addition of dopamine on basal tone (0.1-1000\u202f\u3bcM); ii) 4-Hz electric field stimulation (EFS) in the presence of 30\u202f\u3bcM dopamine with/without 10\u202f\u3bcM SCH-23390 (dopamine D1 receptor (D1R) antagonist) or 10\u202f\u3bcM sulpiride (D2R antagonist). Immunofluorescence distribution of the neuronal HuC/D protein, glial S100\u3b2 marker, D1R, and dopamine transporter (DAT) were determined in longitudinal-muscle-myenteric plexus whole-mounts (LMMPs) by confocal microscopy. D1R and D2R mRNA transcripts were evaluated by qRT-PCR. Key findings: DSS caused an inflammatory process in the small intestine associated to dysmotility and altered barrier permeability, as suggested by decreased fecal output and enhanced stool water content. DSS treatment caused a significant increase of DAT and D1R myenteric immunoreactivity as well as of D1R and D2R mRNA levels, accompanied by a significant reduction of dopamine-mediated relaxation, involving primarily D1-like receptors. Significance: Mouse ileitis affects enteric dopaminergic neurotransmission mainly involving D1R-mediated responses. These findings provide novel information on the participation of dopaminergic pathways in IBD-mediated neuromuscular dysfunction