Our products are safe (don't tell anyone!). Why don't supermarkets advertise their private food safety standards?

Large retail chains have spent considerable resources to promote production protocols and traceability across the supply chain, aiming at increasing food safety. Yet, the majority of consumers are unaware of these private food safety standards (PFSS) and retailers are not informing them. This behavior denotes a pooling paradox: supermarkets spend a large amount of money for food safety and yet they forget to inform consumers. The result is a pooling equilibrium where consumers cannot discriminate among high quality and low quality products and supermarkets give up the potential price premium. This paper provides an economic explanation for the paradox using a contract-theory model. We found that PFSS implementation may be rational even if consumers have no willingness to pay for safety, because the standard can be used as a tool to solve asymmetric information along the supply chain. Using the PFSS, supermarkets can achieve a separating equilibrium where opportunistic suppliers have no incentive to accept the contract. Even if consumers exhibit a limited (but strictly positive) willingness to pay for safety, advertising may be profit-reducing. If the expected price margin is high enough, supermarkets have incentive to supply both certified and uncertified products. In this case, we show that, if consumers perceive undifferentiated products as “reasonably safe”, supermarkets may maximize profits by pooling the goods and selling them as undifferentiated. This result is not driven by advertising costs, as we derive it assuming free advertising.Agribusiness, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety,

Glucocorticoids and Antivirals for HBV Reactivation in Onco-Hematologic Patients.

Patients with inactive or occult hepatitis B virus infection and onco-hematological malignancies are at risk of hepatitis flare, hepatic failure and death due to chemotherapy-mediated reactivation. Nucleot(s)ide analogues can reduce reactivation risks and/or hepatitis. However, immuno-mediated phenomena combine to determine liver damage and clinical outcome. We describe in this report two patients with onco-hematological malignancies and hepatitis B reactivation after chemotherapy in whom glucocorticoids were added to nucleot(s)ide. Antiviral therapy was effective on replication, while glucocorticoids managed hyperergic response. One patient without underlying liver disease survived, while the second died and the autopsy demonstrated cirrhosis undetected before death. This clinical trial suggests that in patients with onco-hematological malignancies and altered liver function tests in spite of effective antiviral response, glucocorticoids could control the effects of immune response. However prognosis and survival are related to the underlying liver status

Pass-through of unfair trading practices in EU food supply chains

This report presents the results of the research project “Pass-Through of Unfair Trading Practices in EU Food Supply Chains: Methodology and Empirical Application”. The purpose of the project is to design and test a monitoring system of unfair trading practices (UTP) along the agri-food supply chain. The investigation has special focus on assessment of the “pass-through effect”, defined as the consequences for the entire supply chain of UTPs adopted in a specific transaction. The report includes: (i) a review of the economic literature for a better understanding of the economic principles of UTPs; (ii) a review of available data sources and past experiences in UTP monitoring; (iii) the illustration of two alternative approaches for UTP monitoring: B-SEA (broad-scope empirical analysis) and IDEA (in-depth analysis); (iv) a test application of the two approaches to the EU fresh fruit sector; (v) a comparative analysis of the IDEA and B-SEA results and (vi) a discussion of the implications of our research.JRC.D.4-Economics of Agricultur