L’épistémologie de l’action et des croyances dans la philosophie évolutionniste de Herbert Spencer

Herbert Spencer peut être considéré à tous les égards comme un des protagonistes majeur de la tradition sociologique et épistémologique de l’individualisme méthodologique. Il a interprété la genèse et la transformation de la société dans son ensemble et des institutions sociales comme le résultat spontané de la composition des actions rationnelles subjectives à fins privées. Dans cette analyse, est prise en considération la rationalité de l’action et des croyances dont la démonstration constitue la première étape de l’explication donnée par Spencer des phénomènes sociaux. Pour Spencer, l’action est un acte rationnel dans le but d’atteindre un objectif et se fonde sur une ou plusieurs croyances. Ces dernières, même quand elles sont très éloignées de celles du chercheur – comme les superstitions – sont considérées comme rationnelles, en d’autres termes elles représentent les meilleurs théories que ces individus ont à disposition pour faire face aux situations d’incertitude dans lesquelles ils se trouvaient. L’individu qui agit selon ces principes se comporte rationnellement puisqu’il agit en cohérence avec sa perception de la situation

L’ “interpretative turn” in economia: Spiegare e interpretare i fatti economici

Lachmann and D. Lavoie are the main exponents of “interpretative economics”, which proposed a “hermeneutical turn” for the economics, as an alternative to the “scientism” and the “positivism” of neoclassical economics, accused of having reduced individuals to anonymous and abstract maximizers of utility, detached from the lifeword. In this essay the theses of these two economists are examined, on the one hand, highlighting how recourse to hermeneutics can improve the epistemological statute of economic science, on the other hand, making some criticisms of their thesis ac-cording to this method would represent an alternative to the nomological-deductive explanation

Le civiltà: tutte relative e tutte diverse: Il relativismo etico contro il relativismo culturale

The recent important debate on ethics and cultural relativism has called the attention to the old question of the foundation of judgements of value, i.e. the argumentations we use to judge other people. By discussing the two classical examples of Diderot and Montaigne, the essay aims at articulating two main theses. On one side, it argues that both absolutist and sceptical solutions to the problem of the foundation of values are the outcome of an ethical foundationalism, which is not acceptable from an epistemological point of view. On the other side, it shows that the theory of ethical relativism, if correctly understood, can be used as a tool for avoiding both the affirmation of the superiority of one culture and a cultural relativism based on the indifference of ethical positions and the impossibility to make judgements and comparisons between different values and cultures.Il recente e importante dibattito sull'etica e sul relativismo culturale ha richiamato l'attenzione sull'antica questione del fondamento dei giudizi di valore, ossia delle argomentazioni che utilizziamo per giudicare gli altri. Discutendo i due esempi classici di Diderot e Montaigne, il saggio intende articolare due tesi principali. Da un lato, sostiene che sia le soluzioni assolutiste che quelle scettiche al problema della fondazione dei valori sono il risultato di un fondazionalismo etico, che non è accettabile da un punto di vista epistemologico. Dall'altro, mostra che la teoria del relativismo etico, se correttamente intesa, può essere utilizzata come strumento per evitare sia l'affermazione della superiorità di una cultura sia un relativismo culturale basato sull'indifferenza delle posizioni etiche e sull'impossibilità di formulare giudizi e confronti tra valori e culture diverse

Ragioni e razionalità

This essay tries to highlight some heuristic potential of the theory of rationality developed by Boudon, comparing it with some of the most important contributions of the epistemology of the twentieth century. The theory of argumentation of Ch. Perelman, the critical rationalism of K. Popper and H. Albert, the theory of rationality of L. von Mises, and the philosophy of action of W. Dray. I try to analyse the similarities and the differences between the views of these authors and that of the French sociologist in order to highlight, through the use of a comparative approach, the peculiarity of the “rationality of good reasons” proposed by Boudon and its capacity to explain in terms individualistic positive and normative collective beliefs. In this way I intend to clarify some philosophical and methodology fundamental assumptions of Boudon’s interpretative sociology, focused on an analysis of social phenomena in terms of the intended and especially unintended effect of individual actions produced by “good reasons”

Métaphores et analogies. Schèmes argumentatifs des sciences sociales

Ve séminaire interdisciplinaire du Groupe d’Études « Raison et rationalités » et XVIIe colloque annuel du Groupe d’Étude « Pratiques sociales et théories », tenu en Valais sous les auspices de l'institut universitaire Kurt Bösch, Sion (CH) du 8 au 11 juillet 1999