Külpe on Cognitive Attitudes

This paper offers a reconstruction of Külpe’s theory of cognitive attitudes from the perspective of contemporary debates about cognitive phenomenology. I argue that Külpe’s view constrasts with analytic mainstream approaches to the same phenomena in at least two respects. First, Külpe claims, cognitive experiences are best described in terms of occurrent cognitive acts or attitudes toward sensory, imagistic or intellectual contents. Second, occurrent cognitive attitudes are intransitively conscious in the sense that they are experienced by, or phenomenally manifest to, the subject. I call the combination of those two claims the conscious cognitive attitudes theory. I suggest that, despite some difficulties, this theory offers a worth-considering alternative to contentual and/or nonphenomenological theories of cognitive phenomena.Phenomenology of thinking past and present (Crédit classique, PhéCog)

Présentation

peer reviewe

Quel effet cela fait, de mordre dans un citron?

Le thème de la conscience a connu un regain d’intérêt spectaculaire, ces dernières années, chez les philosophes et les scientifiques. Des théories nouvelles ont vu le jour dans l’espoir de rendre compte de « l’effet que cela fait », par exemple, de tomber amoureux, de se faire mal ou de… mordre dans un citron. Contrairement à une conception populaire, de nombreux chercheurs ont suggéré que ressentir quelque chose équivalait en réalité à se représenter quelque chose. L’ouvrage "Conscience et représentation. Introduction aux théories représentationnelles de l’esprit" (Paris, Vrin, 2016) dresse un état des lieux des controverses liées à cette question

Light-harvesting capabilities of dielectric sphere multilayers

peer reviewedSelf-assembled synthetic opals are suitable for integration into solution-processed thin film solar cells. In this work, finite-difference time-domain simulations are carried out to tailor optical properties of monolayer and multilayers of semiconductor spheres to trap light when these structures are incorporated into thin film solar cells. In particular, architectures in which spheres are filled with a photoactive material and embedded in a lower refractive index medium are examined. Based on spectra and field intensity maps, this study demonstrates that opal-like photonic crystals obtained from colloidal templates and filled with light-absorbing material can significantly harvest light by exploiting photonic band resonances

Natural Classes in Brentano's Psychology

peer reviewedThis article argues that Brentano’s classification of mental phenomena is best understood against the background of the theories of natural classification held by Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill. Section 1 offers a reconstruction of Brentano’s two-premise argument for his tripartite classification. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the reception and historical background of the classification project. Section 3 addresses the question as to why a classification of mental phenomena is needed at all and traces the answer back to Mill’s view that psychological laws are class-specific. Section 4 and 5 connect the second premise of Brentano’s argument to Comte’s principle of comparative likeness and Mill’s insistance that class membership is determined by the possession of common characteristics. And section 6 briefly discusses the evidence Brentano provides for the first premise

Is Heidegger's "Fundamentalontologie" an Ontology or a Semantics? On the neo-Kantian Reading of Heidegger

peer reviewedMy aim is to clarify Heidegger's foundational program called "Fundamentalontologie". I show that the critical interpretation given by the neo-Kantian philosopher Rudolf Zocher (a heir of Heinrich Rickert) has the merit to emphasize some ambiguities of thos program. Three theses are under examination: 1. the concept of "Fundamentalontologie" is equivocal; 2. the distinction between "grounding theory" and "grounded theory" helps to overcome this equivocity; 3. the "Fundamentalontologie" mainly is a theory of meaning or a semantics.Mon objectif, dans cet article, est de clarifier le programme de Heidegger appelé «ontologie fondamentale». La lecture critique faite par le néokantien Rudolf Zocher permet de mettre en évidence quelques ambiguïtés de ce programme. Trois thèses sont examinées: 1. le concept d’«ontologie fondamentale» est équivoque; 2. la différence entre «théorie fondamentale» et «théorie fondée» permet de supprimer cette équivocité; 3. l’«ontologie fondamentale» est essentiellement une théorie du sens ou une sémantique

Recension de: Heinrich Rickert, Le système des valeurs et autres articles, trad. fr. J. Farges, Paris, Vrin, 2007

peer reviewe

Austrian Phenomenology

J'épingle ici quatre critères de la phénoménologie autrichienne, des critères qui dessinent une certaine conception de ce qu’est la philosophie et comment elle doit être poursuivie. Pour terminer, je dis un mot de ce qu’on peut attendre d’une telle approche.Renaissance of Philosophy at the Turn of 19th Century: The School of Franz Brentan