The Tools of Owatatsumi: Japan's Ocean Surveillance and Coastal Defence Capabilities

Japan is quintessentially by geography a maritime country. Maritime surveillance capabilities – underwater, shore-based and airborne – are critical to its national defence posture. This book describes and assesses these capabilities, with particular respect to the underwater segment, about which there is little strategic analysis in publicly available literature

Breaking Japanese Diplomatic Codes: David Sissons and D Special Section during the Second World War

During the Second World War, Australia maintained a super-secret organisation, the Diplomatic (or `D’) Special Section, dedicated to breaking Japanese diplomatic codes. The Section has remained officially secret as successive Australian Governments have consistently refused to admit that Australia ever intercepted diplomatic communications, even in war-time. This book recounts the history of the Special Section and describes its code-breaking activities. It was a small but very select organisation, whose `technical

Power and International relations: Essays in Honour of Coral Bell

Coral Mary Bell AO, who died in 2012, was one of the world’s foremost academic experts on international relations, crisis management and alliance diplomacy. This collection of essays by more than a dozen of her friends and colleagues is intended to honour her life and examine her ideas and, through them, her legacy

Australia's secret space programs

Australia's largest single space activity involves the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) of the Department of Defence, and concerns the interception of satellite signals. DSD currently maintains satellite signals intelligence (SIGINT) facilities at Stanley Fort in Hong Kong and Shoal Bay near Darwin, and a third station is under construction at Kojarena, near Geraldton, Western Australia. A satellite facility for intelligence communications is also maintained at Watsonia Barracks, Victoria. This monograph describes these facilities and the satellites with which they are concerned. It concludes that DSD's expansion into satellite SIGINT operations requires oversight to ensure that there is no reduction in the overall effectiveness of the Directorate. This monograph also includes a Note on the proposed New Zealand satellite SIGINT facility at Waihopai, near Blenheim, and cooperation between this facility and the DSD operations

Signals intelligence (SIGINT) in South Korea

The Korean Peninsula is the most serious flashpoint in the Asia-Pacific region. Across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating North and South Korea, only 40 km from Seoul, South Korea faces a virtually fully mobilised, obdurate communist regime, with active armed forces of some 1.13 m personnel and a resolute nuclear weapons development programme. South Korea now maintains the most intense signals intelligence (SIGINT) activity in the world, involving some of the most advanced SIGINT systems currently operational. Most of this activity is maintained by US SIGINT authorities and units, but South Korean capabilities for both independent and joint SIGINT activities have increased greatly over the past decade. At the strategic level, South Korea is host to TR-1A/U-2R strategic reconnaissance aircraft, a link facility in the US Navy's Pacific high-frequency direction-finding and cryptologic net, and US Army SIGINT operations. But the depth of the SIGINT activity in South Korea lies at the operational and tactical levels. Most of the US SIGINT agencies and units in South Korea have a direct historical lineage to units which were established during the Korean War. US SIGINT capabilities were completely amiss when North Korea invaded Soul Korea in June 1950 and when the Chinese Communists intervened in October-November 1950. They are now expected to provide some one to four days' warning of a North Korean decision to invade the South and some 12-16 hours' warning of an actual invasion. US Army SIGINT units took some 12 months (from June 1950 to July 1951) before they were able to provide effective support to the Eighth Army. They are now expected to provide essential targeting intelligence and operational support for counter air, strike and strategic interdiction operations immediately following the outbreak of war and to support subsequent battlefield operations. This monograph describes the history of SIGINT activity in South Korea since 1950; the principal US SIGINT stations, deployments and operations; and the advanced battlefield SIGINT systems and capabilities currently operational in South Korea. It discusses the South Korean programme for increased self-reliance with respect to intelligence, and the impact of the crisis in mid-1994 over North Korean nuclear developments, when the possibility of war on the peninsula became very real. It concludes with a brief assessment of the ability of South Korea's SIGINT capabilities to satisfy current strategic and military demands

Provocative plans: a critique of US strategy for maritime conflict in the North Pacific

US strategy for the conduct of maritime operations in the pacific in the event of conflict with the Soviet Union is fundamental and purposefully offensive. US forces would mobilise and movie towards Soviet home waters during periods of crisis and confrontation, and would movie rapidly and directly to attack a wide range of soviet submarine, surface and air forces, and supporting bases and facilities, at the very outset of a conflict. This monograph is concerned with some of the more critical operational aspects of the US strategy for offensive forward operations in the event of maritime conflict in the north Pacific. It discusses the basic rationales for this strategy; the role of the principal submarine, surface and air elements of the US posture; the relevant Soviet operational concepts and force posture; the strong escalatory pressures that derive from the interaction of the US and Soviet operational concepts and posture; some possible implications of START agreement; and some particular subjects which warrant further consideration from the perspective of enhancing strategic stability

Signals intelligence (SIGINT) in south Asia: India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka

This monograph is a study of signals intelligence (SIGINT) activities in South Asia. It describes the history of these activities from the early stations set up in India by the British, through intelligence operations during the Second World War and during the three India-Pakistan wars, to Sri Lanka's operations against Tamil militants. It also describes the higher command and management structures and the intelligence establishments in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka; the organisational aspects of the numerous agencies involved in SIGINT activities, and their facilities and capabilities; and it discusses die efficiency of the SIGINT organisations in the three countries, as well as their operational effectiveness

China's Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Satellite Programs

This report was commisioned by ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centr

Soviet signals intelligence (SIGINT): intercepting satellite communications

The Soviet Union maintains the largest signals intelligence (SIGINT) establishment in the world. It is capable of monitoring virtually the whole radio frequency spectrum on an almost global scale, with particular attention being accorded to high frequency (HF) radio transmissions, terrestrial microwave telecommunications, and satellite communications (SATCOMSs). This monograph is concerned with Soviet capabilities and operations with respect to the intercepting of satellite communications (SATCOMs) - both commercial SATCOMs and defence and intelligence SATCOMs. The monograph describes the Soviet SATCOM SIGINT ground station capability and, most particularly, the major SIGINT facility at Lourdes in Cuba; the Soviet use of diplomatic establishments for intercepting SATCOMs; and Soviet ship-based SATCOM monitoring capabilities. This monograph concludes that the scope and sophistication of the Soviet SATCOM SIGINT activities is inadequately appreciated by Western publics, and that greater public awareness of the vulnerability of SATCOMs is necessary for the implementation of effective and comprehensive communications security (COMSEC) policies and practices