How to win and know it: an effects-based approach to irregular warfare

The United States is entering its seventh year of the Global War on Terror and continues to struggle with irregular war. As the Department of Defense's lead for Irregular Warfare (IW), U.S. Special Operations Command co-authored the Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) Version 1.0 with the U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command in order to "outline a holistic U.S. Government and partner nation approach to IW." The concept establishes the need to integrate all instruments of national power in order to enable a joint force commander to successfully conduct a protracted IW campaign against state and non-state actors. The end state is a joint force with enhanced capability for IW and a balanced approach to warfighting. To succeed in IW the commander and staff need a campaign planning system that answers two primary questions: "How do you effectively focus on controlling or influencing populations?" and, "How do you measure your efforts in IW?" The answer maybe a "marriage" of an effects-based thinking with the concepts outlined in the new IW JOC. This thesis will analyze the potential of such a concept utilizing a case study of Special Operations Command Pacific's own effects-based approach to the War on Terror.http://archive.org/details/howtowinndknowit109453048US Army (USA) author

U.S. Military Transformation and the Rise of China: Restructuring Regional Alliances

Thesis advisor: Robert S. RossThe United States military is currently carrying out a transformation in its war fighting strategy aimed at countering threats to America and maintaining a long term balance of power. As the lone superpower in the world, the United States seeks to secure its global supremacy by dealing with threats to the status quo in all regions of the world. In recent years, the major target of this transformation has been the rise of China, an event that could destabilize both the East Asian balance of power and the global one. The goal of this transformation is to improve upon American capabilities and deployment time to structure our forces in a way that allows them to be rapidly deployable to almost anywhere at any time. At the same time, the U.S., through a series of unilateral deployments, forward positioning of troops and equipment, and a restructuring of regional alliances in East and Southeast Asia, the United States is actively working to promote a peaceful rise of China.Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2007.Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences.Discipline: College Honors Program

Espaces communs et grandes stratégies : vers un nouveau jeu mondial

Espaces non-terrestres accessibles à tous mais détenus par personne, les global commons constituent à l'heure actuelle une préoccupation fondamentale des chancelleries1. Préserver leur accès est une condition fondamentale tant pour la projection des forces armées que pour le fonctionnement de l'économie mondialisée. En effet, aucun Etat ne peut assurer une intervention militaire mais aussi sa propre prospérité sans garantir l'accès à l'espace aérien international2, l'espace extra-atmosphérique3, la haute mer4 et le cyber (...)

Hybrid Warfare

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Senior military officials recently testified before Congress that current and future adversaries are likely to use "hybrid warfare" tactics, a blending of conventional and irregular approaches across the full spectrum of conflict. In addition, several academic and professional trade publications have commented that future conflict will likely be characterized by a fusion of different forms of warfare rather than a singular approach. The overarching implication of hybrid warfare is that U.S. forces must become more adaptable and flexible in order to defeat adversaries that employ an array of lethal technologies to protracted, population-centric conflicts such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Department of Defense (DOD) officials have discussed the need to counter the continuum of threats that U.S. forces could face from nonstate- and state-sponsored adversaries, including computer network and satellite attacks; portable surface-to-air missiles; improvised explosive devices; information and media manipulation; and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and highyield explosive devices. In light of references to "hybrid warfare" by senior military officials and possible implications it could have for DOD's strategic planning, Congress requested we examine: (1) whether DOD has defined hybrid warfare and how hybrid warfare differs from other types of warfare and (2) the extent to which DOD is considering the implications of hybrid warfare in its overarching strategic planning documents. On June 16, 2010, we met with congressional staff to discuss the preliminary results of our work. This report formally transmits our final response to Congress' request.

China's Use of Cyber Warfare: Espionage Meets Strategic Deterrence

This article presents three reasons for states to use cyber warfare and shows that cyberspace is—and will continue to be—a decisive element in China's strategy to ascend in the international system. The three reasons are: deterrence through infiltration of critical infrastructure; military technological espionage to gain military knowledge; and industrial espionage to gain economic advantage. China has a greater interest in using cyberspace offensively than other actors, such as the United States, since it has more to gain from spying on and deterring the United States than the other way around. The article also documents China's progress in cyber warfare and shows how it works as an extension of its traditional strategic thinking and the current debate within the country. Several examples of cyber attacks traceable to China are also presented. This includes cyber intrusions on a nuclear arms laboratory, attacks on defense ministries (including the Joint Strike Fighter and an airbase) and the U.S. electric grid, as well as the current Google affair, which has proved to be a small part of a broader attack that also targeted the U.S. Government. There are, however, certain constraints that qualify the image of China as an aggressive actor in cyberspace. Some believe that China itself is the victim of just as many attacks from other states. Furthermore, certain actors in the United States and the West have an interest in overestimating China's capabilities in cyberspace in order to maintain their budgets

Access to the global commons and grand strategies: a shift in global interplay

The global commons – non-terrestrial spaces accessible to all and owned by none – are currently a major concern for government administrations. Maintaining an access to them is a key necessity both for the deployment of the armed forces and the functioning of the globalised economy. No State can intervene militarily while ensuring its own prosperity without being assured of its access to the international airspace, the atmosphere, the high seas and cyberspace..

Focused Mission High Speed Combatant

U.S. Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command, Program Executive Office SHIPS, PMS 500 DD X Progra

Leveraging National Guard counterdrug assets for Homeland Security

CHDS State/LocalThis thesis describes how existing capabilities in the National Guard Counterdrug (NG CD) Support Program can be leveraged for use in Homeland Security (HLS) missions and explains what the implications are for organizing a NG HLS Support Program. National Guard CD assets should be made dual-use for HLS activities and additional missions should be added to the CD mission, leveraging existing resources for HLS prevention. The Governors will have the flexibility of having highly trained and equipped soldiers that can be utilized for HLS activities according to the needs of the state and the current threat level. An already established integrated program in West Virginia provided a suitable model for conducting a case study to determine additional missions to supplement the NG CD Support Program in other states. Examples of additional CD-HLS missions include CD intelligence analysts tracking suspicious activities and CD ground reconnaissance teams cross-trained to assist with the FSIVA mission for the protection of critical infrastructure. Potential challenges of integration identified include funding and personnel shortages along with legal restrictions. Solutions include developing stabilized and fenced funding with cross-leveling up to a designated threshold, adding more dual-use personnel and HLS core staffing, and amending the CD statute.http://archive.org/details/leveragingnation109451491Major, Army National GuardApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited

A Clipped Wing: An Assessment of the Effectiveness of the B-21

This thesis examines the effectiveness of the Northrop Grumman B-21 long range strike bomber in advancing the ability of U.S. policy makers to achieve national security objectives. The operational value of the B-21 is assessed through analysing its probable role in four hypothetical combat scenarios, and the relative effectiveness of the B-21 is measured alongside the potential performance of alternative systems. This operational analysis is augmented by a consideration of the shape of recent U.S. national security strategies, as well as the anticipated future security environment, which provides the foundation of an analysis of the ability of the B-21 to support U.S. security objectives within the context of U.S. policy makers\u27 intended approach to foreign policy. This thesis concludes that the B-21 provides a limited increase in the effectiveness of U.S. military operations, and its procurement is incompatible with the anticipated future shape of U.S. security strategy and global interaction