THE ELECTORAL COSTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS WHEN VOTERS ARE IGNORANT

It is widely believed that the free-rider problem and the incentives to build minimum winning coalitions cause politics to reflect the preferences of special interest groups. Nevertheless, if voters do not know all the positions of all the candidates, then a candidate who proposes policies that benefit the public at large may defeat a candidate who depends on the support of special interests. Moreover, even if the latter candidate can win, he must use a publicity strategy which allows any voter to hear of proposals that benefit groups other than the voter's. Copyright 1989 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..

Preference modification vs. incentive manipulation as tools of terrorist recruitment: The role of culture

Terrorism is a tactic much more likely to be used when combatants have asymmetric numerical strength and weaponry. Only if one side is comparatively very weak will it use terror tactics. This weakness requires a means of controlling strong incentives for free-riding or defection from the weaker side. There are two (nonexclusive) answers: (1) Atttract or inculcate recruits with an innate preference for cooperation, even if it results in the recruit's own death (2) Create a set of incentives that reward loyalty, by giving access to excludable near-public (“club”) goods. Culture is the key to achieving either of these solutions. Culture is defined here as the set of “inherited” beliefs, attitudes, and moral strictures that a people use to distinguish outsiders, to understand themselves and to communicate with each other. The primary question is whether culture creates a preference for cooperation as a primitive, or accommodates incentives such as excludable club goods that can only be obtained by cooperation. The difference between the two accounts matters greatly for determining the correct strategy to fight terrorism. If terrorists are selected for having unusual (cooperative, from the perspective of the terror group) preferences, then recruitment must be disrupted somehow. If, on the other hand, terrorists allow themselves to be recruited to gain access to club goods, then the intervention strategy must be the disruption of social networks that credibly guarantee access to those club goods. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006Terrorism, Culture, Ideology, Commitment, Club goods,

Party Polarization and the Business Cycle in the United States

A large literature has studied the trend of greaterpolarization between Democrats and Republicans in Congress.This paper empirically examines the extent to which inflationand unemployment explain cyclical movements ofpolarization over time. An informal application of thestandard Downsian spatial competition model of partiesgenerates the following relationships, ceteris paribus: (1)inflation should be associated with policy convergence, (2)unemployment should be associated with polarization, (3) theeffect of unemployment on polarization should be larger inmagnitude than the effect of inflation on convergence, and (4)the effect of unemployment on polarization should be strongerin the House than in the Senate. We estimate the relationshipbetween vote records and business cycle conditions over the1947–1999 period using a GLS model with varying lags. Ourresults are broadly consistent with these business cyclehypotheses of polarization, though greater support is found inHouse data than in Senate data. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Party competition in a heterogeneous electorate: The role of dominant-issue voters

This paper provides a theoretical model of party competition in a heterogeneous electorate. The latter consists of numerous groups of dominant-issue-voters who base their voting decision primarily on one issue of the political agenda. Parties follow a lexicographic objective function, aiming to gain power at minimum programmatic concessions. The emerging pattern of movement in policy platforms is fundamentally different to the concept of convergence proposed by the spatial theory of voting. Rather than the centre of the scale of policy preference, its extreme ends, occupied by dominant-issue-voters, attract the policy platforms. The difference in policy platforms is not reduced. The conclusions are found to be compatible with some major empirical findings of the Manifesto Research Group. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Collusion, Collective Action and Protection: Theory and Evidence

This paper provides a novel explanation forthe formation of protectionist lobby groupsin imperfectly competitive sectors. Thelevel of collusion is shown to be a crucialdeterminant of the ability of firms tosustain lobbying. We show that greatercollusion reduces firm contributionsto tariff lobbying, when the governmentvalues welfare sufficiently and thecross-price elasticity between the domesticand foreign goods is sufficiently high. The empirical evidence from the U.S.supports the theory. Greater collusionreduces the level of PAC contributions. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004