Conspiracy theories on the basis of the evidence

Conspiracy theories are often portrayed as unwarranted beliefs, typically supported by suspicious kinds of evidence. Yet contemporary work in Philosophy argues provisional belief in conspiracy theories is at the very least understandable---because conspiracies occur---and that if we take an evidential approach, judging individual conspiracy theories on their particular merits, belief in such theories turns out to be warranted in a range of cases. Drawing on this work, I examine the kinds of evidence typically associated with conspiracy theories, and show how the so-called evidential problems with conspiracy theories are also problems for the kinds of evidence put forward in support of other theories. As such, if there is a problem with the conspiracy theorist's use of evidence, it is one of principle: is the principle which guides the conspiracy theorist's use of evidence somehow in error? I argue that whatever we might think about conspiracy theories generally, there is no prima facie case for a scepticism of conspiracy theories based purely on their use of evidence

Politics, Deception, and Being Self-Deceived

A review of Anna Elisabeth Galeotti's "Political Self-Deception

In Defence of Particularism: A Reply to Stokes

A reply to Patrick Stokes' “Between Generalism and Particularism About Conspiracy Theory"

Conspiracy Theories and Their Investigator(s)

A reply to Patrick Stokes' 'Reluctance and Suspicion'—itself a reply to an early piece by myself replying to Stokes—in which I clarify what it is I intend when talking about how we should investigate conspiracy theories

The Problem of Fake News

Looking at the recent spate of claims about “fake news” which appear to be a new feature of political discourse, I argue that fake news presents an interesting problem in epistemology. Te phenomena of fake news trades upon tolerating a certain indiference towards truth, which is sometimes expressed insincerely by political actors. Tis indiference and insincerity, I argue, has been allowed to fourish due to the way in which we have set the terms of the “public” epistemology that maintains what is considered “rational” public discourse. I argue one potential salve to the problem of fake news is to challenge this public epistemology by injecting a certain ethical consideration back into the discourse

The Problem of Conspiracism

Belief in conspiracy theories is typically considered irrational, and as a consequence of this, conspiracy theorists––those who dare believe some conspiracy theory––have been charged with a variety of epistemic or psychological failings. Yet recent philosophical work has challenged the view that belief in conspiracy theories should be considered as typically irrational. By performing an intra-group analysis of those people we call “conspiracy theorists”, we find that the problematic traits commonly ascribed to the general group of conspiracy theorists turn out to be merely a set of stereotypical behaviours and thought patterns associated with a purported subset of that group. If we understand that the supposed prob- lem of belief in conspiracy theories is centred on the beliefs of this purported sub- set––the conspiracists––then we can reconcile the recent philosophical contribu- tions to the wider academic debate on the rationality of belief in conspiracy theories

What is fake news?

Talk of fake news is rife in contemporary politics, but what is fake news, and how, if anything, does it differ from news which is fake? I argue that in order to make sense of the phenomenon of fake news, it is necessary to first define it and then show what does and does not fall under the rubric of ‘fake news’. I then go on to argue that fake news is not a new problem. Rather, if there is problem with fake news it is its centrality in contemporary public debate

Between Forteana and Skepticism

A review of Bernard Will's "Believing Weird Things"

Clearing Up Some Conceptual Confusions About Conspiracy Theory Theorising

A reply to Gérald Bronner, Véronique Campion-Vincent, Sylvain Delouvée, Sebastian Dieguez, Nicolas Gauvrit, Anthony Lantian, and Pascal Wagner-Egger's piece, '“They” Respond: Comments on Basham et al.’s “Social Science’s Conspiracy-Theory Panic: Now They Want to Cure Everyone”

SMART GIRLS, HARD‐WORKING GIRLS BUT NOT YET SELF‐ASSURED GIRLS: THE LIMITS OF GENDER EQUITY POLITICS

Higher levels of girls and women’s participation in targeted areas are widely apparent, particularly in affluent and middle‐class sites. Here, we report on research with young middle and upper middle‐class high school girls successfully enrolled in non‐traditional advanced placement (AP) courses in mathematics, science, and computer programming in a suburban school district in Midwestern USA. Focus group inter‐views with 45 of the highest achieving students in this affluent suburb revealed salient inequities and lingering impediments in the struggle for women’s equality. Likewise, the limitations of gender equity politics are evident in the co‐ opting of discourse of privilege and individualism. Key words: girls’ achievement, secondary schools, girls in advanced placement study, AP classes Une présence accrue des filles dans les cours avancés de mathématiques, de science et d’informatique au secondaire est manifeste, surtout dans les milieux aisés aux É.‐U. et dans d’autres pays occidentaux. Cette recherche quantitative, effectuée auprès de jeunes filles de classe moyenne ou supérieure inscrites dans des cours de niveau avancé de mathématiques, de science et d’informatique au secondaire dans un arrondissement scolaire du Midwest américain, révèle des inégalités importantes et des obstacles persistants dans la lutte des femmes pour une pleine égalité, ce qui montre les limites des politiques en faveur de l’équité entre les sexes. Mots clés : équité entre les sexes, filles et mathématiques avancées, cours de science, cours d’informatique, filles et science, cours de mathématiques