Due visioni della responsabilità sociale dell'impresa, con una applicazione alla società benefit

Il lavoro analizza due diverse concezioni della CSR e tenta una applicazione all'istituto della societ\ue0 benefit.The paper analyzes two different conceptions of CSR and attempts an application to the benefit corporation

Different policies for corporate creditor protection

Rules on corporate creditor protection are asymmetric rules. Rules which could increase the welfare of one class of creditors could at the same time reduce the welfare of another class. Different classes of creditors often coincide with different social groups (unskilled workers, small trade creditors, etc.). As we do not have an universally accepted social welfare function, the results of the comparisons between gains and losses caused by each rule are, in terms of overall welfare (efficiency), indeterminate. In conclusion, the choice of the best system of creditor protection is not a matter of efficiency but of fairness and political judgments. From this viewpoint, many arguments can support the preference for a rule (the net system with its formal test) rather than a more flexible standard

Logica dello scambio e contrattualità : la società per azioni di fronte alla cirisi

The paper maintains that \u201ccontractualism\u201d still provides the best conceptual pattern in which company law can be framed. \u201cContractualism\u201d does not imply any special protec- tion of the shareholders\u2019 interest, not even the absence of rules, mandatory ones included. \u201cContractualism\u201d implies instead that company law ought to be interpreted as a means to facilitate the conclusion of contracts (among investors, managers, creditors, etc.), to balance the interests of the contracting parties, to protect third parties from negative externalities. This conceptual model offers an interpretation of current Italian and European law, better than the one offered by competing models as institutionalism (strong or weak) or system theory. Even the legal aspects of the events that led to the financial crisis can be explained by the \u201cFaustian bargain\u201d between investors and managers, better than in any other way. Some difficulties presently faced by the same contractarian model are finally illustrated