Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision

We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensity is endogenous and effort a continuous variable. Wage level, monitoring intensity and consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined by the maximization problem of the firm. As a result, monitoring and pay should be complements. In our experiment, between and within treatment variation is qualitatively in line with the normative predictions of the model under selfishness assumptions. Yet, we also find evidence for reciprocal behavior. The data analysis shows, however, that it does not pay for the employer to rely on the reciprocity of employees

A life-span perspective on life satisfaction

The German population is ageing due to decreasing birth rates and increasing life expectancy. To sustain the German pension system, legal retirement age is increased step by step to 67 years. This raises questions about how to enable and motivate older individuals to work that long. Hence, it is important to understand whether they represent a homogeneous group that can be addressed through specific measures and instruments. Life-span theory points to systematic changes as well as increased heterogeneity with age. For example, work motivation does not generally decline with age but becomes increasingly task-specific, depending on changing life goals and individual adaptation processes in adult development. In this empirical study we analyse age heterogeneity with regard to current life satisfaction and life satisfaction domains (measured as satisfaction with work, income, family and health) that represent personal utilities individuals strive for. For our analysis we use data collected as part of a representative German longitudinal data study (SOEP1). We find increasing heterogeneity in current life satisfaction, satisfaction with work, family life, and health with age. Thus, common mean level analyses on age effects yield only limited informative value. The heterogeneity of older adults should be taken into account when motivating and developing older workers

A life-span perspective on life satisfaction

The German population is ageing due to decreasing birth rates and increasing life expectancy. To sustain the German pension system, legal retirement age is increased step by step to 67 years. This raises questions about how to enable and motivate older individuals to work that long. Hence, it is important to understand whether they represent a homogeneous group that can be addressed through specific measures and instruments. Life-span theory points to systematic changes as well as increased heterogeneity with age. For example, work motivation does not generally decline with age but becomes increasingly task-specific, depending on changing life goals and individual adaptation processes in adult development. In this empirical study we analyse age heterogeneity with regard to current life satisfaction and life satisfaction domains (measured as satisfaction with work, income, family and health) that represent personal utilities individuals strive for. For our analysis we use data collected as part of a representative German longitudinal data study (SOEP1). We find increasing heterogeneity in current life satisfaction, satisfaction with work, family life, and health with age. Thus, common mean level analyses on age effects yield only limited informative value. The heterogeneity of older adults should be taken into account when motivating and developing older workers

Dynamic Repeated Random Dictatorship and Gender Discrimination

To reduce the cognitive experimenter demand effect we embed a dictator game in a more complex decision environment, a dynamic household savings decision problem, thus rendering the dictator decision to share some endowment less salient. We then use this game in a laboratory experiment to investigate gender specific allocation behaviour and discrimination. We observe that dictators treat females nicer than males independent of their own gender. Participants are not aware of their discriminating behaviour

Dynamic Repeated Random Dictatorship and Gender Discrimination

To reduce the cognitive experimenter demand effect we embed a dictator game in a more complex decision environment, a dynamic household savings decision problem, thus rendering the dictator decision to share some endowment less salient. We then use this game in a laboratory experiment to investigate gender specific allocation behaviour and discrimination. We observe that dictators treat females nicer than males independent of their own gender. Participants are not aware of their discriminating behaviour

Dynamic Repeated Random Dictatorship and Gender Discrimination

To reduce the cognitive experimenter demand effect we embed a dictator game in a more complex decision environment, a dynamic household savings decision problem, thus rendering the dictator decision to share some endowment less salient. We then use this game in a laboratory experiment to investigate gender specific allocation behaviour and discrimination. We observe that dictators treat females nicer than males independent of their own gender. Participants are not aware of their discriminating behaviour

Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision

We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensity is endogenous and effort a continuous variable. Wage level, monitoring intensity and consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined by the maximization problem of the firm. As a result, monitoring and pay should be complements. In our experiment, between and within treatment variation is qualitatively in line with the normative predictions of the model under standard assumptions. Yet, we also find evidence for reciprocal behavior. Our data analysis shows, however, that it does not pay for the employer to solely rely on the reciprocity of employees