54 research outputs found

    Statistical estimates of absenteeism attributable to seasonal and pandemic influenza from the Canadian Labour Force Survey

    Get PDF
    <p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>As many respiratory viruses are responsible for influenza like symptoms, accurate measures of the disease burden are not available and estimates are generally based on statistical methods. The objective of this study was to estimate absenteeism rates and hours lost due to seasonal influenza and compare these estimates with estimates of absenteeism attributable to the two H1N1 pandemic waves that occurred in 2009.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>Key absenteeism variables were extracted from Statistics Canada's monthly labour force survey (LFS). Absenteeism and the proportion of hours lost due to own illness or disability were modelled as a function of trend, seasonality and proxy variables for influenza activity from 1998 to 2009.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Hours lost due to the H1N1/09 pandemic strain were elevated compared to seasonal influenza, accounting for a loss of 0.2% of potential hours worked annually. In comparison, an estimated 0.08% of hours worked annually were lost due to seasonal influenza illnesses. Absenteeism rates due to influenza were estimated at 12% per year for seasonal influenza over the 1997/98 to 2008/09 seasons, and 13% for the two H1N1/09 pandemic waves. Employees who took time off due to a seasonal influenza infection took an average of 14 hours off. For the pandemic strain, the average absence was 25 hours.</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>This study confirms that absenteeism due to seasonal influenza has typically ranged from 5% to 20%, with higher rates associated with multiple circulating strains. Absenteeism rates for the 2009 pandemic were similar to those occurring for seasonal influenza. Employees took more time off due to the pandemic strain than was typical for seasonal influenza.</p

    The Geographic Synchrony of Seasonal Influenza: A Waves across Canada and the United States

    Get PDF
    BACKGROUND: As observed during the 2009 pandemic, a novel influenza virus can spread globally before the epidemic peaks locally. As consistencies in the relative timing and direction of spread could form the basis for an early alert system, the objectives of this study were to use the case-based reporting system for laboratory confirmed influenza from the Canadian FluWatch surveillance program to identify the geographic scale at which spatial synchrony exists and then to describe the geographic patterns of influenza A virus across Canada and in relationship to activity in the United States (US). METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Weekly laboratory confirmations for influenza A were obtained from the Canadian FluWatch and the US FluView surveillance programs from 1997/98 to 2006/07. For the six seasons where at least 80% of the specimens were antigenically similar, we identified the epidemic midpoint of the local/regional/provincial epidemics and analyzed trends in the direction of spread. In three out of the six seasons, the epidemic appeared first in Canada. Regional epidemics were more closely synchronized across the US (3-5 weeks) compared to Canada (5-13 weeks), with a slight gradient in timing from the southwest regions in the US to northeast regions of Canada and the US. Cities, as well as rural areas within provinces, usually peaked within a couple of weeks of each other. The anticipated delay in peak activity between large cities and rural areas was not observed. In some mixed influenza A seasons, lack of synchronization sub-provincially was evident. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE: As mixing between regions appears to be too weak to force a consistency in the direction and timing of spread, local laboratory-based surveillance is needed to accurately assess the level of influenza activity in the community. In comparison, mixing between urban communities and adjacent rural areas, and between some communities, may be sufficient to force synchronization

    Estimating Sensitivity of Laboratory Testing for Influenza in Canada through Modelling

    Get PDF
    Background: The weekly proportion of laboratory tests that are positive for influenza is used in public health surveillance systems to identify periods of influenza activity. We aimed to estimate the sensitivity of influenza testing in Canada based on results of a national respiratory virus surveillance system. Methods and Findings: The weekly number of influenza-negative tests from 1999 to 2006 was modelled as a function of laboratory-confirmed positive tests for influenza, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), adenovirus and parainfluenza viruses, seasonality, and trend using Poisson regression. Sensitivity was calculated as the number of influenza positive tests divided by the number of influenza positive tests plus the model-estimated number of false negative tests. The sensitivity of influenza testing was estimated to be 33 % (95%CI 32–34%), varying from 30–40 % depending on the season and region. Conclusions: The estimated sensitivity of influenza tests reported to this national laboratory surveillance system is considerably less than reported test characteristics for most laboratory tests. A number of factors may explain this difference, including sample quality and specimen procurement issues as well as test characteristics. Improved diagnosis would permit better estimation of the burden of influenza

    Comparison of Statistical Algorithms for the Detection of Infectious Disease Outbreaks in Large Multiple Surveillance Systems

    Get PDF
    A large-scale multiple surveillance system for infectious disease outbreaks has been in operation in England and Wales since the early 1990s. Changes to the statistical algorithm at the heart of the system were proposed and the purpose of this paper is to compare two new algorithms with the original algorithm. Test data to evaluate performance are created from weekly counts of the number of cases of each of more than 2000 diseases over a twenty-year period. The time series of each disease is separated into one series giving the baseline (background) disease incidence and a second series giving disease outbreaks. One series is shifted forward by twelve months and the two are then recombined, giving a realistic series in which it is known where outbreaks have been added. The metrics used to evaluate performance include a scoring rule that appropriately balances sensitivity against specificity and is sensitive to variation in probabilities near 1. In the context of disease surveillance, a scoring rule can be adapted to reflect the size of outbreaks and this was done. Results indicate that the two new algorithms are comparable to each other and better than the algorithm they were designed to replace

    Using a Dynamic Model to Consider Optimal Antiviral Stockpile Size in the Face of Pandemic Influenza Uncertainty.

    Get PDF
    <label>BACKGROUND</label>The Canadian National Antiviral Stockpile (NAS) contains treatment for 17.5% of Canadians. This assumes no concurrent intervention strategies and no wastage due to non-influenza respiratory infections. A dynamic model can provide a mechanism to consider complex scenarios to support decisions regarding the optimal NAS size under uncertainty.<label>METHODS</label>We developed a dynamic model for pandemic influenza in Canada that is structured by age and risk to calculate the demand for antivirals to treat persons with pandemic influenza under a wide-range of scenarios that incorporated transmission dynamics, disease severity, and intervention strategies. The anticipated per capita number of acute respiratory infections due to viruses other than influenza was estimated for the full pandemic period from surveys based on criteria to identify potential respiratory infections.<label>RESULTS</label>Our results demonstrate that up to two thirds of the population could develop respiratory symptoms as a result of infection with a pandemic strain. In the case of perfect antiviral allocation, up to 39.8% of the population could request antiviral treatment. As transmission dynamics, severity and timing of the emergence of a novel influenza strain are unknown, the sensitivity analysis produced considerable variation in potential demand (median: 11%, IQR: 2-21%). If the next pandemic strain emerges in late spring or summer and a vaccine is available before the anticipated fall wave, the median prediction was reduced to 6% and IQR to 0.7-14%. Under the strategy of offering empirical treatment to all patients with influenza like symptoms who present for care, demand could increase to between 65 and 144%.<label>CONCLUSIONS</label>The demand for antivirals during a pandemic is uncertain. Unless an accurate, timely and cost-effective test is available to identify influenza cases, demand for antivirals from persons infected with other respiratory viruses will be substantial and have a significant impact on the NAS

    Projected range of treatment required depending on the level of vaccine coverage in the population.

    No full text
    <p>The proportion of the Canadian population expected to require antiviral treatment in the presence of a safe and effective pandemic vaccine when different vaccine coverage levels are considered [UIIP – Ontario Universal Influenza Immunization Program age-specific coverage, RRFSS – Ontario Rapid Risk Factor Surveillance System age-specific coverage estimates]. The dashed line represents the proportion of the Canadian population who would be able to be treated by our existing stockpile (17.5%).</p

    Projected range of treatment required depending on the transmissibility of the virus.

    No full text
    <p>The proportion of the Canadian population expected to require antiviral treatment for different combinations of model scenarios in the presence of a safe and effective pandemic vaccine when the reproductive number of the virus ranges from 1.3 to 2.0 [1.4 for seasonal influenza, 1.6–2.0 historical pandemic range]. The dashed line represents the proportion of the Canadian population who would be able to be treated by our existing stockpile (17.5%).</p

    Projected range of treatment required for different pandemic wave patterns.

    No full text
    <p>The median (line within the shaded box), 25<sup>th</sup> and 75<sup>th</sup> percentile values (top and bottom of shaded box), and upper and lower adjacent values (error bars) proportion of the Canadian population expected to require antiviral treatment (Y-axis) in the presence of a safe and effective pandemic vaccine that becomes available at different points in time (X-axis). We assumed that the proportion of clinical cases seeking medical attention for their illness was 50% (left) or 70% (right). The dashed line represents the proportion of the Canadian population who would be able to be treated by our existing stockpile (17.5%). A – Fall/Winter emergence, 1 wave; B – Spring emergence, 2 waves.</p

    Parameter values and assumptions used for the Canadian antiviral stockpile model.

    No full text
    <p>UIIP – Universal Influenza Immunization Program.</p><p>RRFSS – Rapid Risk Factor Surveillance System.</p>*<p>RRFSS Module – Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term Care and Public Health Ontario.</p
    • …
    corecore