The next generation of digital currencies: in search of stability. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue #15 December 2019

Four major developments have challenged the status quo and reopened the debate on the forms that money will take in the future: 1) use of cash as a medium of exchange has declined; 2) distributed ledger technology (DLT) has led to the emergence of thousands of digital cryptocurrencies; 3) some global tech giants are planning to provide private digital currencies to their billions of users in the form of stablecoins; and 4) in turn, public authorities are thinking about providing their own digital currencies to the general public. • These developments raise questions about the implications for financial stability, the transmission of monetary policy and financial intermediation. This Policy Contribution focuses on the consequences stablecoins and central bank digital currencies could have. • Stablecoins, such as Facebook’s Libra, differ from earlier generations of cryptocurrencies in three fundamental ways. First, they would start with large networks of users and global accessibility, two pivotal features for the critical uptake of a new currency. Second, given the current limitations of DLT, including in terms of energy efficiency, new stablecoins would rely on (more) centralised systems to validate transactions. Third, stablecoins would focus particularly on reducing the volatility in the value of the new currency. • These new features of stablecoins attempt to correct some of the critical deficiencies identified in first-generation cryptocurrencies, which meant they did not acquire the main functions of money. However, new stablecoins raise other questions and potentially create new problems. One issue could arise from the more centralised (permissioned) validation system, which could lead to collusion problems. Another issue could arise from the reserve system that is supposed to ensure the stability of stablecoins, such as Libra, which could be incompatible with the profit maximisation behaviour of a private issuer. • Facebook’s Libra plan has been a wake-up call to central banks and governments which, afraid of losing their monetary sovereignty, have renewed their interest in central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) as a potential solution. CBDCs could make private digital currencies less attractive and slow down their adoption. • But there are other reasons to give the general public access to central bank liabilities. One important reason to provide CBDCs to citizens is that if cash disappears, citizens will lose direct access to sovereign money. Another benefit of the introduction of CBDCs is that monetary policy could be strengthened by transmitting it directly to the general public. • However, the introduction of CBDCs could also be disruptive and create risks. In particular, CBDCs could have major consequences for financial intermediation. These risks would have to be evaluated by policymakers before any decisions are taken. • If CBDCs are introduced, central banks would have to carefully calibrate their properties to minimise these risks. But, eventually, if these risks – and in particular the risk of structural financial disintermediation – do materialise, central banks would have various instruments to counter the

Inflation Targets as Focal Points

In a world characterised by noisy information and conflicting signals, no Central Bank is always able to affect private sector expectations. Based on Morris and Shin's model, monetary policy then becomes an information game, in which individuals form their expectations based on all the information that is available to them (public and private). However individual agents also know that ultimately inflation is affected by both the objectives of the Central Bank (and hence the policies it pursues) as well as the average expectation formed by the all agents. They thus need to evaluate both actions. Central to our argument is the way that individuals interpret these actions to form their expectations. We apply Bacharach's methodology to provide a framework for assessing everyone's interpretations. Our contribution is to merge these two models to show that a monetary policy regime that has explicit quantitative objectives may provide individuals with better anchors for expectations to coordinate at. However, that is only true first, if no great shocks are anticipated to hit the economy and second, when all other public information is very unclear thus rendering the inflation target the only clear piece of information. We derive in detail the conditions under which this is true.

5. FACING THE LOWER BOUND: WHAT WILL THE ECB DO IN THE NEXT RECESSION? Bruegel Study 2020

In responding to the global financial crisis and its aftermath, the ECB has pushed its monetary policy into unchartered territories over the past decade. Today, it appears increasingly constrained by persistently low interest rates and the uncertainty of the environment it operates in. This paper seeks to understand these new challenges and assess whether its current toolkit will allow the ECB to weather the next European recession. We make five key recommendations: first, the ECB must find a way to mitigate the potentially negative effects of its negative interest rate policy; second, it must rethink the issuer limit on its asset purchase program; third, a review of its monetary policy framework is in order; fourth, it must be fully prepared to use its outright monetary transactions (OMT) program; and finally, more innovative unconventional policies might be necessary

Central Bank Transparency in Theory and Practice

We study the effects of Central Bank transparency on inflation and the output gap. We thus first identify a small analytical model which concludes that transparency affects the variability of inflation and output and not their average levels. Then we examine whether this conjecture holds empirically, employing the recently derived index of transparency by Eijffinger and Geraats. The empirical findings confirm that the averages are not affected by transparency. It does seem to explain however, about 50% of the variability in inflation. The relation between transparency and output volatility is less clear but appears to be positive rather than negative.central bank, economic and political transparency, inflation and output gap performance

When can an Independent Central Bank offer lower Inflation at no Cost? A Political Economy Analysis.

An Independent Central Bank is often associated with being able to achieve low inflation and greater output stability than government run policies. In this paper we examine whether, and under what circumstances, an independent Central Bank can achieve both these targets with only one policy instrument at its disposal. This turns out to be possible in some special cases, or sometimes for limited periods of time, but not in general. It is an outcome which arises when increasingly conservative policies reduce the 2 target, 1 instrument conflicts, rather than from the suppression of any political cycle.

Anchors for Inflation Expectations

We identify credible monetary policy with first, a disconnect between inflation and inflation expectations and second, the anchoring of the latter at the inflation target announced by the monetary authorities. We test empirically whether this is the case for a number of countries that have an explicit inflation target and therefore include the Euro Area. We find that for the last 10 year period, the two series are less dependent on each other and that announcing inflation targets help anchor expectations at the right level.Inflation Targets, Measures of Credibility

A Measure for Credibility: Tracking US Monetary Developments

Our objective is to identify a way of checking empirically the extent to which expectations are de-coupled from inflation, how well they might be anchored in the long run, and at what level. This methodology allows us then to identify a measure for the degree of anchorness, and as anchored expectations are associated with credibility, this will serve as a proxy for credibility. We apply this methodology to the US history of inflation since 1963 and examine how well our measure tracks the periods for which credibility is known to be either low or high. Of particular interest to the validity of the measure is the start of the Great Moderation. Following the narrative of a number of well documented incidents in this period, we check how well our measure captures both the evolution of credibility in US monetary policy, as well as reactions to inflation scares.Great Inflation, Great Moderation, Anchors for Expectations

Tackling Europe’s crisis legacy: a comprehensive strategy for bad loans and debt restructuring. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue No. 11 2017

From the Executive Summary. Eight years after the start of Europe’s financial crisis, the legacy of non-performing loans and excessive private debt remains a key obstacle to the recovery of bank credit and investment. We argue that efforts to reduce and remove NPLs from the balance sheets of creditors must simultaneously remove excess debt from the balance sheets of debtors. This is the only way to ensure that bank balance sheets are restored to health sustainably, and that both supply and demand for new credit revive