From Property Rights and Institutions, to Beliefs and Social Orders : Revisiting Douglass North’s Approach to Development

Douglass North is a uniquely creative and inspiring social scientist. The impact of North’s ideas in the area development cooperation can hardly be overstated. By stressing the role of institutions, this scholar has immensely influenced development thinking and practice, providing intellectual underpinnings to the dominant good governance paradigm. North’s landmark Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance is one of the most cited books in the social sciences. This paper contends, however, that North’s ideas are widely cited, but not always properly understood. Moreover, some of his core arguments have been overlooked, ignored, or misrepresented, not least by the aid community. This paper provides a systematic assessment of the content and evolution of North’s writings, from his pioneering works on property rights and institutions in the 1970s, to his recent scholarship on beliefs and political violence. The focus is on identifying the key analytical problems and remaining challenges of the institutional approach to development. The paper also takes issue with the inconsistencies and policy gaps of the good governance consensus. In doing so, it also reflects upon the future of the research program on institutions and development. Would the renewed emphasis on politics, conflict, inequality, and context lead to an improved governance agenda or to a shift towards a post-institutionalist paradigm?

Governing the Irish Economy : A Triple Crisis

The international economic crisis hit Ireland hard from 2007 on. Ireland’s membership of the Euro had a significant effect on the policy configuration in the run-up to the crisis, as this had shaped credit availability, bank incentives, fiscal priorities, and wage bargaining practices in a variety of ways. But domestic political choices shaped the terms on which Ireland experienced the crisis. The prior configuration of domestic policy choices, the structure of decision-making, and the influence of organized interests over government, all play a vital role in explaining the scale and severity of crisis. Indeed, this paper argues that Ireland has had to manage not one economic crisis but three – financial, fiscal, and competitiveness. Initial recourse to the orthodox strategies of spending cuts and cost containment did not contain the spread of the crisis, and in November 2010 Ireland entered an EU-IMF loan agreement. This paper outlines the pathways to this outcome

The European Context of Ireland’s Economic Crisis

The current economic crisis has hit all European countries hard, but some are more severely affected than others. The problems manifest in European peripheral countries that are also members of the Eurozone, that is, Ireland, Spain, and Greece, have roots in domestic policy mistakes. However, the European context of these policy profiles also needs to be taken into account. The creation of the Euro initially yielded large credibility gains for the weaker economies, extending low interest rates across the Eurozone. But it also introduced a set of perverse incentives toward fiscal expansion which were supposed to be managed at domestic level. Weak European coordinating capacity meant there were few effective external disciplines on national decision making. The sanctions built into the Stability and Growth Pact proved more controversial and, therefore, less constraining than originally envisaged. The problems accumulating in the weaker economies made them particularly exposed to crisis when the downturn came. The crisis is not merely one of peripheral economies’ policy errors, but extends to the design of European decision making and the management of monetary union, and to the underlying structural differences in relative trade capabilities between Eurozone member states. These issues are explored with reference to the Irish case: the crisis of the Irish and other peripheral economies points to a number of unresolved difficulties at the heart of European politics.

What determines the suspension of budget support in Sub-Saharan Africa?

This working paper examines what determines the suspension of budget support in Sub-Saharan Afric

The political economy of housing in England

Problems of housing affordability have been afflicting parts of the UK, especially the South East of England, for a number of years. The problem is closely related to shortages in housing supply, which are, in turn, largely associated with constraints imposed by the English land planning system. A leading theory for explaining these constraints posits that they reflect political economy forces that convey the interests of current homeowners to planning decisions in disproportionate and excessively influential ways. We test this theory by examining survey data on public attitudes to house building in local communities; and by investigating whether these attitudes are related to local planning decisions. We find that there is a tendency for owner-occupiers to express greater opposition to local house building and that, in the decade to 2011, the housing stock grew significantly less in local authorities with higher proportions of owner-occupiers among local households. The results suggest the risk that planning decisions might have been distorted in favour of current homeowners is real and economically significant. We discuss a range of historical, socio-economic and policy trends that help explain why successive governments of various stripes have been reluctant to address head-on problems in housing supply and put a curb on house prices

Parallel Lines? Policy Mood in a Plurinational Democracy

We usually think of democratic accountability in national terms – the people do not approve of a government, they can replace it. However, in a plurinational democracy it is not obvious that such a single national public exists. We consider this problem in the case of Scotland, providing the first application of the macro-polity approach to a plurinational democracy. We provide a systematic study of how public opinion in Scotland changes over time compared to that in the rest of Great Britain, using recently developed Bayesian IRT scaling techniques, and ask whether Scottish and British public opinion move in parallel. To the extent that there is a separate Scottish public opinion with a separate party system, this forces us to rethink the way that democracy and accountability work in plurinational political systems

Dynamics of Public Opinion and Policy Response under Proportional and Plurality Elections

We compare the patterns of adjustment of government policy to changes in public opinion in the Netherlands and the UK. These countries are similar in many ways, except that the UK has plurality elections and single-party government, while the Netherlands has proportional representation and coalition government. This provides the first application of the Macro Polity approach (Erikson et al., 2002) to a country with PR elections. We find that government policy in the Netherlands is highly responsive to public opinion. This cannot be the result of alternation of government, but instead must be the result of some other process, such as coalition bargaining. In the UK, however, the dynamic of adjustment is far more complex. Alternation of government does not produce responsiveness, but rather seems to get in the way of it. This leads to an over-correction dynamic in which policy can be out of line with public opinion for long periods of time

Elections rather than public opinion determine the broad direction of government policy

Does UK public policy respond to changes in public preferences? If so, is this the result of the government adjusting its agenda, or of unpopular governments being voted out and replaced by those more in line with public opinion? New research by John Bartle, Sebastian Dellepiane-Avellaneda, and Anthony McGann finds that voters' signals broadly work to guide parties to deliver what the electorate want, but with a risk of over-correction and some ‘fuzzing’ due to ‘valence’ issues

Financial resource curse in the Eurozone periphery

The housing booms and busts in Ireland and Spain were among the most striking episodes of the Eurozone crisis. While asset price inflation and financialization of housing was gathering pace across the developed world, these two ‘most different’ cases converged on the same outcome as the most extreme forms of construction-based bubbles. The key contributions of this paper are threefold. Firstly, we show how cheap credit can be understood as analogous to a natural resource such as oil: resource abundance generates a ‘paradox of plenty’ whereby an asset becomes a liability. Secondly, we open the black box of political pathways through which this happens, expanding our understanding of how perverse outcomes are produced. Thirdly, we account for why Spain and Ireland were more susceptible to extreme outcomes than other European countries, thereby extending our understanding of asymmetries in the political economy of the Eurozone

Pathways from the European Periphery : lessons from the political economy of development

The European economic crisis need not be considered as a problem that is sui generis. Drawing on literature from the political economy of development that centers on finance and monetary policy, we show that the economic vulnerabilities and policy predicaments facing the European periphery share many similarities with problems encountered by middle-income developing countries. Three main concerns guide our discussion: the politics of credible commitment, the significance of state capacity for stabilizing credibility, and the challenges of maintaining democratic legitimacy during times of financial volatility. Our analysis of the dynamics of hard currency pegs and monetary unions draws on lessons from the classic Gold Standard and on more recent experiences of financial crises in emerging markets. We consider how these may apply to the Eurozone periphery, before drawing out some implications for the problems of core–periphery relationships in European Monetary Union