The Parent Trap: Differential Familial Power in Same-Sex Families

Do intact same-sex couples where one member of the couple became pregnant with assisted reproduction or was the primary adopter, and the other member became a parent through second parent adoption, understand the legal protections afforded them? In short the answer is no. An interesting family dynamic arises around those who can claim the true status as parent based on their legal understandings of parenthood and their interactions with the dominant culture. While high profile custody cases on this issue have been decided in the United States with varying results, no research has examined the impact of uneven legal protections afforded to gay fathers and mothers on intact same-sex families, until now. The result of research conducted on this issue indicated that second parent adopters had much less emotional power in the family, but often had more economic power. Even in long-term stable relationships, non-biological mothers and second parent adoptive fathers expressed significant worries about this emotional power differential. On the other hand, biologically connected mothers and some primary adoptive fathers were concerned about whether their partners would continue to financially support their children should the couple\u27s relationship dissolve. Both parents had misconceptions about what kind of legal protections or obligations the law afforded these second parent adopters should the couple end their relationship. Furthermore, the families\u27 interactions with the larger culture served to further undermine the stability of the family, as they worried whether their family would be culturally and legally recognized if they traveled from one state to another. Ultimately, I conclude that second parent adopters become imprisoned parents within the family and across the larger culture because of current legal frameworks and policies. Recommendations are made for legislatures, courts, policy-makers, and lawyers to expand parentage presumptions, allow for joint adoption outside of the marital context, and reframe how lawyers counsel same-sex couples as they engage in family formation

Meeting Across the River: Why Affirmative Action Needs Race and Class Diversity

This paper is a response to Richard Sander’s latest work challenging the notion that race based affirmative action is still relevant and demanding that institutions of higher education consider class based affirmative action. To support his thesis, Sander conducts an empirical study on who benefits from affirmative action. This Article is divided into three sections, each containing a critique of Sander’s arguments and analysis. First, I briefly reframe and reiterate the history of race and ethnicity in affirmative action’s origins to directly confront the assumption that Sander makes about what affirmative action’s original purpose entailed. The goal of Part I is to correct the erroneous epistemology from which Sander’s study emerges: the entrenched de-contextualization of race and ethnicity as a means to supplant race with class in an effort to assert that high socioeconomic minorities are over-represented in law school admissions. Part II critiques the way in which Sander presents the data to create a narrative that supports his post-race argument rather than presenting them in the most transparent manner – thus allowing the data in their fullest form to reveal their story. Specifically, Sander ignores wealth as a key measure of socioeconomic status (SES), ignores the increasing data on racial inequality, and ignores the data indicating that class and race are not interchangeable. In Part III of this Article, I consider the arguments Sander continues to reify regarding the harms of affirmative action for students of color. Ultimately, I argue that while class and racial diversity should and do intersect, racial diversity should play a key role in higher education regardless of one’s SES. In addition, I argue that a central component of Sander’s goal is to perpetuate the myth of a colorblind society without confronting how best to use racial diversity within educational institutions. Finally, I address the role of wealth and its function in access to education

Meeting Across the River: Why Affirmative Action Needs Race and Class Diversity

This paper is a response to Richard Sander’s latest work challenging the notion that race based affirmative action is still relevant and demanding that institutions of higher education consider class based affirmative action. To support his thesis, Sander conducts an empirical study on who benefits from affirmative action. This Article is divided into three sections, each containing a critique of Sander’s arguments and analysis. First, I briefly reframe and reiterate the history of race and ethnicity in affirmative action’s origins to directly confront the assumption that Sander makes about what affirmative action’s original purpose entailed. The goal of Part I is to correct the erroneous epistemology from which Sander’s study emerges: the entrenched de-contextualization of race and ethnicity as a means to supplant race with class in an effort to assert that high socioeconomic minorities are over-represented in law school admissions. Part II critiques the way in which Sander presents the data to create a narrative that supports his post-race argument rather than presenting them in the most transparent manner – thus allowing the data in their fullest form to reveal their story. Specifically, Sander ignores wealth as a key measure of socioeconomic status (SES), ignores the increasing data on racial inequality, and ignores the data indicating that class and race are not interchangeable. In Part III of this Article, I consider the arguments Sander continues to reify regarding the harms of affirmative action for students of color. Ultimately, I argue that while class and racial diversity should and do intersect, racial diversity should play a key role in higher education regardless of one’s SES. In addition, I argue that a central component of Sander’s goal is to perpetuate the myth of a colorblind society without confronting how best to use racial diversity within educational institutions. Finally, I address the role of wealth and its function in access to education

Brilliant Disguise: An Empirical Analysis of a Social Experiment Banning Affirmative Action

The notion of a colorblind society captured the imagination of voters who passed propositions banning affirmative action in higher education admissions in California, Washington, more recently in Michigan, and on November 4th, in Nebraska. Affirmative action is no longer required, proponents assert, because society no longer judges people by their skin color. They argue that the need for affirmative action is a vestige of a bygone era, and such a policy only creates resentment and stigma. This paper confronts the colorblind ideal myths of stigma and resentment, which appear at much greater rates in anti-affirmative action states. In analyzing data from a national survey of 335 students majoring in the sciences, this paper tests the three main arguments of affirmative action opponents and finds: 1. that under-represented minorities experience far more hostility at institutions of higher learning in states that bar affirmative action in admissions than in those states that permit race-based admissions;2. that under-represented minority students encounter more external and internal stigma at institutions in states that ban race-based admissions; and3. students who experience critical mass by never being racially isolated in the classroom encounter the least amount of overt racism and stigma. Thus, contrary to what anti-affirmative action advocates argue, students of color endure silencing, the pressure of performing and the hostility of imposition in white spaces at a far greater rate in the states that espouse a colorblind ideal. Moreover, this paper raises questions about the court\u27s use of a diversity rationalization, the benefits of critical mass, and the effects of stereotype threat and makes recommendations

Use of Immigration Status for Coercive Control in Domestic Violence Protection Orders

In the context of domestic violence (DV), immigration-related circumstances can be exploited by an abuser to coerce and manipulate their partner. Using an intersectional structural framework, we examine how social structures overlaid with immigration-specific experiences operate to further enhance opportunities for abuse against immigrant women. We conducted a textual analysis to identify how socially constructed systems interact with a victim-survivor’s immigration status to introduce more tools for abusers to engage in coercive control and/or acts of violence in a random sample of petitioners (i.e., victim-survivors) who were granted a Domestic Violence Protection Order (DVPO) in King County, WA (n = 3,579) from 2014–2016 and 2018–2020. We hand-reviewed textual petitioner narratives and identified n = 39 cases that discussed immigration- related circumstances and related acts of violence and coercion. These narratives included threats to contact authorities to interfere with an ongoing immigration process, deportation threats, and threats that would separate families. In many cases, petitioners indicated that immigration-related threats prevented them from leaving the violent partner, seeking help, or reporting the abuse. We also found mention of barriers for victims to receive protection and gain autonomy from further abuse including a lack of familiarity with US protections and laws, and restrictions on authorizations to work. These findings demonstrate that structurally created immigration-specific circumstances provide opportunities for threats and retaliation against victim-survivors by abusers and create barriers to seeking help initially. Policy should respond to anticipate these threats in the immigrant community and engage early responders (e.g., healthcare providers, law enforcement) to support victim-survivors from immigrant communities

This is Your Sword: How Damaging Are Prior Convictions to Plaintiffs in Civil Trials?

The conventional wisdom in law is that a prior conviction is one of the most powerful and damaging pieces of evidence that can be offered against a witness or party. In legal lore, prior convictions seriously undercut the credibility of the witness and can derail the outcome of a trial. This Article suggests that may not always be true. This Article details the results of an empirical study of juror decision-making that challenges the conventional wisdom about prior convictions. In our study, the prior conviction evidence did not have a direct impact on the outcome of the civil trial or the credibility of the witness with the conviction. Moreover, we tested prior conviction evidence with a white witness and an African-American witness and saw no difference in results. The prior conviction evidence did, however, change the trial in a substantial, but indirect, way. Rather than the direct effect on outcome that we might have expected, the introduction of the prior conviction evidence changed the mental decision-making process of the jurors. Specifically, the evidence seemed to subconsciously lead the jurors to conclude that to decide liability, they had to believe one party over the other. The prior conviction evidence thus turned the trial into a zero-sum credibility contest wherein believing the plaintiffs story necessarily meant disbelieving the defendant\u27s (and vice versa). This zero-sum effect did not appear in the control version of the trial. In sum, the results of our experiment suggest that while prior convictions are highly noticeable and powerful pieces of evidence, they may not always be the bane that lawyers think they are. Nevertheless, the introduction of this evidence has the potential to change a civil trial by changing the juror decision-making process