Accounting for International War: The State of the Discipline

In studies of war it is important to observe that the processes leading to so frequent an event as conflict are not necessarily those that lead to so infrequent an event as war. Also, many models fail to recognize that a phenomenon irregularly distributed in time and space, such as war, cannot be explained on the basis of relatively invariant phenomena. Much research on periodicity in the occurrence of war has yielded little result, suggesting that the direction should now be to focus on such variables as diffusion and contagion. Structural variables, such as bipolarity, show contradictory results with some clear inter-century differences. Bipolarity, some results suggest, might have different effects on different social entities. A considerable number of studies analysing dyadic variables show a clear connection between equal capabilities among contending nations and escalation of conflict into war. Finally, research into national attributes often points to strength and geographical location as important variables. In general, the article concludes, there is room for modest optimism, as research into the question of war is no longer moving in non-cumulative circles. Systematic research is producing results and there is even a discernible tendency of convergence, in spite of a great diversity in theoretical orientations.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/69148/2/10.1177_002234338101800101.pd

The Power of the Weak: How Informal Power-Sharing Shapes the Work of the UN Security Council

To what extent is the work of international organizations shaped by their most powerful members? Can minor powers influence the decisions taken by these organizations? This dissertation presents the argument that great powers engage in power-sharing in order to attain unanimity inside international organizations, which enhances compliance and increases the effect of the signals these organizations convey to the public. The pursuit of unanimity lends weight even to votes that are not needed for the adoption of a proposal under the formal rules. It enables minor powers to exert more influence inside international organizations than they could if the formal rules and/or the balance of material power between member states determined the outcome of decision-making in international organizations. An analysis of the UN Security Council tests this argument. The dissertation identifies a series of informal power-sharing practices in the Security Council, which systematically depart from the organization's formal rules, and which promote consensus and augment minor powers' influence far beyond what one would expect on the basis of the material capabilities and voting power of these states. In turn, these informal power-sharing practices are motivated by great powers' desire to attain unanimous support for the policies enacted in the Security Council, irrespective of the body's formal voting rules. Survey experiments demonstrate the rationale behind great powers' pursuit of unanimity. They show that a policy's endorsement by a united Security Council has a much larger signaling effect on public opinion than the policy's approval by a divided Council. Qualitative case studies and novel design-based causal inference that exploits natural experiments show that minor powers strongly influence the deployment of UN peace operations and UN counter-terrorism sanctions, and that minor powers also use their influence in the Council to attain side-payments. Minor powers' influence is particularly strong during crises, when great powers are most eager to secure small states' votes through power-sharing. Interviews with diplomats in seven countries and quantitative analyses of exogenous variation in minor powers' representation on the Security Council under pre-determined rotation rules trace minor powers' influence to informal power-sharing practices in the Council