63 research outputs found
The Strategic Shuffle: Ethnic Geography, the Internal Security Apparatus, and Elections in Kenya
For autocrats facing elections, officers in the internal security apparatus play a crucial role by engaging in coercion on behalf of the incumbent. Yet reliance on these officers introduces a principal‐agent problem: Officers can shirk from the autocrat’s demands. To solve this problem, autocrats strategically post officers to different areas based on an area’s importance to the election and the expected loyalty of an individual officer, which is a function of the officer’s expected benefits from the president winning reelection. Using a data set of 8,000 local security appointments within Kenya in the 1990s, one of the first of its kind for any autocracy, I find that the president’s coethnic officers were sent to, and the opposition’s coethnic officers were kept away from, swing areas. This article demonstrates how state institutions from a country’s previous authoritarian regime can persist despite the introduction of multi‐party elections and thus prevent full democratization.Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/136510/1/ajps12279_am.pdfhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/136510/2/ajps12279.pd
High stakes and low bars: How international recognition shapes the conduct of civil wars
When rebel groups engage incumbent governments in war for control of the state, questions of international recognition arise. International recognition determines which combatants can draw on state assets, receive overt military aid, and borrow as sovereigns—all of which can have profound consequences for the military balance during civil war. How do third-party states and international organizations determine whom to treat as a state's official government during civil war? Data from the sixty-one center-seeking wars initiated from 1945 to 2014 indicate that military victory is not a prerequisite for recognition. Instead, states generally rely on a simple test: control of the capital city. Seizing the capital does not foreshadow military victory. Civil wars often continue for many years after rebels take control and receive recognition. While geopolitical and economic motives outweigh the capital control test in a small number of important cases, combatants appear to anticipate that holding the capital will be sufficient for recognition. This expectation generates perverse incentives. In effect, the international community rewards combatants for capturing or holding, by any means necessary, an area with high concentrations of critical infrastructure and civilians. In the majority of cases where rebels contest the capital, more than half of its infrastructure is damaged or the majority of civilians are displaced (or both), likely fueling long-term state weakness
The Production of Insecurity by African Security Forces: Insights from Liberia and the Central African Republic
Israeli Technical Assistance to Mrican Countries by Jehudi J. Kanarek Geneva, Geneva-Africa Institute, 1969. Pp. 115.
Third World Coups d'Etat and International Security. By Steven R. David (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987. xi, 191p. $22.50).
Chris Allen, Michael S. Radu, Keith Somerville and Joan Baxter, Benin, the Congo, Burkina Faso, London: Pinter Publishers, 1989, 300 pp., £25.00 hardcover, £9.95 paperback.
Naissance d'un Etat Noir: L'évolution politique et constitutionnelle du Dahomey, de la colonisation à nos jours. By Maurice A. Glele. (Paris: R. Pichon and R. Durand-Auzias, 1969. Pp. xii, 527. Approx. $10.00.)
Touaregs nigériens: unité culturelle et diversité régionale d'un peuple pasteur by Edmond Bernus Paris, Editions de I'Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre-Mer, 1981, Pp. 507.
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