Tying hands is not commitment: can fiscal rules and institutions really enhance fiscal discipline?

Visiting Bruegel Scholar, Xavier Debrun, discusses the role of fiscal institutions, including budget rules and non-partisan agencies, in enhancing fiscal discipline.

Implementing the stability and growth pact: enforcement and procedural flexibility

The paper proposes a theoretical analysis illustrating some key policy trade-offs involved in the implementation of a rules-based fiscal framework reminiscent of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The analysis offers some insights on the current debate about the SGP. Specifically, greater "procedural" flexibility in the implementation of existing rules may improve welfare, thus increasing the Pact’s political acceptability. Here, procedural flexibility designates the enforcer’s room to apply well-informed judgment on the basis of underlying policies and to set a consolidation path that does not discourage high-quality policy measures. Yet budgetary opaqueness may hinder the qualitative assessment of fiscal policy, possibly destroying the case for flexibility. Also, improved budget monitoring and greater transparency increase the benefits from greater procedural flexibility. Overall, we establish that a fiscal pact based on a simple deficit rule with conditional procedural flexibility can simultaneously contain excessive deficits, lower unproductive spending and increase high-quality outlays. JEL Classification: E62, H6deficits, fiscal rules, procedural flexibility, Stability and Growth Pact, structural reforms

Economic reforms in the euro area: is there a common agenda?

Visiting scholar Xavier Debrun, and Bruegel director Jean Pisani-Ferry contribute to the emerging discussion on reform strategies in the euro area. An earlier version of this note was presented to the Eurogroup Working Group of the Economic Policy Committee of the EU.

Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?

It is widely argued that Europe's unified monetary policy calls for the international coordination at the fiscal level. We survey the issues involved with such coordination of fiscal policy as a demand management tool and we use a simple model to investigate the circumstances under which coordination may be desirable. It turns out that coordination is beneficial when the correlation of the shocks hitting the various economies is low. However, given the potentially adverse reaction by the ECB (as a result of free-riding and/or a conflict on the orientation of the policy mix), fiscal coordination is likely to be counterproductive when demand or supply shocks are highly symmetric across countries and the governments are unable to acquire a strategic leadership position vis-à-vis the ECB.EMU, fiscal coordination, shocks, demand management

Safe public debt: Towards and operational definition

The paper proposes an operational definition of safe public debt levels and discusses various concrete approaches to calculate them. A public debt level is considered safe if it is associated with a low probability of reaching levels likely to generate significant economic costs within a given time frame. Like debt sustainability assessments, implementing such a broad definition requires medium-term projections of the debt-to-GDP ratio. This implies that different sets of plausible assumptions can yield fairly different "safe2 debt levels for the same country. However, the proposed framework has the merit to force policymakers and analysts to be explicit about the assumptions underlying their calculations

Government size and output volatility: should we forsake automatic stabilisation?

In this working paper, Xavier Debrun, Jean Pisani-Ferry and André Sapir explore the relationships between government size and output volatility. Whilst government size contributes to macroeconomic stabilisation, the slow down in output volatility of the 1980s and 90s was due more to a combination of monetary policy improvements and financial developments. That this decline was especially pronounced in small-government countries showed a reduction in the variance of primary income was more important than government transfers and that other channels of stabilisation were available for small-government countries. For most countries in the euro area, the impact of a marginal change in the size of government is bound to be small.

Primary Surplus Behavior and Risks to Fiscal Sustainability in Emerging Market Countries: A "Fan-Chart" Approach

This paper proposes a probabilistic approach to public debt sustainability analy-sis (DSA) using "fan charts." These depict the magnitude of risks-upside and downside-surrounding public debt projections as a result of uncertain economic conditions and policies. We propose a simulation algorithm for the path of public debt under realistic shock configurations, combining pure economic disturbances (to growth, interest rates, and exchange rates), the endogenous policy response to these, and the possible shocks arising from fiscal policy itself. The paper empha-sizes the role of fiscal behavior, as well as the structure of disturbances facing the economy and due to fiscal policy, in shaping the risk profile of public debt. Fan charts for debt are derived from the "marriage" between the pattern of shocks on the one hand and the endogenous response of fiscal policy on the other. Applications to Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey are used to illustrate the approach and its limitations. Copyright 2006, International Monetary Fund