Backwardation and Normal Backwardation in Energy Futures Markets: With an Application to Metallgesellschaft's Short-Dated Rollover Hedging of Long-Term Contracts

We show that, since the inception of energy futures markets, prices have on average exhibited backwardation. Normal backwardation has also been the norm, but, because of the low power of the standard tests, most researchers have concluded that the unbiased expectations model cannot be rejected. The fact that backwardation has been and (though somewhat more weakly) continues to be prevalent makes MGRM?s strategy of hedging long-term supply commitments with short-dated futures contracts look somewhat better than previous observers have argued. That said, it should be re-stressed that their strategy was a highly speculative one and its unraveling should have come as no great surprise. --

The dynamics of overconfidence: Evidence from stock market forecasters

As a group, market forecasters are egregiously overconfident. In conformity to the dynamic model of overconfidence of Gervais and Odean (2001), successful forecasters become more overconfident. What’s more, more experienced forecasters have “learned to be overconfident,” and hence are more susceptible to this behavioral flaw than their less experienced peers. It is not just individuals who are affected. Markets also become more overconfident when market returns have been high.

Backwardation and Normal Backwardation in Energy Futures Markets : With an Application to "Metallgesellschaft’s" Short-Dated Rollover Hedging of Long-Term Contracts

We show that, since the inception of energy futures markets, prices have on average exhibited backwardation. Normal backwardation has also been the norm, but, because of the low power of the standard tests, most researchers have concluded that the unbiased expectations model cannot be rejected. The fact that backwardation has been and (though somewhat more weakly) continues to be prevalent makes MGRM’s strategy of hedging long-term supply commitments with short-dated futures contracts look somewhat better than previous observers have argued. That said, it should be re-stressed that their strategy was a highly speculative one and its unraveling should have come as no great surprise

Bubbles in experimental asset markets: Irrational exuberance no more

The robustness of bubbles and crashes in markets for finitely lived assets is perplexing. This paper reports the results of experimental asset markets in which participants trade two assets. In some markets, price bubbles form. In these markets, traders will pay even higher prices for the asset with lottery characteristics, i.e., a claim on a large, unlikely payoff. However, institutional design has a significant impact on deviations in prices from fundamental values, particularly for an asset with lottery characteristics. Price run-ups and crashes are moderated when traders finance purchases of the assets themselves and are allowed to short sell.Financial markets ; Risk

The Response of Interest Rates to the Federal Reserve's Weekly Money Announcements: The "Puzzle" of Anticipated Money

Researchers, using the survey conducted by Money Market Services, Inc., have found that the anticipated component in the Federal Reserve's weekly money supply announcement is negatively correlated with the post- announcement change in market yields. We prove that eliminating a (downward) bias in the measure of anticipated money can, in theory, eliminate this puzzle, but that improving the efficiency of an already unbiased measure cannot. We find, using Canadian as well as U.S. interest rate data, that correcting the downward bias in the survey measure reduces, but does not eliminate, the role of anticipated money.

Emotion and financial markets

Psychologists and economists hold vastly different views about human behavior. Psychologists contend that economists' models bear little relation to actual behavior. This view is supported by a large body of psychological research that shows that emotional state can significantly affect decision making. ; Economists, on the other hand, argue that psychological studies have no theoretical basis and offer little empirical evidence about people's decision-making processes. The reigning financial economics paradigm-the efficient market hypothesis (EMH)-assumes that individuals make rational investment decisions using the rules of probability and statistics. A newer branch of financial economics called behavioral finance applies lessons from psychology to financial decision making, but most of these studies have focused on cognitive biases rather than emotion. ; The authors of this article argue that emotion has important, and possibly beneficial, influences on financial behavior. After defining the term emotion and describing how emotions can be categorized, the authors consider how emotions influence human behavior. The discussion focuses particularly on three aspects of emotion and financial decision making: emotional disposition and stock market pricing, the feeling of regret, and investors' emotional response to information. ; No new financial economics paradigm that incorporates behavioral influences and better models actual behavior has yet emerged to replace the EMH. Yet the authors believe that emotional behavior's influence on financial decision making should be taken into account in future research.Financial markets

The origins of bubbles in laboratory asset markets

In twelve sessions conducted in a typical bubble-generating experimental environment, we design a pair of assets that can detect both irrationality and speculative behavior. The specific form of irrationality we investigate is probability judgment error associated with low-probability, high-payoff outcomes. Independently, we test for speculation by comparing prices of identically paying assets in multiperiod versus single-period markets. When these tests indicate the presence of probability judgment error and speculation, bubbles are more likely to occur. This finding suggests that both factors are important bubble drivers.

The Dynamics of Overconfidence: Evidence from Stock Market Forecasters

As a group, market forecasters are egregiously overconfident. In conformity to the dynamic model of overconfidence of Gervais and Odean (2001), successful forecasters become more overconfident. What's more, more experienced forecasters have "learned to be overconfident", and hence are more susceptible to this behavioral flaw than their less experienced peers. It is not just individuals who are affected. Markets also become more overconfident when market returns have been high

Are time preference and risk preference associated with cognitive intelligence and emotional intelligence?

The authors investigated whether cognitive intelligence (intelligence quotient [IQ]) and emotional intelligence (emotional quotient [EQ]) meaningfully correlate with time preference and risk preference, finding solid evidence in support. In the realm of time preference, high-EQ individuals are less subject to present (or future) bias and more patient. Further, high-IQ subjects tend to exhibit preferences that conform to expected utility maximization. While recent research on the relationship between cognitive ability and preferences has provided important insights, the results suggest that both cognitive intelligence and emotional intelligence matter