Mutual Fund Tournaments: Evidence From Global And International Funds

For a sample of global and international equity mutual funds, we test the proposition that managers likely to end up as losers manipulate fund risk differently from interim winners. In contrast with Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) who found robust support for the tournament model, we found no evidence of tournament like behavior for international and global mutual funds. A possible explanation of this behavior is that investors in these funds are primarily seeking diversification and therefore are less sensitive to relative performance

Mutual Fund Tournaments: Evidence From Global And International Funds

For a sample of global and international equity mutual funds, we test the proposition that managers likely to end up as “losers” manipulate fund risk differently from interim winners. In contrast with Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) who found robust support for the tournament model, we found no evidence of tournament like behavior for international and global mutual funds. A possible explanation of this behavior is that investors in these funds are primarily seeking diversification and therefore are less sensitive to relative performance

Quantitative investment analysis, 3rd ed./ Richard A. DeFusco (et al)

xx, p. 609.: ill.; 27 c

Quantitative investment analysis, 3rd ed./ Richard A. DeFusco (et al)

xx, p. 609.: ill.; 27 c

The Effect of Executive Stock Option Plans on Stockholders and Bondholders.

Executive stock option plans have asymmetric payoffs that could induce managers to take on more risk. Evidence from traded call options and stock return data supports this notion. Implicit share price variance, computed from the Black-Scholes options pricing model, and stock return variance increase after the approval of an executive stock option plan. The event is accompanied by a significant positive stock and a negative bond market reaction. This evidence is consistent with the notion that executive stock options may induce a wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders. Copyright 1990 by American Finance Association.