Combinatorial Voting

We study elections that simultaneously decide multiple issues, where voters have independent private values over bundles of issues. The innovation is in considering nonseparable preferences, where issues may be complements or substitutes. Voters face a political exposure problem: the optimal vote for a particular issue will depend on the resolution of the other issues. Moreover, the probabilities that the other issues will pass should be conditioned on being pivotal. We prove that equilibrium exists when distributions over values have full support or when issues are complements. We then study large elections with two issues. There exists a nonempty open set of distributions where the probability of either issue passing fails to converge to either 1 or 0 for all limit equilibria. Thus, the outcomes of large elections are not generically predictable with independent private values, despite the fact that there is no aggregate uncertainty regarding fundamentals. While the Condorcet winner is not necessarily the outcome of a multi-issue election, we provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the implementation of the Condorcet winner. © 2012 The Econometric Society

The Condorcet Jur(ies) Theorem

Should two issues be decided jointly by a single committee or in separately by different committees? Similarly, should two defendants be tried together in a joint trial or tried separately in severed trials? Multiplicity of issues or defendants introduces novel strategic considerations. As in the standard Condorcet Jury Theorem, we consider large committees with common values and incomplete information. Our main result is that the joint trial by a single committee can aggregate information if and only if the severed trials by separate committees can aggregate information. Specifically, suppose that either for the joint trial or for the severed trials there exists an sequence of equilibria that implements the optimal outcome with probability approaching one as the number of voters goes to infinity. Then a sequence of equilibria with similar asymptotic efficiency exists for the other format. Thus, the advantage of either format cannot hinge on pure information aggregation with many signals

Incentives and Efficiency in Constrained Allocation Mechanisms

We study private-good allocation mechanisms where an arbitrary constraint delimits the set of feasible joint allocations. This generality provides a unified perspective over several prominent examples that can be parameterized as constraints in this model, including house allocation, roommate assignment, and social choice. We first characterize the set of two-agent strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms, showing that every mechanism is a "local dictatorship." For more than two agents, we leverage this result to provide a new characterization of group strategy-proofness. In particular, an N-agent mechanism is group strategy-proof if and only if all its two-agent marginal mechanisms (defined by holding fixed all but two agents' preferences) are individually strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. To illustrate their usefulness, we apply these results to the roommates problem to discover the novel finding that all group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms are generalized serial dictatorships, a new class of mechanisms. Our results also yield a simple new proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem

Local Priority Mechanisms

We introduce a novel family of mechanisms for constrained allocation problems which we call local priority mechanisms. These mechanisms are parameterized by a function which assigns a set of agents -- the local compromisers -- to every infeasible allocation. The mechanism then greedily attempts to match agents with their top choices. Whenever it reaches an infeasible allocation, the local compromisers move to their next favorite alternative. Local priority mechanisms exist for any constraint so this provides a method of constructing new designs for any constrained allocation problem. We give axioms which characterize local priority mechanisms. Since constrained object allocation includes many canonical problems as special constraints, we apply this characterization to show that several well-known mechanisms, including deferred acceptance for school choice, top trading cycles for house allocation, and serial dictatorship can be understood as instances of local priority mechanisms. Other mechanisms, including the Boston mechanism, are not local priority mechanisms. We give necessary and sufficient conditions which characterize the local priority mechanisms that are group strategy-proof. As an application, we construct novel mechanisms for a natural variation of the house allocation problem where no existing class of mechanisms besides serial dictatorship would be applicable

Transcriptional landscape of epithelial and immune cell populations revealed through FACS-seq of healthy human skin.

Human skin consists of multiple cell types, including epithelial, immune, and stromal cells. Transcriptomic analyses have previously been performed from bulk skin samples or from epithelial and immune cells expanded in cell culture. However, transcriptomic analysis of bulk skin tends to drown out expression signals from relatively rare cells while cell culture methods may significantly alter cellular phenotypes and gene expression profiles. To identify distinct transcriptomic profiles of multiple cell populations without substantially altering cell phenotypes, we employed a fluorescence activated cell sorting method to isolate keratinocytes, dendritic cells, CD4+ T effector cells, and CD8+ T effector cells from healthy skin samples, followed by RNA-seq of each cell population. Principal components analysis revealed distinct clustering of cell types across samples, while differential expression and coexpression network analyses revealed transcriptional profiles of individual cell populations distinct from bulk skin, most strikingly in the least abundant CD8+ T effector population. Our work provides a high resolution view of cutaneous cellular gene expression and suggests that transcriptomic profiling of bulk skin may inadequately capture the contribution of less abundant cell types

Designing rigid carbon foams

We use ab initio density functional calculations to study the stability, elastic properties and electronic structure of sp2 carbon minimal surfaces with negative Gaussian curvature, called schwarzites. We focus on two systems with cubic unit cells containing 152 and 200 carbon atoms, which are metallic and very rigid. The porous schwarzite structure allows for efficient and reversible doping by electron donors and acceptors, making it a promising candidate for the next generation of alkali ion batteries. We identify schwarzite structures that act as arrays of interconnected quantum spin dots or become magnetic when doped. We introduce two interpenetrating schwarzite structures that may find their use as the ultimate super-capacitor.Comment: 6 pages, 5 figure

Enantioselective Synthesis of the Lomaiviticin Aglycon Full Carbon Skeleton Reveals Remarkable Remote Substituent Effects During the Dimerization Event

Chemistry and Chemical Biolog

Spin Hall torque magnetometry of Dzyaloshinskii domain walls

Current-induced domain wall motion in the presence of the Dzyaloshinskii-Moriya interaction (DMI) is experimentally and theoretically investigated in heavy-metal/ferromagnet bilayers. The angular dependence of the current-induced torque and the magnetization structure of Dzyaloshinskii domain walls are described and quantified simultaneously in the presence of in-plane fields. We show that the DMI strength depends strongly on the heavy metal, varying by a factor of 20 between Ta and Pa, and that strong DMI leads to wall distortions not seen in conventional materials. These findings provide essential insights for understanding and exploiting chiral magnetism for emerging spintronics applications