The Robustness of ‘Enemy-of-My-Enemy-is-My-Friend’ Alliances

This paper examines the robustness of alliance formation in a three-player, two-stage game in which each of two players compete against a third player in disjoint sets of contests. Although the players with the common opponent share no common interests, we find that under the lottery contest success function (CSF) there exists a range of parameter configurations in which the players with the common opponent have incentive to form an alliance involving a pre-conflict transfer of resources. Models that utilize the lottery CSF typically yield qualitatively different results from those arising in models with the auction CSF (Fang 2002). However, under the lottery and the auction CSFs, the parameter configurations within which players with a common opponent form an alliance are closely related. Our results, thus, provide a partial robustness result for ‘enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend’ alliances.Alliance Formation, Contests, Economics of Alliances, Conflict

Homomorphisms of Strongly Regular Graphs

We prove that if $G$ and $H$ are primitive strongly regular graphs with the same parameters and $\varphi$ is a homomorphism from $G$ to $H$, then $\varphi$ is either an isomorphism or a coloring (homomorphism to a complete subgraph). Therefore, the only endomorphisms of a primitive strongly regular graph are automorphisms or colorings. This confirms and strengthens a conjecture of Cameron and Kazanidis that all strongly regular graphs are cores or have complete cores. The proof of the result is elementary, mainly relying on linear algebraic techniques. In the second half of the paper we discuss implications of the result and the idea underlying the proof. We also show that essentially the same proof can be used to obtain a more general statement.Comment: strengthened main result, shortened proof of main resul

Sabidussi Versus Hedetniemi for Three Variations of the Chromatic Number

We investigate vector chromatic number, Lovasz theta of the complement, and quantum chromatic number from the perspective of graph homomorphisms. We prove an analog of Sabidussi's theorem for each of these parameters, i.e. that for each of the parameters, the value on the Cartesian product of graphs is equal to the maximum of the values on the factors. We also prove an analog of Hedetniemi's conjecture for Lovasz theta of the complement, i.e. that its value on the categorical product of graphs is equal to the minimum of its values on the factors. We conjecture that the analogous results hold for vector and quantum chromatic number, and we prove that this is the case for some special classes of graphs.Comment: 18 page

Fractional Zero Forcing via Three-color Forcing Games

An $r$-fold analogue of the positive semidefinite zero forcing process that is carried out on the $r$-blowup of a graph is introduced and used to define the fractional positive semidefinite forcing number. Properties of the graph blowup when colored with a fractional positive semidefinite forcing set are examined and used to define a three-color forcing game that directly computes the fractional positive semidefinite forcing number of a graph. We develop a fractional parameter based on the standard zero forcing process and it is shown that this parameter is exactly the skew zero forcing number with a three-color approach. This approach and an algorithm are used to characterize graphs whose skew zero forcing number equals zero.Comment: 24 page