Federal Minimum Wage, Tax-Transfer Earnings Supplements, and Poverty

[Excerpt] This report focuses on the impact of minimum wage and tax-transfer earnings supplements for workers of different family types. It does so through illustrating how the minimum wage and federal tax-transfer policies affect the income of a minimum wage worker who works full-time, full-year in four different family types: a single childless worker; a worker supporting a married couple; a single mother with two children; and a married couple with two children. These family types are chosen to highlight the different treatment federal tax-transfer policies have on workers of different family types. They were not chosen as representative of most minimum wage workers. The illustrations show the impact of policies on two childless workers—one married, one not. They also show the impact of two workers with children—one married, one not. The report highlights how policies differ between families with children, and families without children. This report supplements these illustrations with some background on policies, as well as some policy considerations that apply generally to debates on the minimum wage and tax-transfer policies. Full-year, full-time work at the minimum wage is not common. In 2012, 32% of workers earning the minimum wage worked full-time. Again, the illustrations were not chosen to be representative of most minimum wage workers. Full-time, full-year work was chosen for illustrative purposes. Additionally, the income produced by full-time, full year work at the minimum wage is an important policy benchmark, as it reflects the federally-determined minimum income for someone with full-time involvement in the labor force. This report • describes current law minimum wage and tax-transfer earnings supplement policies; • provides the illustrations of gross earnings and net income (after taxes and SNAP benefits) for full-time full-year minimum wage workers at both the current minimum wage ($7.25 per hour) and the proposed$10.10 minimum wage; and • discusses some of the policy implications of addressing poverty through both the minimum wage and federally-funded earnings supplements

Institutions and Contract Enforcement

We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions – dismissal barriers, and bonus pay – affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and market efficiency, by interfering with firms' use of firing threat as an incentive device. Dismissal barriers also distort the dynamics of worker effort levels over time, cause firms to rely more on the spot market for labor, and create a distribution of relationship lengths in the market that is more extreme, with more very short and more very long relationships. The introduction of a bonus pay option dramatically changes the market outcome. Firms are observed to substitute bonus pay for threat of firing as an incentive device, almost entirely offsetting the negative incentive and efficiency effects of dismissal barriers. Nevertheless, contract enforcement behavior remains fundamentally changed, because the option to pay bonuses causes firms to rely less on long-term relationships. Our results show that market outcomes are the result of a complex interplay between contract enforcement policies and the institutions in which they are embedded

Implicit Contracts, Unemployment, and Labor Market Segmentation

We analyze the impact of imperfect contract enforcement on the emergence of unemployment. In an experimental labor market where trading parties can form long-term employment relationships, we compare a work environment where effort is observable, but not verifiable to a situation where explicit contracts are feasible. Our main result shows that unemployment is much higher when third-party contract enforcement is absent. Unemployment is involuntary, being caused by firms' employment and contracting policy. Moreover, we show that implicit contracting can lead to a segmentation of the labor market. Firms in both segments earn similar profits, but workers in the secondary sector face much less favorable conditions than their counterparts in primary-sector jobs.incentives, implicit contracts, unemployment, fairness, dual labor markets

Drivers of topsoil saturated hydraulic conductivity in three contrasting landscapes in Kenya

Markförsämring i tropiska regioner kan ha förödande konsekvenser för vattentillgänglighet. Vattenkvalité och kvantitet är oerhört viktiga för lokalbefolkningar och är grundförutsättningar för socioekonomisk utveckling då stora delar av befolkningen i många tropiska länder är direkt beroende av jordbruk och boskapshållning för sin inkomst. En strategi för att öka mängden tillgängligt vatten i torra tropiska ekosystem är att öka hastigheten och kvantiteten av vattennederbörd som infiltreras i jorden. Olika faktorer samspelar i infiltrationskapaciteten, däribland vegetation, jordart och markanvändning. Förståelsen för hur olika variabler påverkar markens hydrologiska funktioner på landskapsnivå är begränsad. Det behövs mer forskning kring hur biologisk mångfald och vegetationsmängd påverkar infiltration. En vetenskaplig förståelse för hur dessa variabler påverkar infiltrationskapacitet är avgörande för effektiviteten av restaureringsinitiativ i tropiska områden som har försämrade vattentillgångar. Syftet med detta examensarbete är att undersöka huvudfaktorerna som påverkar infiltrationskapacitet i tre kontrasterande lokaler i Kenya, för att förstå vad som driver infiltration på en övergripande landskapsnivå. Linjära mixade modeller användes för att urskilja de viktigaste variablerna både i, och mellan de tre lokalerna. Variabler relaterade till markegenskaper, vegetationsmängd, funktionell biodiversitet, markanvändning och markförsämring inkluderades i modellerna. Resultaten visade att de statistiskt viktigaste variablerna var jordart, markanvändning, erosion och funktionell biodiversitet, för den modell som beskrev alla tre lokaler. Tre ytterligare modeller konstruerades och kunde påvisa att resultaten på enskild lokalnivå var annorlunda, då infiltrationskapaciteten i grovkornig jord var mest påverkad av jordart. I finkornig jord var andra variabler viktigare, så som markanvändning och markförsämring. Infiltrationskapaciteten är naturligt högre i grovkornig jord, därför har restaureringsinitiativ minimal effekt. Finkornig jord har lägre infiltrationskapacitet som i högre utsträckning skulle kunna påverkas av anpassad restaurering inriktad på att öka befintlig vegetation och minimera markanvändning som leder till markförsämring. Den här studien visar att olikheter i infiltrationskapacitet är relaterade till markegenskaper, vilket understryker behovet av restaureringsinitiativ som är anpassade till lokala förhållanden.Land degradation in the tropics has severe impacts on the availability of water and can lead to decreased rates of infiltration. Reduced infiltrability leads to less water availability, which negatively impacts livelihoods and hinders socioeconomic development. Understanding the drivers of infiltrability is essential for managing landscapes in the tropics, particularly when implementing restoration measures to improve soil hydrological function. The aim of this thesis is to identify the factors driving infiltrability across three different landscapes in Kenya. Linear mixed effects models were conducted to identify the main factors affecting infiltrability across and within sites, based on data from the Land Degradation Surveillance Framework. Variables related to inherent soil properties, land use, land degradation, functional diversity and vegetation cover were included in the model. Results indicate that the main factors increasing infiltrability across the three sites are land use, functional evenness and soil texture, while erosion decreases infiltrability. In coarse-grained soils, texture is the dominating factor while in finegrained soils land use and degradation are more important. Hence, as infiltrability is inherently high in coarse-grained soils, improving soil hydrological function is not necessary. On the contrary, fine-grained soils have lower infiltrability that can be improved by adaptive restoration measures that target increasing continuous vegetation cover and minimizing land use practices that lead to land degradation. Therefore, this study demonstrates that differences in infiltrability are related to inherent soil properties, which emphasize the need for restoration measures adapted to an understanding of local site conditions

Institutions and Contract Enforcement

We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions – dismissal barriers, and bonus pay - affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and market efficiency, by interfering with firms’ use of firing threat as an incentive device. Dismissal barriers also distort the dynamics of worker effort levels over time, cause firms to rely more on the spot market for labor, and create a distribution of relationship lengths in the market that is more extreme, with more very short and more very long relationships. The introduction of a bonus pay option dramatically changes the market outcome. Firms are observed to substitute bonus pay for threat of firing as an incentive device, almost entirely offsetting the negative incentive and efficiency effects of dismissal barriers. Nevertheless, contract enforcement behavior remains fundamentally changed, because the option to pay bonuses causes firms to rely less on long-term relationships. Our results show that market outcomes are the result of a complex interplay between contract enforcement policies and the institutions in which they are embedded.institutions, contracts, contract enforcement, market experiment

Institutions and Contract Enforcement

We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions – dismissal barriers, and bonus pay – affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and market efficiency, by interfering with firms' use of firing threat as an incentive device. Dismissal barriers also distort the dynamics of worker effort levels over time, cause firms to rely more on the spot market for labor, and create a distribution of relationship lengths in the market that is more extreme, with more very short and more very long relationships. The introduction of a bonus pay option dramatically changes the market outcome. Firms are observed to substitute bonus pay for threat of firing as an incentive device, almost entirely offsetting the negative incentive and efficiency effects of dismissal barriers. Nevertheless, contract enforcement behavior remains fundamentally changed, because the option to pay bonuses causes firms to rely less on long-term relationships. Our results show that market outcomes are the result of a complex interplay between contract enforcement policies and the institutions in which they are embedded.employment protection, efficiency wages, bonus pay, incomplete contracts, firing costs, experiment

Institutions and Contract Enforcement

We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions – dismissal barriers, and bonus pay – affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and market efficiency, by interfering with firms' use of firing threat as an incentive device. Dismissal barriers also distort the dynamics of worker effort levels over time, cause firms to rely more on the spot market for labor, and create a distribution of relationship lengths in the market that is more extreme, with more very short and more very long relationships. The introduction of a bonus pay option dramatically changes the market outcome. Firms are observed to substitute bonus pay for threat of firing as an incentive device, almost entirely offsetting the negative incentive and efficiency effects of dismissal barriers. Nevertheless, contract enforcement behavior remains fundamentally changed, because the option to pay bonuses causes firms to rely less on long-term relationships. Our results show that market outcomes are the result of a complex interplay between contract enforcement policies and the institutions in which they are embedded.incomplete contracts; bonus pay; efficiency wages; employment protection; firing costs; experiment

Using Imprecise Tags of CP Eigenstates in B(s) and the Determination of the CKM Phase gamma

We consider the possibility of studying the CP properties of various B(s) decays at an electro-positron machine tuned to the Upsilon(5s). Since decay modes of the B(s) with definite CP are relatively rare, we suggest that the use of more common modes which are not pure CP eigenstates may allow the determination of the CKM phase gamma. By studying the degree of correlation between different decay modes at a Upsilon(5s) it is possible to determine the degree of affinity of each decay mode to a CP eigenstate. Once this is known, the correlation between a decay mode with a greater affinity to a particular CP eigenstate with a mode such as D(s) + K- gives a determination of the phase gamma.Comment: 12 pages; In version 2, we have corrected some typos and equation 13 as well as adding some reference

Are Risk Aversion and Impatience Related to Cognitive Ability?

This paper investigates whether risk aversion and impatience are correlated with cognitive ability. We conduct incentive compatible choice experiments measuring risk aversion, and impatience over an annual time horizon, for a representative sample of roughly 1,000 German adults. A measure of cognitive ability is provided by two submodules of one of the most widely used IQ tests. Interviews are conducted in subjects'' own homes. We find that lower cognitive ability is associated with greater risk aversion, and more pronounced impatience. These relationships are statistically and economically significant, and robust to controlling for personal characteristics, educational attainment, income, and measures of liquidity constraints. We perform a series of additional robustness checks, which help rule out other possible confounds.Economics ;