Conclusion : Où allons-nous en études stratégiques? Les dix commandements du « nouveau stratège »

If Strategic Studies are to progress and remain relevant as a fîeld of social sciences and a sub-field of international relations, they have to be more pluralistic, interdisciplinary and innovative. If there is no work at these three levels, strategic thought may become more and more marginalized This short paper defines ten ways by which the "new strategist" may reform and help the cause of strategic Studies

Introduction : La crise des études stratégiques

The young field of strategic studies has difficulties establishing a solid consensus on its purpose, basic philosophy and main concepts, because the definitions and meanings given to the nature of research in that field are largely controversial. Strategists have serious problems in addressing the criticisms that are made of the fundamental assumptions and theories that underline strategic studies. This paper explores the causes and implications of a crisis which now permeates heavily the development of the field

La théorie du culte de l’offensive et la formulation des choix stratégiques

The theory of the Cult of the Offensive clearly stands out among the most recent works being conducted in Strategic Studies. The aim of this article is to better understand this new theoretical contribution by looking at its strengths and weaknesses, and by applying it to the case of the evolving American naval strategy. The central elements of this approach will be analysed in order to explain the significant growth that the American Navy has experienced since the start of the 1980s. In this manner, it will be possible to perceive as much the applicability of this theory as the relevance of the case study, to show the value of strategic studies as a field which seeks a greater understanding of strategic choices

L’évolution de la doctrine nucléaire américaine de contreforce

There has been a tendency lately in the United States to talk about the breakdown of the domestic consensus on the purpose of American nuclear strategy. The Reagan administration policies have been largely responsible for the growing felt need by many to question the doctrine and plans underlining that strategy. Why did the erosion of the strategic consensus take place ? One explanation examined in this paper is that the U.S. government has appeared in its nuclear strategy to emphasize more and more counterforce and limited nuclear war plans as its nuclear weapons policy, and therefore has become increasingly receptive to the idea that atomic bombs can be treated like conventional weapons and thought in ways characteristic of the pronuclear world. The central purpose of this article is to analyze how those two phenomenons - the attractiveness of counterforce and the erosion of the strategic consensus - are related to one another. The evolution of the doctrine of counterforce is assessed through a survey of the literature from 1974 to 1984, and particularly from 1980 with the coming to power of the Reagan administration